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V 


RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 


THE    MACMILLAN    COMPANY 

NEW  YORK    •    BOSTON    •    CHICAGO    •    DAIXAS 
ATLANTA    •    SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO..  Limited 

LONDON    •    BOMBAY    •    CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OP  CANADA.  Ltd. 

TORONTO 


RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 


BY 

LEO  PASVOLSKY 

AUTHOE   OF   "THE  ECONOMICS   OF    COMMUNISM" 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1922 

All  rights  reserved 


FEINTED  IN   THE   UNITED  STATES  OF  AMERICA 


t36 


COPTRIGHT,    1922, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 
Set  up  and  printed.     Published  January,   1922. 


Presg  of 

J.  J.  Little  &  Ives  Company 

New  York,  U.  S.  A. 


PREFACE 

As  this  book  goes  to  press,  the  Washington  Confer- 
ence on  the  Limitation  of  Armament  is  still  in  session, 
with  the  question  of  Siberia  on  that  part  of  the  agenda, 
which  the  Conference  has  not  as  yet  reached.  The 
book,  therefore,  does  not  contain  the  actual  decisions 
of  the  Conference  on  the  Russian  question.  It  appears 
likely  that  these  decisions  will  be  entirely  within  the 
scope  of  the  American  position  with  regard  to  the 
"moral  trusteeship"  over  Russia's  national  interests, 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  deliberations  at  the  Con- 
ference will  push  to  the  fore  many  aspects  of  the 
Russian  situation  in  the  Far  East.  It  is  hoped,  there- 
fore, that  this  book  will  furnish  a  background  for  a 
clearer  understanding  of  this  important  situation. 

Materials  on  the  various  Russian  phases  of  the  Far 
Eastern  question  are  not  easily  available  in  this  country, 
and  their  interpretation  is  most  difficult.  I  wish  to 
express  my  gratitude  to  those  who  have  helped  me  with 
suggestion  and  advice,  and  to  thank  particularly  my 


vi  PREFACE 

friend,  Professor  Samuel  N.  Harper  of  the  University 
of  Chicago,  for  his  invaluable  cooperation. 

Leo  Pasvolsky. 
Washington,  D.  C, 

December  20,  1921 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

I  Russia  and  the  Washington  Conference      ...        1 

The  Russian  Question  in  Paris  and  in  Washing- 
ton.— The  idea  of  "Moral  Trusteeship." — Three 
Conceptions  of  Russia. — The  Purpose  of  the  Book. 

II  Russian  Expansion  in  Asia 9 

Early  Explorations. — The  Acquisition  of  the  Far 
East. — The  Colonization  of  Siberia. 

III  Relations  with  China  and  Japan 21 

Chinese-Japanese  Conflicts  over  Korea. — The  Be- 
ginning of  Russian  Imperialism. — Russo-Japanese 
Rivalry  in  Korea. — The  Boxer  Uprising. — Far 
Eastern  Agreements  Preceding  the  Russo-Japanese 
War. — The  War  between  Russia  and  Japan. 

IV  Treaty  Arrangements  in  the  Far  East  ...  37 
Russia  and  Japan  after  the  War. — The  Ports- 
mouth Treaty. — The  Fisheries  and  the  General 
Political  Conventions. — The  Russo-Japanese  Se- 
cret Treaties. — Russia's  Activities  in  Mongolia. — 
The  Kyakhta  Agreement. 

V  The  Bolsheviki  and  the  Japanese  in  Siberu  .     .       56 

Siberia  during  the  Revolution. — The  Activities 
of  the  Japanese  Troops. — The  Idea  of  the  "Buffer" 
State. — The  Far  Eastern  Republic. 

VI  The  Third  International  in  Asia 71 

Its  General  Aims  and  Purposes. — The  Baku  Con- 
gress.— Communist  Activities  in  the  Near  East. — ■ 
The  Soviet  Diplomacy  in  China. — Communist 
Activities  in  India  and  Afghanistan. 


viii  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  PAGE 

VII  The  Soviet  Strategy  in  the  Far  East  ...  99 
The  Transfer  of  the  Emphasis  of  Communist  Ac- 
tivities from  the  Near  to  the  Far  East. — The 
Kamchatka  Incident. — The  Overthrow  of  the  Au- 
thority of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  in  Vladivo- 
stok.— The  Soviet  Troops  in  Mongolia. — The  So- 
viets Banking  on  a  War  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States. 

VIII  The  So\7et  Far  Eastern  Conference  .     .     .     122 
The  Development  of  the  Idea. — The  Dairen  Con- 
ference.— The  Soviet  Analysis  of  the  Situation. — 

""  Relations  between  China  and  the  Soviets. 

IX  Russia's  National  Interests  in  the  Far  East  .     138 
National  Interests  vs.  Imperialistic  Aggression. — 
Territorial     Integrity. — National     Sovereignty. — 
Economic    Cooperation   with    Foreign   Powers, — 
Japan  and  the  United  States  in  Siberia. 

X  Russia's  Role  in  a  World  Balance  of  Powers  .     .     147 

The  World  Equilibrium. — The  New  Importance 
of  the  Pacific  Basin. — The  Six  Principal  Factors 
in  the  World  Situation. — Communist  Russia  as  a 
Supernational  Factor. — The  Results  of  Commun- 
ist Activities  in  Asia. — The  Probable  Character 
of  Reconstructed  Russia. — The  United  States  and 
Russia  as  the  Upholders  of  the  World  Peace. 

APPENDIX :  Text  of  Treaties  and  Documents  .     .  163 

I  Russia  and  Japan 163 

A.  Political  Convention  of  1907 163 

B.  Secret  Treaty  of  1916 165 

C.  Secret  Telegram  of  the  Russian  Ambassador  at 
Tokyo  Regarding  the  Lansing-Ishii  Agreement  168 

D.  Chicherin's  Note  on  the  Far  East  ....     170 

II  Russia  and  China 174 

A.  Russo-Mongolian-Chinese   Convention    .     .     .     174 


CONTENTS  ix 


B.  Appeal   of  the   Revolutionary   Government   of 

Mongolia 176 

C  Chicherin's  Reply  to  the  Appeal  of  the  Revolu- 
tionary  Government   of   Mongolia    ....     177 

D.  Soviet  Note  on  Chinese-Mongolian  Relations     180 


RUSSIA 
IN  THE  FAR  EAST 


CHAPTEK   I 

RUSSIA  AND  THE   WASHINGTON   CONFEEENCE 

Russia  is  not  represented  at  the  Washington  Confer- 
ence. For  the  second  time  since  the  termination  of 
the  World  War,  an  international  conference  of  far- 
reaching  importance  takes  place  with  Russia  absent 
from  the  conference  table.  So  it  was  in  Paris  in  1919 ; 
so  it  is  in  Washington  in  1921.  Yet  there  is  a  vast 
difference  between  the  conditions  attending  these  two 
instances  when  Russia  is  not  present  at  a  world  con- 
clave of  nations. 

At  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris  no  serious  attempt 
was  made  to  face  squarely  the  problems  presented  by 
the  state  of  affairs  that  had  become  established  in 
Russia  as  a  result  of  her  Communist  regime.  The 
Conference  dealt  with  problems  resulting  directly  from 


2  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAH,  EAST 

the  World  War,  in  whicli  Russia  was  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal participants  and  in  which  she  suffered  losses  at 
least  as  great  as  any  of  her  Allies.  She  had  vital  and 
direct  interests  at  stake,  which  demanded  determination 
and  for  which  some  provisions  had  to  be  made.  Yet 
no  such  determination  of  Russia's  interests  was  made; 
no  such  provision  for  the  eventual  satisfaction  of  these 
interests  was  attempted.  What  the  Conference  really 
did  was  to  make  every  effort  to  push  the  Russian  ques- 
tion into  the  background  and  leave  it  there  hanging  in 
the  air. 

Almost  throughout  the  duration  of  the  Paris  Con- 
ference the  great  powers  which  controlled  it  never 
seemed  either  decided  or  in  accord  even  on  the  question 
of  Russia's  representation  at  the  conference  table. 
They  attempted  the  Prinkipo  Conference  of  different 
Russian  groups.  Russia  was  then  in  the  throes 
of  a  civil  war,  and  the  differences  between  the  combatant 
groups  were  obviously  of  such  a  nature  as  could  not 
be  composed  by  means  of  the  kind  of  conference  pro- 
posed from  Paris.  After  the  Prinkipo  attempt  at 
solving  the  Russian  problem,  the  Paris  Conference 
permitted  the  question  to  drop  altogether.  Occasionally 
this  question  would  come  up  in  the  deliberations  of  the 
great  powers,  but  never  either  for  action  or  for  any 


RUSSIA  AND  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE   3 

direct  and  binding  declaration.  For  weeks  the  Con- 
ference conducted  an  exchange  of  notes  with  Admiral 
Kolchak,  finally  ending  these  protracted  negotiations 
with  a  promise  of  assistance  which,  incidentally,  was 
never  carried  out  to  the  satisfaction  of  any  Russian 
groups. 

As  against  this  attitude  to  the  Russian  question  on 
the  part  of  the  Paris  Conference,  we  have  quite  a  dif- 
ferent situation  in  Washington.  The  subject  of  "Si- 
beria" is  on  the  agenda  of  the  Conference,  and  there 
is  an  authoritative  indication  as  to  the  attitude  toward 
the  Russian  question  on  the  part  of  at  least  one  great 
power  in  the  form  of  the  declaration  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  contained  in  the  cable- 
gram to  the  American  Minister  at  Peking,  dated 
September  19,  1921.  This  declaration  was  evoked 
by  the  fact  that  an  agent  of  the  Far  Eastern  Re- 
public, the  "buffer"  state  created  by  the  Soviets  in 
Eastern  Siberia,  sent  a  request  to  the  American  Lega- 
tion at  Peking  that  representatives  of  that  Republic 
be  admitted  to  the  Washingon  Conference  on  Limitation 
of  Armament.  In  reply  to  this,  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  instructed  its  Minister  at  Peking  to 
communicate  to  the  agent  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic 
the  following  "informal  observations": 


4  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

*1n  the  absence  of  a  single,  recognized  Russian  Govern- 
ment, the  protection  of  legitimate  Russian  interests  must 
devolve  as  a  moral  trusteeship  upon  the  whole  Conference. 
It  is  regrettable  that  the  Conference,  for  reasons  quite  beyond 
the  control  of  the  participating  powers,  is  to  be  deprived  of 
the  advantage  of  Russian  cooperation  in  deliberations,  but 
it  is  not  to  be  conceived  that  the  Conference  will  take  deci- 
sions prejudicial  to  legitimate  Russian  interests  or  which 
would  in  any  manner  violate  Russian  rights.  It  is  the  hope 
and  expectation  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  that 
the  Conference  will  establish  general  principles  of  inter- 
national action  which  will  deserve  and  have  the  support  of 
the  people  of  Eastern  Siberia  and  of  all  Russia  by  reason 
of  their  justice  and  efficacy  in  the  settlement  of  outstanding 
difficulties." 


The  thesis  set  forth  in  these  "unofficial  observations" 
represents,  naturally,  only  the  position  of  the  United 
States.  But  it  is  inconceivable  that  the  position  of  the 
whole  Conference  should  be  fundamentally  at  variance 
with  that  of  the  United  States,  the  initiator  of  the 
Conference  itself,  and  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  "the 
moral  trusteeship"  over  Russia's  interests  will  be  the 
attitude  toward  the  Russian  problem  on  the  part  of 
the  Washington  Conference. 

If  we  compare  the  attitude  toward  the  Russian  ques- 
tion at  the  Paris  and  the  Washington  Conferences,  we 
find  three  basic  differences.  The  Paris  Confer- 
ence failed  entirely  to  face  the  Russian  question  with 
the  directness  and  squareness  that  the  importance  of 
this  qutetion  merited  and  demanded;  the  Washington 


EUSSIA  AND  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE   5 

Conference,  judging  bj  so  authoritative  a  forecast  of 
its  position  as  the  September  declaration  of  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  seems  prepared  to  face  the 
Russian  question  directly  and  squarely.  The  Paris 
Conference  was  never  certain  of  its  position  as  to 
whether  or  not  the  Soviet  regime  in  Russia  was  entitled 
to  representation  at  the  conference  table,  and  demon- 
strated this  lack  of  assurance  by  its  attempt  to  call  the 
Prinkipo  Conference;  the  Washington  Conference, 
again  judging  by  the  same  forecast  as  above,  is  decided 
on  its  refusal  to  admit  the  right  of  the  Soviet  regime 
or  any  of  its  vassal  formations  on  the  former  Russian 
territory  to  act  as  the  spokesmen  for  the  national  and 
international  interests  of  the  Russian  people,  or  to  re- 
ceive officially  the  representatives  of  any  of  the  Russian 
groups  in  emigration.  Finally,  the  Paris  Conference 
made  no  attempt  to  apply  international  action  to  any 
of  Russia's  legitimate  interests,  jeopardized  in  any  way 
by  the  situation  that  has  become  created  in  Russia  be^ 
cause  of  the  existence  there  of  the  Soviet  regime;  the 
Washington  Conference  seems  prepared  not  only  to 
examine  these  legitimate  interests  of  Russia,  but  also 
to  defend  them  by  international  action  and  hold  them 
in  trust  for  the  reconstructed  Russia  of  the  future. 
But  the  declaration  of  the  Government  of  the  United 


6  EUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

States,  defining  Russia's  position  at  the  Washington 
Conference,  raises  two  significant  questions. 

The  first  of  these  questions  is  concerned  with  the 
nature  and  scope  of  Russia's  "legitimate  interests"  and 
"rights."  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  "unofficial  obser- 
vations" contained  in  the  cablegram  of  September  19, 
1921,  were  not  intended  to  preclude  an  opportunity  for 
various  Russian  groups  to  present  their  interpretation 
of  these  interests  and  rights  to  the  Washington  Confer- 
ence, and  there  is  equally  no  doubt  that  such  interpre- 
tations have  been  presented.  But  it  is  the  idea  of 
"moral  trusteeship"  that  is  to  be  the  main  protection  of 
Russia's  rights  and  interests,  and  it  ought  not  to  be 
difficult  to  distinguish  between  what  may  properly 
be  considered  as  Russia's  legitimate  interests,  the  result 
of  healthy  national  policies,  and  the  spurious  and  ques- 
tionable advantages  wrested  by  the  Russian  Imperial 
Government  at  different  phases  of  its  unhealthy 
imperialistic  ventures.  It  seems  most  important,  there- 
fore, in  view  of  the  situation,  to  review  the  historic 
background  of  the  events  that  have  recently  unfolded 
themselves  in  Russia. 

Moreover,  it  is  most  important  to  bear  in  mind  that 
there  are  at  least  three  conceptions  of  "Russia"  pre^ 
sented  to  us  by  Russia's  recent  history.     The  first  is 


RUSSIA  AND  WASHINGTON  CONFERENCE      7 

the  conception  of  Imperial  Russia,  the  Russia  that 
vxLS,  the  Russia  that  was  swept  out  of  existence  by  the 
Revolution  of  March,  1917.  This  Russia  was  often 
aggressive  and  imperialistic.  The  second  is  the  con- 
ception of  Soviet  Russia,  the  Russia  that,  for  the 
moment,  is.  This  Russia  is  bound  to  be,  by  its  very 
nature,  insatiably  aggressive  and,  though  in  a  different 
sense  from  its  Imperial  predecessor,  violently  imperial- 
istic. The  third  is  the  conception  of  Democratic 
Russia,  the  Russia  that  will  he.  This  Russia  emerged 
for  a  few  short  months  between  the  March  Revolution 
and  the  November  overthrow  of  the  Provisional  Govern- 
ment; it  is  this  Russia  that  is  bound  to  emerge  from 
the  suffering  country's  present-day  tragic  trials. 

The  "legitimate"  interests  of  Russia  are  those  in- 
terests the  impairment  or  violation  of  which  will  be 
prejudicial  to  this  third  Russia.  Only  for  such  a 
Russia  is  a  "moral  trusteeship"  of  the  United  States 
and  of  the  Washington  Conference  conceivable. 

The  second  question  is  concerned  with  the  impos- 
sibility to  invite  representatives  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment or  of  any  of  its  vassal  formations  to  the  confer- 
ence table  in  Washington.  It  is  often  argued  that  in 
its  foreign  policy  the  Soviet  Government  follows 
"nationalistic"  lines  and  consequently  defends  and  pro- 


8  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

tects  Russia's  national  interests.  And  this  argument  is 
used  as  a  basis  for  the  belief  that  the  Soviet  Government 
is  competent  to  act  as  the  spokesman  for  Russia  in  all 
vital  international  relations. 

It  is  primarily  to  the  answer  to  these  two  questions 
that  this  book  is  devoted.  The  attention  is  centered  on 
the  Far  East,  rather  than  on  the  Russian  situation 
generally,  because  the  Washington  Conference  deals 
principally  with  the  questions  affecting  the  Far  East. 
The  book  is  an  attempt  to  present  the  salient  features 
of  Russia's  concern  with  the  Far  East  in  the  light  of 
the  history  of  her  expansion  and  policies  in  Asia,  as 
well  as  of  the  special  problems  presented  by  the  recent 
activities  in  various  parts  of  the  Asiatic  continent  of 
the  Russian  Soviet  Government  and  of  its  ''General 
Staff  of  the  World  Revolution,"  known  as  the  Third  or 
Communist  International,  particularly  with  regard  to 
their  present-day  politico-military  strategy  in  the  Far 
East.  The  concluding  chapter  is  devoted  to  the  relative 
position  of  Russia  and  the  United  States,  in  the  light 
both  of  their  relations  as  separate  national  entities 
and  of  the  role  that  they  are  likely  to  play  in  a  world 
political  equilibrium,  the  foundation  for  which  it  is 
hoped  will  be  laid  at  the  Washington  Conference. 


CHAPTEE  II 

RUSSIAN    EXPANSION    IN    ASIA 

The  story  of  Kussia's  expansion  east  of  the  Ural  monn- 
tains  is  one  of  nearly  five  centuries  of  slow  and  gradual 
infiltration,  followed  by  a  quarter  of  a  century  of  very 
intense  and  energetic  activity.  Out  of  this  last  quarter 
of  a  century  grew  a  number  of  international  conflicts 
which  had  far-reaching  consequences  for  the  history 
of  Russia. 

As  early  as  the  thirteenth  century,  settlers  from  the 
more  energetic  of  the  Slavic  principalities,  at  that  time 
scattered  like  oases  through  the  vast  stretches  of  Euro- 
pean Russia,  began  to  push  their  way  across  the  Ural 
mountains  and  into  the  plains  of  Western  Siberia. 
They  conquered  the  aboriginal  tribes  which  occupied 
these  lands  and  built  their  trading  outposts.  The 
process  continued  through  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth 
centuries,  adventurous  bands  of  Slavs  pushing  their 
way  farther  and  farther  into  the  fertile  lands  beyond 
the  Urals. 


10  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

In  the  second  half  of  the  sixteenth  century,  a  band 
of  adventurous  Cossacks  appeared  on  the  territory  of 
Siberia  and,  in  the  course  of  a  series  of  expeditions,  se- 
cured for  Moscow  a  vast  realm  east  of  the  Urals.  The 
status  of  these  bands  and  the  precise  reasons  for  their 
appearance  in  Siberia  does  not  appear  clear  in  historic 
records.  One  version  makes  them  and  particularly  their 
leader,  Yermak,  refugees  from  justice;  another  version 
makes  them  semi-regular  troops  in  the  service  of  the 
Russian  authorities  along  the  Siberian  border.  In  any 
event,  Yermak  and  his  band  pushed  their  way  through 
the  Siberian  wilderness,  and  brought  the  aboriginal 
tribes  to  allegiance  to  the  Tsar  of  Moscow. 

This  event  is  usually  taken  as  the  historic  beginning 
of  definite  and  organized  efforts  on  the  part  of  the 
rapidly  consolidating  Russian  state,  centered  around 
Moscow,  to  push  its  way  eastward.  From  that  time  on, 
for  a  whole  century,  groups  of  adventurous  traders 
went  on  and  on  into  the  heart  of  Asia.  They  were 
drawn  by  innumerable  fantastic  tales  told  by  the 
aborigines  of  Siberia  with  whom  they  came  in  contact 
concerning  the  vast  mineral  wealth  which  lies  farther 
and  farther  east.  By  the  middle  of  the  following  cen- 
tury the  power  of  Russia  had  already  become  extended 
as  far  as  Lake  Baikal.     And  all  through  the  territory 


EUSSIAN  EXPANSION"  IN  ASIA  11 

lying  around  the  lake,  the  Russian  settlers  heard  stories 
about  a  wonderful  river  that  was  supposed  to  take  its 
source  in  the  heart  of  China  and  flow  through  marvel- 
ously  rich  country  into  the  huge  ocean  that  bounded  the 
continent  at  its  easternmost  extremities. 

Enticed  by  these  stories,  an  adventurous  emissary- 
sent  by  the  governor  of  the  Yakutsk  province,  which 
covers  the  north-central  portion  of  Siberia,  set  out  in 
search  of  the  great  river  and  its  untold  riches.  This 
emissary,  Vasily  Poyarkov  by  name,  succeeded  in  1646 
in  reaching  the  Amur  river,  the  great  stream  that  had 
figured  so  prominently  in  the  tales  of  the  Siberian 
aborigines.  He  sailed  down  the  river  and  returned  to 
Yakutsk  with  an  enthusiastic  story  of  what  he  had  seen 
on  his  journey.  Three  years  after  Poyarkov's  explora- 
tion, Erofey  Khabarov,  an  enterprising  peasant  settler 
in  the  Yakutsk  province,  sailed  down  the  Amur  river 
with  a  band  of  followers  and  began  the  real  conquest 
of  the  land,  which  was  to  some  extent  inhabited  by  the 
Chinese  and  acknowledged  the  rule  of  the  Manchu 
dynasty.  Others  followed  Khabarov,  and  in  the  course 
of  the  next  forty  years  a  number  of  Russian  settlements 
sprang  up  along  the  Amur  and  in  the  surrounding 
country. 

However,  the  Peking  Government  objected  to  this 


12  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

colonization,  with  the  result  that  in  1689  a  treaty  was 
signed  at  Nerchinsk  between  Russia  and  China,  by 
virtue  of  which  the  whole  Amur  territory  was  officially 
recognized  as  a  part  of  China. 

For  a  hundred  and  fifty  years  after  that,  the  efforts 
of  Russian  colonizers  in  Siberia  were  restricted  to  the 
lands  lying  west  of  the  Amur  territory.  But  in  1846 
Nicholas  I  ordered  an  investigation  of  the  Amur  ques- 
tion, as  well  as  of  the  Amur  territory  itself.  Following 
this  order,  the  Governor-General  of  Eastern  Siberia, 
N.  Muraviev,  sent  an  expedition  to  the  Amur  river, 
led  by  Captain  Nevelsky,  a  young  and  energetic  officer, 
who  started  out  on  his  mission  in  1849. 

At  that  time  Russia  did  not  feel  herself  very  strongly 
situated  in  her  eastern  possessions,  while  her  general 
international  situation  was  far  from  satisfactory:  the 
clouds  of  the  Crimean  War,  which  was  to  result  in  an 
utter  defeat  of  Russia,  were  already  on  the  horizon. 
In  view  of  this,  the  order  for  the  investigation  of  the 
Amur  territory  was  accompanied  by  strict  instructions 
to  avoid  any  conflict  with  China.  In  spite  of  these 
instructions,  however.  Captain  Nevelsky  in  1850  built 
a  fort  near  the  mouth  of  the  Amur  river  on  the  site 
of  the  present  city  of  Nikolayevsk,  and,  raising  the 


RUSSIAN  EXPANSION  IN  ASIA  13 

Russian  flag  over  the  city,  claimed  the  whole  territory 
as  a  part  of  the  Russian  Empire. 

Although  the  report  of  this  exploit  was  received 
very  unfavorably  in  St.  Petersburg  and  the  fort  was 
ordered  destroyed,  the  Russian  Imperial  Government 
soon  after  this  resumed  its  efforts  to  gain  possession  of 
the  Amur  territory.  Negotiations  looking  toward  the 
cession  of  the  Amur  lands  to  Russia  were  conducted 
during  the  following  five  years  by  the  Russian  ambassa- 
dor in  Peking.  The  Chinese  Government  at  first  refused 
the  demands  of  the  Russian  ambassador,  but  finally  gave 
in,  and  in  1858,  by  virtue  of  the  Aigun  treaty,  the  Amur 
territory  became  definitely  and  officially  a  part  of  the 
Russian  Empire. 

Thus,  by  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century,  or  five 
hundred  years  after  Russia  began  her  movement  toward 
the  East,  she  finally  ended  her  eastward  march  and 
came  to  rest  on  the  shores  of  the  Pacific  Ocean.  By 
the  time  of  the  signing  of  the  Aigun  treaty,  Russian 
settlers  were  already  scattered  over  the  Amur  territory 
and  the  various  points  of  the  coast.  The  first  appear- 
ance of  Russian  settlers  on  the  island  of  Sakhalin  was 
in  1857,  and  on  the  peninsula  of  Kamchatka  much 
earlier  than  that. 

But  the  occupation  of  this  whole  territory  did  not 


14  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

in  anj  way  imply  an  active  policy  of  development  on 
the  part  of  tlie  Russian  Government.  On  the  contrary, 
for  a  number  of  decades,  following  the  formal  cession 
of  the  Amur  territory  to  Russia,  scarcely  anything  was 
done  for  an  active  utilization  of  the  vast  resources 
which  had  thus  been  acquired  by  Russia.  One  of  the 
great  difficulties  was  the  question  of  transportation, 
which  greatly  hindered — in  fact,  rendered  almost  im- 
possible— any  colonization  scheme  on  a  fairly  large 
scale. 

Generally  speaking,  the  colonization  of  Asiatic  RuS" 
sia  began  soon  after  Yermak's  formal  conquest  of  the 
country.  For  three  hundred  years  after  that,  i.  e., 
until  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  there 
were  recurrent  periods  of  slow  infiltration  of  settler 
groups  into  the  vast  reaches  of  Siberia.  These  settlers 
were  principally  of  four  different  classes :  traders,  mili- 
tary contingents,  exiles,  and  free  immigrants. 

The  first  colonizers  of  Siberia  were  mainly  traders, 
attracted  by  the  fur  and  mineral  wealth  of  the  new 
lands.  Together  with  them  came  Cossack  groups,  who 
settled  there  and  served  for  protection.  In  the  eigh- 
teenth century,  large  groups  of  Cossacks  from  the  Don 
district  moved  to  the  Transbaikal  region  and  settled 
there.     They  received  special  privileges  from  the  Gov- 


RUSSIAN  EXPANSION"  IN  ASIA  15 

eminent.  Numerically,  however,  neither  of  these  two 
classes  of  settlers  was  important  for  the  colonization  of 
Siberia. 

The  exiles  were  a  much  more  important  element  in 
the  work  of  colonizing  Asiatic  Russia.  The  system  of 
Siberian  exile  was  begun  as  early  as  the  seventeenth 
century,  the  first  recorded  legislation  providing  for 
exile  to  Siberia  being  in  1648.  At  the  beginning,  the 
system  of  exile  was  used  merely  as  a  punitive  measure 
and  was  applied  mostly  to  criminal  offenders.  Gradu- 
ally, however,  economic  importance  began  to  be  attached 
to  it.  The  development  of  Siberia's  natural  wealth, 
particularly  of  its  mineral  resources,  and  the  beginning 
of  manufacturing  in  some  of  the  larger  centers,  notably 
in  Irkutsk,  opened  up  the  possibilities  of  utilizing  the 
exiles  as  a  source  of  labor  supply.  Political  offenders 
and  religious  non-conformists  were  early  added  to  the 
exile  elements,  and  together  the  three  exile  groups  con- 
stituted a  rather  important  factor,  from  the  viewpoint 
of  both  colonization  and  economic  development. 

In  1753  capital  punishment  was  abolished  in  Russia, 
and  penal  servitude  in  Siberia  was  substituted  for  it. 
This,  naturally,  resulted  in  a  certain  amount  of  increase 
in  the  number  of  exiles,  though  it  scarcely  improved 
the  character  of  the  exile  elements. 


16  EUSSIA  IN"  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  fourth  and  by  far  the  most  important  class  of 
settlers  was  the  free  immigrant  element.  During  the 
early  centuries  of  the  colonization  of  Siberia  this  ele- 
ment was  not  very  large.  The  Russian  Government 
itself  did  not  encourage  free  migration  to  Siberia,  and 
until  1870  even  made  no  cifforts  to  separate  the  peaceful 
settlers  from  the  exiles. 

But,  beginning  with  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  importance  of  the  free  immigrant  element 
increased  very  considerably.  The  liberation  of  the 
serfs  in  1861  provided  a  decided  stimulus  to  free 
migration  beyond  the  Urals.  Soon  after  the  actual 
liberation  itself  the  peasants  realized  that  the  agrarian 
forms  established  under  the  new  system  would  scarcely 
provide  them  in  any  part  of  Russia  with  sufficient 
amounts  of  land.  New  opportunities  began  to  be 
sought  elsewhere  by  the  more  energetic  of  the  liberated 
peasants. 

Lack  of  transportation  facilities,  however,  impeded 
greatly  the  work  of  colonization.  But  in  the  eighties 
of  the  past  century,  when  the  Russian  Government 
began  to  take  up  a  project  of  the  construction  of  a  txans- 
Siberian  railroad,  interest  in  free  migration  into  Siberia 
increased  very  perceptibly.  This  interest  continued  to 
grow  as  the  construction  of  the  railroad  was  begun  and 


RUSSIAN  EXPANSION"  IN"  ASIA  17 

was  pushed  farther  and  farther  eastward.  The  com- 
pletion of  the  railroad  line  and  the  Eusso-Japanese  War 
served  to  induce  an  increasingly  rapid  tempo  into  the 
process  of  the  colonization  of  Siberia. 

This  constantly  increasing  tempo  was  in  a  rather 
interesting  contrast  with  the  slow  movement  of  the 
first  centuries  of  Russian  occupation  of  Siberia.  It 
has  been  calculated  that  from  the  time  of  the  first 
migrations,  following  Yermak's  conquest  of  Siberia  and 
up  to  the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  less 
than  three  million  settlers  had  crossed  the  Urals.  The 
number  that  crossed  the  great  Eurasian  divide  during 
the  last  quarter  of  a  century  was  several  times  that 
total.  In  the  course  of  the  half-decade  from  1906  to 
1910,  nearly  three  million  settlers  left  European  Russia 
and  went  into  the  different  parts  of  Siberia. 

There  was  another  factor  which  served  to  stimulate 
the  migration  into  Siberia  during  the  years  following 
the  Russo-Japanese  War,  and  that  was  the  attitude 
on  the  part  of  the  Russian  Government,  coupled  with 
the  direct  result  of  a  number  of  its  agrarian  measures. 
In  1906,  over  200,000  square  miles  of  governmental 
or  so-called  "Cabinet"  lands  in  Siberia  were  thrown 
open  to  general  colonization.  This  in  itself  caused  a 
rush  of  colonists,  which  was  still  further  stimulated 


18  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

by  the  fact  that,  the  following  year,  the  agrarian  pro- 
gram  sponsored  by  Prime  Minister  Stolypin  went  into 
effect.  This  program  consisted  in  abolishing  some  of 
the  features  of  the  traditional  system  of  communal  land 
tenure.  Its  object  was  to  create  a  class  of  small  peasant 
proprietors  by  permitting  the  cutting  up  of  communally 
held  lands  and  granting  individual  peasants  the  right 
of  selling  their  lands  without  the  consent  of  the  com- 
munal organizations.  All  this  afforded  the  more  ener- 
getic peasant  elements  more  opportunity  for  migration, 
and  rendered  Siberia  with  its  extensive  and  virgin  land 
tracts  more  accessible  to  them. 

The  migration  to  Siberia  during  the  year  1906  itself 
comprised  only  141,294  immigrants.  But  the  very  next 
year  the  number  increased  to  427,339,  while  in  1908 
the  high-water  mark  of  the  Siberian  migration  was 
reached:  in  the  course  of  that  year  664,777  immigrants 
entered  Asiatic  Russia.  Then  the  volume  of  migration 
began  to  decrease,  though  the  number  for  1909  was 
still  619,320. 

The  colonists  in  Siberia  occupy  almost  exclusively 
the  "black-soil"  belt,  which  runs  through  the  southern 
part  of  the  country  and  through  which  the  Trans- 
Siberian  Railroad  and  the  great  Siberian  roadway  are 
laid.     They  spread  away  from  this  belt  occasionally, 


EUSSIAN  EXPANSION"  IN  ASIA  19 

hewing  their  way  into  the  vast  Siberian  forests  and  clear- 
ing for  themselves  tremendously  valuable  virgin  lands. 

The  colonization  of  Eastern  Siberia  and  particularly 
of  the  Far  East  proper  is  of  more  recent  origin  than 
that  of  the  western  portion  of  the  country,  though, 
curiously  enough,  in  some  territories  here  the  percentage 
of  Russian  immigrant  population  by  comparison  with 
the  non-Russian  elements  is  very  high.  In  the  Transr 
baikal  territory,  it  was  calculated  in  1900  that  the 
percentage  of  Russian  population  was  64;  it  is  much 
higher  now.  This  territory  was  used  for  a  long  time 
as  a  place  of  exile  for  political  offenders,  and  some  of 
the  most  important  political  prisons  and  places  of  exile 
were  located  here. 

In  the  Amur  territory  the  first  colonizers  were  Cos- 
sacks who  were  ordered  to  settle  there  after  1857-8, 
when  the  territory  was  formally  ceded  by  China  to 
Russia.  Peasant  colonization  of  the  territory  began 
in  1869.  These  settlers  came  to  entirely  unoccupied 
lands,  for  the  native  population  was  extremely  sparse, 
while  the  Chinese  were  aggregated  at  a  small  number 
of  centers,  principally  at  the  confluences  of  rivers.  By 
1911  the  total  population  of  the  Amur  territory  was 
estimated  at  286,000,  of  whom  only  about  44,000  were 
non-Russian. 


20  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  colonization  of  the  Maritime  or  Primorsk  Prov- 
ince proceeded  under  conditions  practically  analogous 
with  those  which  obtained  in  the  Amur  territory.  The 
percentage  of  Russian  population  there  is  somewhat 
lower,  being  a  little  over  60,  though  the  total  population 
is  more  than  twice  the  population  of  the  Amur  territory. 
^Neither  Sakhalin  nor  Kamchatka  have  been  found  suit- 
able for  extensive  colonization,  except  in  certain  points 
along  the  coast. 

By  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  Russia's  possessions 
in  Asia  occupied  the  whole  of  the  northern  belt  and  a 
large  part  of  the  temperate  zone  of  Asia,  stretching 
clear  across  the  continent^  from  the  Ural  mountains  to 
the  Pacific  Ocean.  In  some  of  its  mid-Asiatic  posses- 
sions, notably  Turkestan,  the  Russian  Empire  pushed 
into  the  very  heart  of  central  Asia.  One  third  of  the 
total  surface  of  the  continent  constituted  Russian  terri- 
tory. The  population  of  this  territory  in  that  year  was 
over  twenty  millions.  The  twelve  provinces  which 
constitute  Siberia  had  at  that  time  a  population  of  about 
fifteen  millions.  Fully  seventy-five  per  cent,  of  this 
number  were  white,  almost  exclusively  settlers  from 
European  Russia — the  living  forces  of  Russia's  expan- 
sion in  Asia- 


CHAPTER   III 

RELATIONS    WITH    CHINA   AND   JAPAN 

The  awakening  of  Japan  in  the  second  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  led  her  to  an  aggi'essive  policy  on 
the  continent  of  Asia  and  brought  her  into  a  series  of 
violent  conflicts,  first  with  China  and  eventually  with 
Russia.  The  first  important  appearance  of  Japan  was 
the  result  of  a  commercial  treaty  which  she  signed  in 
1876  with  the  Government  of  Korea.  Although  at  that 
time  practically  a  vassal  of  China,  Korea  made  her 
own  international  arrangements,  of  which  the  treaty 
of  1876  was  probably  the  most  important  in  her  history, 
for  it  opened  the  door  to  foreigners,  made  Korea  the 
arena  of  an  international  struggle,  and  led  to  her  almost 
complete  absorption  by  Japan. 

Korea's  agreement  with  Japan  was  followed  by  simi- 
lar treaties  with  a  number  of  European  powers,  the  last 
one  being  with  Russia  in  1884.  The  influx  of  for- 
eigners resulting  from  these  arrangements  caused  very 

considerable  resentment  on  the  part   of  the  Korean 

21 


22  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAE  EAST 

people  and  led  to  a  rebellion,  whicli  occurred  soon  after 
the  signing  of  the  Russian  treaty.  The  principal 
enmity  of  the  Korean  people  was  directed  against  the 
Japanese,  who  were  both  most  active  among  the  foreign 
groups  and  were  generally  considered  the  initiators  and 
the  principal  cause  of  the  whole  situation.  Japan  sent 
troops  to  Korea,  but,  upon  China's  protest,  withdrew 
them,  for  the  rebellion  had  already  been  put  down. 
But  she  conditioned  the  withdrawal  of  her  troops  upon 
a  convention  signed  at  the  same  time,  by  virtue  of  which 
both  China  and  Japan  reserved  the  right  to  send  troops 
to  Korea  to  establish  order,  but  undertook  to  notify 
each  other  whenever  such  dispatching  of  troops  would 
be  in  contemplation. 

Ten  years  later,  in  1894,  another  rebellion  occurred 
in  Korea,  and  when  the  Korean  Emperor  appealed  to 
Peking  for  help  and  the  Chinese  Government  sent  troops 
to  Korea,  Japan  immediately  dispatched  her  own  troops 
there.  Under  the  pretext  of  taking  measures  to  quell 
the  uprising,  the  Japanese  troops  occupied  the  city  of 
Seoul,  tbe  Korean  capital.  At  the  same  time  the 
Japanese  ambassador  demanded  from  the  Korean  Gov- 
ernment the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  Chinese  troops 
and  the  placing  in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese  expedi- 
tionary force  of  the  entire  task  of  maintaining  order 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  AND  JAPAN      23 

in  Korea.  China  served  a  counter-demand  of  the  same 
nature  upon  the  Japanese  Government,  and  this  counter- 
demand,  served  in  the  terms  of  an  ultimatum,  led  to 
a  war  between  China  and  Japan. 

The  war  was  of  a  very  short  duration,  and  Japan 
was  entirely  successful  in  its  conduct.  On  April  17, 
1895,  a  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  at  the  Japanese  city 
of  Simonoseki.  By  virtue  of  this  treaty,  China  recog- 
nized the  independence  of  Korea  and  ceded  to  Japan 
the  island  of  Formosa,  a,  number  of  other  smaller 
islands,  and,  what  was  most  important  of  all.  Southern 
Manchuria  and  the  naval  base  of  Port  Arthur;  more- 
over, a  large  contribution  was  provided  for  by  this 
treaty. 

The  treaty  of  Simonoseki  brought  to  the  Russian 
Imperial  Government  a  realization  of  the  importance 
which  the  Far  Eastern  situation  was  beginning  to  as- 
sume. The  Chinese  colossus  was  apparently  badly 
weakened.  At  the  same  time,  a  new  power  appeared 
on  the  continent  of  Asia  in  the  form  of  the  awakened 
Japan,  which  was  rapidly  forcing  its  influence  and  was 
becoming  a  force  to  be  reckoned  with  through  its  acqui- 
sition of  such  an  important  continental  base  as  rich  and 
fertile  Manchuria.  Russia  immediately  set  to  work 
to  frustrat-e  the  plans  of  the  Japanese. 


24  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

An  ultimatum  was  sent  to  Tokyo,  demanding  from 
Japan  the  immediate  return  to  China  of  Manchuria 
and  the  city  of  Port  Arthur.  France  and  Germany 
joined  in  the  Russian  protest,  which  was  supported  very 
forcefully  by  the  dispatching  to  the  Chinese  waters  of 
a  strong  Russian-French-German  fleet.  Japan  agreed 
to  relinquish  her  claims  to  Manchuria,  but  insisted  on 
retaining  Port  Arthur.  To  this  the  coalition  powers 
would  not  consent,  and  Japan  was  forced  in  the  end 
to  give  up  Port  Arthur. 

This  first  active  interference  on  the  part  of  Russia 
in  the  affairs  of  the  Far  East  was  decidedly  a  conflict 
between  her  and  Japan,  which  resulted  in  her  favor  but 
left  Japan  very  resentful.  This  initial  resentment  on 
the  part  of  Japan  increased  greatly  in  intensity,  when 
three  years  later  Russia  herself  did  precisely  what  Japan 
tried  to  do  and  was  prevented  from  doing  by  the  active 
interference  on  the  part  of  Russia  and  her  Allies. 

Its  success  in  the  reversing  of  the  Simonoseki  agree- 
ment was  no  doubt  a  powerful  stimulus  in  changing  the 
attitude  of  the  Russian  Government  toward  the  affairs 
of  the  Far  East.  An  excellent  illustration  of  this  may 
be  found  in  its  suddenly  changed  estimate  of  the  sig- 
nificance of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railroad,  the  construc- 
tion of  which  by  that  time  had  already  practically 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  AND  JAPAN      25 

reached  the  Amur  Eiver.  Until  its  appearance  as  an 
active  political  factor  in  the  Far  Eastern  situation, 
the  Russian  Imperial  Government  looked  upon  the 
Trans-Siberian  Eailroad  solely  as  an  artery  of  trade 
and  an  instrument  of  colonization.  After  the  first  en- 
counter with  Japan  the  Siberian  railroad  began  to 
loom  in  its  eyes  as  a  strategic  possibility. 

The  terminus  of  the  Trans-Siberian  Railroad  is  the 
city  of  Vladivostok.  The  question  of  how  that  city 
was  to  be  connected  by  railroad  with  the  already  con- 
structed portions  of  the  Trans-Siberian  came  up  just 
about  that  time.  A  line  could  be  run  along  the  left- 
hand  bank  of  the  Amur,  or  else  it  could  traverse 
Manchuria  at  a  rather  considerable  distance  from  the 
right-hand  bank  of  the  Amur.  The  second  course  meant 
fewer  technical  difficulties  and  a  very  important  shorten- 
ing of  the  track,  but  it  also  involved  political  consid- 
erations of  a  prime  importance,  sine©  fourteen  hundred 
versts  of  the  track  had  to  be  laid  over  Chinese  territory. 

The  possibility  of  a  line  through  Manchuria  had 
been  discussed  before,  and  its  economic  importance  to 
Russia  was  fully  realized  since  the  Amur  line,  even- 
tually constructed  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  obvi- 
ously presented  great  difficulties  both  of  construction 
and  maintenance.     Negotiations   relative  to  the  con- 


26  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAK  EAST 

struction  of  this  road  bad  been  carried  on  between  tbe 
Eusso-Chinese  Bank  and  tbe  Cbinese  Government,  and 
a  contract  was  finally  signed  in  1896.  Tbe  result  of 
tbis  contract  was  tbe  construction  of  tbe  Cbinese  Eastr 
em  Eailroad  and  tbe  cession  to  Russia  of  important 
privileges  in  a  strip  of  Cbinese  territory,  extending 
along  botb  sides  of  tbe  railroad. 

But  tbe  railroad  agreement  was  followed  two  years 
later  by  a  Russian-Cbinese  convention,  wbicb  was  of  a 
tremendously  far-reacbing  nature  and  wbicb  made  it 
possible  for  tbe  imperialistic  groups  in  St.  Petersburg 
to  obscure  tbe  paramount  economic  importance  of  tbe 
Cbinese  Eastern  Railroad  by  political  considerations 
of  a  most  dangerous  nature.  By  virtue  of  tbis  con- 
vention, signed  in  Peking  on  Marcb  15,  1898,  Russia 
leased  from  Cbina  for  tbe  period  of  twenty-five  years 
tbe  cities  of  Port  Artbur  and  Talienwan,  tbe  two  impor^ 
tant  ports  in  tbe  soutbem  part  of  Mancburia.  Russia 
received  also  tbe  rigbt  to  connect  tbese  ports  by  means 
of  a  railroad  line  witb  tbe  main  line  of  tbe  Cbinese 
Eastern  Railroad.  Tbe  lease  was  made  renewable 
indefinitely  by  agreement  of  tbe  two  sides. 

By  tbe  conclusion  of  tbe  Russo-Cbinese  agreement, 
Russia  entered  definitely  upon  a  policy  of  imperialistic 
aggression  in  tbe  Far  East.     Her  role  and  tbat  of  Japan 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  AND  JAPAN      27 

became  reversed.  She  was  now  attempting  to  do,  by 
pushing  down  from  the  north,  what  Japan  had  attempted 
to  do  by  pushing  up  from  the  south,  viz.,  to  establish 
dominating  control  in  Manchuria.  An  intense  rivalry 
sprang  up  between  Kussia  and  Japan  which  lasted  for 
a  number  of  years  and  finally  brought  them  to  an  armed 
encounter.  The  scene  of  the  rivalry  was  at  first  trans- 
ferred from  Manchuria  to  Korea,  only  to  be  shifted  back 
again  on  the  very  eve  of  the  Eusso- Japanese  War. 

Deprived  of  the  advantages  in  Manchuria  she  had 
wrested  from  China  by  the  Simonoseki  treaty,  Japan 
turned  her  attention  definitely  in  the  direction  of  Korea 
and  began  to  establish  her  influence  there.  But  she 
was  again  brought  face  to  face  with  Russia,  which  was 
quick  to  follow  her  to  Korea.  On  May  14,  1896,  a 
convention  was  signed  between  Russia  and  Japan,  by 
virtue  of  which  both  Russia  and  Japan  undertook  to 
assist  Korea  in  establishing  internal  order  and  other- 
wise reorganizing  her  affairs  after  her  break  with  China. 
This  assistance  was  to  be  in  the  form  of  the  presence 
of  Russian  and  Japanese  advisers  in  Seoul. 

In  March,  1898,  the  Korean  Government  informed 
Russia  that  order  had  been  established  in  the  country 
and  that  the  presence  of  foreign  advisers  was  no  longer 
necessary.     The  Russian  Government  replied  to  this 


28  EUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

that  it  was  quite  willing  to  cease  all  active  participation 
in  the  affairs  of  Korea,  provided  Korea  had  really 
established  order  and  was  in  a  position  to  defend  her 
independence.  Otherwise  Russia  would  consider  it 
necessary  to  take  measures  to  insure  this.  This  reply 
was  obviously  a  mere  formality  on  the  part  of  the 
Kussian  Government,  for  neither  Russia  nor  Japan 
were  prepared  to  leave  Korea.  On  the  contrary,  they 
were  vying  with  each  other  in  the  work  of  economic 
penetration.  Japan  was  particularly  interested  in  the 
construction  of  railroads,  while  Russia  sought  timber 
concessions,  which  were  a  very  poor  disguise  for  stra- 
tegic advantages.  This  ostensibly  economic  but  really 
military  rivalry  between  Russia  and  Japan  in  Korea 
continued  for  several  years  and  was  one  of  the  imme- 
diate causes  of  the  war  between  the  two  countries. 

In  the  meantime,  Russia  was  working  in  Manchuria 
with  a  truly  feverish  energy.  Immediately  upon  her 
acquisition  of  the  ports  in  southern  Manchuria  she 
began  to  construct  a  powerful  naval  fortress  at  Port 
Arthur  and  a  commercial  port  at  Talienwan,  which  she 
renamed  Dalny.  At  the  same  time  she  was  pushing 
the  construction  of  the  railroad  line  which  was  to  con- 
nect these  ports  with  the  Trans-Siberian  line. 

In  1900  a  formidable  revolt  took  place  in  China, 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  AND  JAPAN      29 

known  as  the  Boxer  uprising.  This  uprising  was 
directed  against  all  foreigners,  who  were  acquiring 
greater  and  greater  privileges  in  China  and  obtaining 
more  and  more  a  firm  footing  on  Chinese  territory. 
The  revolt  was  put  down  by  the  intervention  of  the 
great  world  powers,  which  sent  an  international  expe- 
ditionary force  into  China.  But  before  the  revolt  was 
put  down,  much  damage  was  done  to  foreign  life  and 
property. 

As  far  as  Russia  was  concerned,  the  Boxer  uprising 
affected  particularly  her  property  in  Manchuria.  By 
the  time  of  the  uprising,  nearly  1300  versts  of  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railroad  had  been  laid,  and  of  them 
over  900  versts  were  destroyed  by  the  insurgents. 
Tremendous  amounts  of  property  and  supplies  were 
also  destroyed.  As  a  result  of  this,  Russian  troops 
occupied  nearly  the  whole  of  Manchuria. 

When  the  Boxer  uprising  had  been  put  down  and 
the  terms  of  the  settlement  arranged,  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment took  up  with  the  Russian  Government  the  ques- 
tion of  the  evacuation  of  Manchuria,  which  was  still 
occupied  by  the  Russian  troops.  On  March  26,  1902, 
a  Russo-Chinese  convention  was  signed  in  Peking,  which 
provided  for  the  withdrawal  of  the  Russian  troops  from 
Manchuria,  but  this  provision  was  made  in  very  indefi- 


30  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

nite  terms.  At  the  same  time,  the  convention  placed 
Kussia  in  an  especially  favorable  situation  with  regard 
to  her  economic  penetration  there.  So  far  as  Manchuria 
was  concerned,  Russia  had  practically  obtained  the 
application  to  that  part  of  China  of  the  principle  of 
the  "closed  door,"  with  herself  as  the  holder  of  the  key. 
Quite  carried  away  by  the  success  which  had  attended 
so  far  its  imperialistic  ventures  in  the  Far  East,  the 
Russian  Imperial  Government  became  more  and  more 
ambitious  in  its  Far  Eastern  policies.  There  were 
groups  that  even  urged  an  annexation  of  the  whole  of 
Manchuria  in  lieu  of  the  Boxer  indemnities,  to  which 
Russia  was  entitled  by  the  terms  of  the  settlement 
following  the  Boxer  uprising.  While  this  part  of  the 
Russian  diplomatic  history  is  still  unwritten,  there  is 
reason  to  believe  that  Germany  was  to  a  large  extent 
responsible  for  the  ambitious  Far  Eastern  policy  of  the 
Government  of  Nicholas  II.  Russia's  international 
position  during  that  period  was  very  strong,  while 
internally  she  was  going  through  a  very  rapid  industrial 
development,  which  caused  considerable  apprehensions 
to  Germany.  Although  the  relations  between  Russia 
and  Germany  were  very  friendly,  the  Germans  were 
growing  more  and  more  disturbed  about  Russia's  eco- 
nomic progress,  which,  the  Germans  knew  but  too  well, 


RELATIONS  WITH  CHINA  AND  JAPAN      31 

would  bring  with  it  an  insistent  demand  for  a  non- 
freezing  port  and  was  bound  to  be  a  serious  economic 
blow  to  Germany.  To  inspire  Russia  with  ambitions 
in  the  Far  East,  to  fill  her  with  fears  of  a  "Yellow 
Peril,"  to  whisper  into  the  ear  of  her  Government  the 
dreams  of  a  non-freezing  port  in  Manchuria,  to  inveigle 
her  in  this  manner  in  a  hot-headed  adventure  in  the 
Far  East  and  draw  her  attention  away  from  develop- 
ment in  Europe — all  this,  there  is  reason  to  believe, 
was  planned  and  executed  by  the  German  Imperial 
Government. 

In  1901  a  Far  Eastern  Convention  was  signed  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Germany.  This  convention 
guaranteed  the  integrity  of  China  and  freedom  of  trade 
there.  But  it  did  not  mention  Korea,  and  deliberately 
excluded  Manchuria.  This  exclusion  of  Manchuria 
from  guarantees  of  freedom  of  trade  was  made  at  the 
insistence  of  Germany  with  a  view  to  Russian  preten- 
sions there.*  It  was  opposed  by  Great  Britain,  and  not 
only  rendered  the  whole  convention  practically  inopera- 
tive but  led  to  most  important  consequences  in  the  form 

•  Prince  Biilow,  the  German  Imperial  Chancellor,  declared  in  the 
Reichstag  with  reference  to  the  German-British  convention  that  the 
German  Imperial  Government  recognized  delinjtely  Russia's  special 
rights  in  Manchuria.  This  declaration  of  the  German  Imperial 
Chancellor  caused  much  jubilation  at  the  time  in  the  Russian  govern- 
mental circles,  which  then  little  dreamt  of  the  consequences  that  this 
apparently  "friendly"  attitude  of  the  German  Government  was  destined 
to  have  for  Russia. 


32  EUSSIA  IN"  THE  FAE  EAST 

of  an  Anglo-Japanese  agreement,  signed  the  following 
year. 

The  Anglo-Japanese  agreement,  signed  in  1902,  guar- 
anteed the  independence  of  China  and  Korea.  But  it 
recognized  special  interests  of  Great  Britain  in  China 
and  of  Japan  in  both  China  and  Korea,  as  well  as  the 
right  of  each  to  protect  its  interests  in  these  countries, 
if  threatened  by  aggression  of  another  country  or  by 
internal  disorders.  The  agreement  also  provided  that 
in  case  one  of  the  contracting  powers  should  be  drawn 
into  a  war,  the  other  must  preserve  neutrality  and  make 
every  effort,  to  prevent  other  powers  from  joining  against 
its  ally.  Should,  however,  another  power  join  against 
the  ally,  the  neutral  contracting  power  would  be  obliged 
immediately  to  render  assistance  to  its  ally. 

This  agreement  was  Russia's  first  reverse  in  the  Far 
East.  She  countered  it,  however,  by  a  Eusso-French 
convention,  signed  the  same  year,  in  which  the  two 
contracting  parties  declared  that  they  reserved  a  right 
to  defend  their  interests  in  the  Far  East.  The  possi- 
bility of  an  armed  conflict  with  other  powers  was  men- 
tioned in  the  convention,  which  was  generally  taken  as 
a  notice  on  the  part  of  France  that  the  provisions  of 
her  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  Russia,  then 
already  in  existence,  would  apply  in  case  of  an  armed 


EELATI0:N^S  with  china  and  japan      33 

encounter  in  tlie  Far  East.  The  Russian  Government 
thought  it  had  thus  checkmated  its  opponent,  but  the 
very  next  year  Russia's  second  reverse  in  the  Far  East 
took  place. 

This  second  reverse  was  in  the  form  of  the  American- 
Chinese  convention,  signed  in  1903,  whicli  opened  up 
for  foreign  trade  the  cities  of  Mukden  and  Andun  and 
provided  that  the  rules  of  foreign  trade  and  of  the  resi- 
dence of  foreigners,  i.  e.,  Americans,  would  be  settled 
by  agreement  between  China  and  the  United  States. 
These  provisions  were  counter  to  the  provisions  of  the 
Russo-Chinese  convention  of  the  previous  year,  and  the 
Russian  Government  protested  against  it,  hoping  that 
it  would  not  be  ratified  in  its  original  form.  Pending 
the  ratification  of  the  convention,  Russia  interrupted 
the  evacuation  of  Manchuria,  which  had  already  begun, 
and  reoccupied  the  city  of  Mukden.  However,  the  con- 
vention was  ratified  as  originally  di-afted,  and  Russian 
claims  to  the  establishment  in  Manchuria  of  her  sphere 
of  special  interests  was  definitely  shaken.  This  reverse 
was  particularly  telling  for  Russia,  because  Japan  was 
entirely  in  harmony  with  the  United  States  in  the  de- 
mand for  the  maintenance  of  the  principle  of  "open 
door"  in  Manchuria. 

All  through  the  year  1903  negotiations  were  carried 


34  EUSSIA  IN"  THE  FAE  EAST 

on  between  Russia  and  Japan,  looking  toward  a  settle- 
ment of  the  Korean  question  and  a  composition  of  the 
difficulties  between  the  two  countries.  Finally  a  tenta- 
tive agreement  was  reached,  but  Japan  demanded  that 
the  settlement  include  also  the  Manchurian  question. 
To  this  Eussia  would  not  consent,  claiming  that  the 
two  questions  should  not  be  confused,  but  should  be 
settled  separately.  Then  Japan  suddenly  broke  off  the 
negotiations  and  declared  a  war  on  Russia. 

The  Eusso-Japanese  War  began  at  the  end  of  1903 
and  lasted  for  nearly  a  year  and  a  half,  when  it  was 
terminated  by  an  intervention  of  Theodore  Eoosevelt, 
then  President  of  the  United  States.  Japan  was  en- 
tirely victorious  throughout  the  war.  The  reasons  for 
this  were  numerous  and  varied.  The  Eussian  advance 
in  Manchuria  and  Korea  was  not  carried  on  with  any 
degree  of  either  military  or  economic  skill.  Eussia  was 
utterly  unprepared  for  the  war,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that, 
for  months  before  it  came,  its  clouds  were  unmistakable 
on  the  political  horizon.  There  were  not  enough  troops 
in  the  Far  East  or  close  enough  to  the  Far  Eastern 
theatre  of  war.  Supplies  were  utterly  insufficiont. 
Transportation  was  wretched,  and  the  Trans-Siberian 
Eailroad  still  in  an  unfinished  state.  The  naval  equip- 
ment   was    thoroughly    inadequate.     The    whole    high 


RELATION'S  WITH  CHINA  AND  JAPAN     35 

administrative  personnel,  from  the  Viceroy,  Admiral 
Alexeyev,  down,  seems  to  have  been  scarcely  fitted  for 
the  difficult  tasks  at  hand.  Moreover,  the  war  was 
never  for  a  moment  popular  in  Russia  herself.  The 
public  opinion  of  the  country  was  never  in  sympathy 
with  the  Far  Eastern  ambitions  of  the  Government, 
which  were  so  obviously  wasteful  and  unnecessary,  the 
product  of  foreign  intrigue  and  overbearing  hot- 
headedness. 

Beginning  with  the  daring  sinking  of  three  Russian 
warships  in  the  harbor  of  Port  Arthur,  which  was  the 
first  act  of  war,  and  on  through  the  victories  of  Mukden 
and  Tsusima,  as  weU  as  numerous  other  major  and 
minor  triumphs  of  the  Japanese  army  and  navy,  Japan 
dealt  Russia  one  swift  blow  after  another.  But  a  year 
and  a  half  of  this  impetuous  fighting  exhausted  Japan. 
It  is  said — and  probably,  with  justice — that  at  the  time 
when  the  war  was  brought  to  a  close  by  the  American 
offer  of  good  offices,  Japan  was  in  no  position  to  conduct 
either  offensive  operations  or  a  prolonged  war,  while 
Russia,  awakening  from  the  stunning  influence  of  her 
first  defeats,  had  reorganized  herself  for  very  effective 
defensive  operations.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  also 
true  that  the  war  had  already  thrown  Russia  into  the 
throes  of  the  first  revolution,  which  burst  out  in  all  its 


36  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

fury  immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  the  war  and 
could  scarcely  have  been  staved  off  by  the  Government. 
In  any  event,  the  Russo-Japanese  War  ended  the 
first  period  of  Russia's  intense,  though  thoughtless, 
imperialism  in  the  Far  East.  Japan's  triumph  and 
Russia's  defeat  once  more  reversed  their  positions 
in  Far  Eastern  affairs,  at  least  so  far  as  Manchuria  and 
Korea  were  concerned.  Japan  returned  to  the  position 
she  occupied  after  the  Simonoseki  treaty,  now  prac- 
tically unchallenged  in  her  attempts  at  establishing  her 
supremacy  on  the  shores  of  the  Yellow  Sea.  Russia 
lost  all  prestige  in  the  south.  But  the  forces  of  east- 
ward penetration  which  she  had  created  during  that 
decade  of  frenzied  imperialism  in  Manchuria  could  not 
be  crushed  even  by  so  serious  a  reverse  as  the  defeat  she 
suffered  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War.  While  Japan  was 
busy  with  the  securing  of  the  fruits  of  her  stupendous 
victory,  Russia  turned  her  attention  in  another  direc- 
tion. 


CHAPTER  IV 

TREATY  AREANGEMENTS  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  Russo-Japanese  War  brought  to  a  close  a  decade 
of  intense  and  persistent  Russian  imperialism  in  the 
Far  East.  It  took  Japan  eight  years  of  preparations 
and  two  years  of  the  bloodiest  war  in  her  history  to 
avenge  herself  and  to  get  back  what  she  had  lost  because 
of  Russia's  interference  with  the  operation  of  the 
Simonoseki  treaty.  But,  curiously  enough,  the  lesson 
which  should  have  been  drawn  by  both  the  Russian  and 
the  Japanese  empires  from  the  fate  of  Russia's  im- 
perialistic venture  in  Manchuria  passed  entirely  un- 
learnt by  either.  Just  as  Russia,  immediately  after 
frustrating  Japan  in  1895,  set  to  work  to  do  precisely 
what  she  prevented  Japan  from  doing,  so  Japan,  after 
defeating  Russia  on  the  fields  of  Manchuria,  imme- 
diately changed  some  of  the  fundamental  ideas  that 
had  actuated  her  policies  before  and  began  to  demand 
and  assure  to  herself  the  kind  of  rights  and  privileges 

against  which  she  had  protested  so  strenuously  when 

37 


38  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

they  were  held  bj  Russia.  In  each  case  there  was 
merely  a  change  of  technique  and  of  the  method  of 
approach. 

In  1895  Japan  wrested  from  China  by  force  of  arms 
the  recognition  of  Manchuria  as  lying  within  the  sphere 
of  her  special  interests.  Essentially,  that  meant  the 
closing  of  Manchuria  to  all  outsiders  except  Japan. 
During  the  following  three  years  Russia,  by  dint  of 
national  and  international  pressure,  forced  Japan  to 
relinquish  this  position  in  Manchuria,  and  succeeded  in 
replacing  Japan  by  herself.  Then  Japan  immediately 
began  to  demand  the  principle  of  "open  door"  in 
Manchuria.  To  this  Russia  was  strenuously  opposed. 
The  Russo-Japanese  War  again  shifted  the  position  of 
the  principals  in  this  conflict,  bringing  Japan  on  top 
once  more. 

But  the  Russo-Japanese  War  left  Japan  fully  mindful 
of  the  price  she  had  had  to  pay  for  the  political  and 
military  achievements  in  the  course  of  the  decade  of 
her  acute  conflict  with  Russia.  Left  panting  and  nearly 
exhausted  by  the  war  itself,  Japan  was  nevertheless 
watching  carefully  the  internal  political  developments 
in  Russia.  It  was  most  important  for  her  to  determine 
to  what  extent  the  internal  perturbations  in  Russia, 
brought  about  by  the  revolution  of  1905,  would  divert 


TREATY  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  FAR  EAST  39 

the  attention  of  tlie  Russian  Imperial  Government  from 
tbe  problems  of  the  Far  East.  When,  however,  the 
revolution  was  put  down  by  an  armed  hand  and  the 
Imperial  Government  seemed  entrenched  as  strong  as 
ever,  Japan  came  to  a  realization  that  such  an  enemy's 
defeat  may  easily  turn  to  bitter  resentment  and  even- 
tually to  revenge.  And  it  was  certainly  far  from 
Japan's  thoughts  to  endanger  the  advantages  she  had 
won  at  such  a  price  by  another  armed  conflict  with 
Kussia,  the  outcome  of  which  it  would  have  been  most 
difficult  to  predict  on  the  basis  of  the  previous  en- 
counter.   The  enemy  had  to  be  won  over  in  another  way. 

This  policy  pursued  by  Japan  dictated  a  number  of 
treaties  and  agreements  which  she  concluded  with 
Russia  in  the  course  of  the  decade  following  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War.  And  it  is  interesting  to  see  how  quickly 
Japan  changed  from  an  attempt  to  turn  to  advantage 
the  temporary  weakness  of  her  opponent  to  a  realization 
that  a  defeated  enemy  may  sometimes  be  turned  into 
a  valuable  partner. 

The  treaty  of  peace  which  formally  concluded  the 
Russo-Japanese  War  was  signed  at  Portsmouth,  'N.  H., 
in  September,  1905.  In  this  treaty  the  first  phase  of 
Japan's  policy  found  ample  expression. 

By  the  terms  of  the  Portsmouth  treaty,  Russia  re- 


40      ^  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

linquished  formally  all  claims  to  any  privileges  or 
special  interests  in  Korea  and  Southern  Manchuria. 
She  recognized  Korea  as  lying  within  the  sphere  of 
Japan's  special  interests,  and  thereby  opened  the  way 
to  Japan's  subsequent  complete  domination  of  the 
Korean  Peninsula.  She  ceded  to  Japan  all  the  rights 
she  enjoyed  in  Port  Arthur  and  Talienwan  by  virtue 
of  the  Russo-Chinese  agreement  of  1898,  as  well  as  the 
railroad  line,  running  from  these  ports  to  Changchun. 
She  withdrew  her  troops  from  all  parts  of  Manchuria, 
still  unevacuated,  and  formally  turned  over  this  terri- 
tory to  Japan,  which  undertook  to  restore  it  to  China. 
She  still  retained  the  Chinese  Eastern  Eailroad,  but 
obligated  herself  to  use  the  line  merely  for  economic, 
but  never  for  military,  purposes.  So  far  as  Russia's 
dominant  position  in  Manchuria  and  Korea  was  con- 
cerned, these  provisions  of  the  Portsmouth  treaty  ended 
once  for  all  her  pretensions  there. 

But  Japan  was  not  satisfied  with  merely  forcing 
Russia  to  liquidate  in  this  manner  her  whole  imperial- 
istic venture  in  the  Par  East.  She  felt  that  she  could 
also  compel  the  defeated  colossus  to  defray  part  of  the 
expenses  she  had  incurred  during  the  war  and  the  years 
that  preceded  it.  The  Russian  delegation,  headed  by 
Count  Sergius  Witte,  was  entirely  opposed  to  any  pro- 


TREATY  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  FAR  BAST  41 

vision  for  contributions  to  be  paid  bj  Russia  to  Japan. 
The  whole  conduct  of  negotiations  at  Portsmouth  was 
permeated  by  this  adamant  position  of  the  Russian 
delegation  on  the  question  of  contributions.  And  the 
compromise  arrived  at  in  this  regard  resolved  itself  into 
territorial  cession  and  economic  advantages  given  to 
Japan  by  Russia  as  indemnity  due  to  the  victor  in  the 
war. 

The  territorial  cession  consisted  of  the  southern  half 
of  the  island  of  Sakhalin,  below  the  line  of  50°  N.  lat. 
In  this  manner  Russia  relinquished  to  Japan  a  part  of 
the  territory  in  the  Far  East  which  she  had  been 
colonizing  for  nearly  fifty  years  and  which  she  held  in 
formal  possession  for  well  over  a  quarter  of  a  century. 
The  colonization  of  this  island  began  almost  simul- 
taneously by  the  Russians  and  the  Japanese  in  the  fifties 
of  the  past  century  on  the  principle  of  the  acquisition 
of  possession  of  unoccupied  lands.  This  chaotic  distri- 
bution of  mixed  population  on  the  island  led  to  numer- 
ous clashes  and  difficulties,  and  in  1875  a  treaty  was 
concluded  between  Russia  and  Japan,  by  virtue  of  which 
Japan  ceded  to  Russia  all  her  rights  in  the  Sakhalin 
in  exchange  for  the  Kuril  Islands.  By  virtue  of  the 
Portsmouth  treaty  Japan  received  back  the  southern 
half  of  the  island,  which,  during  the  years  subsequent 


43  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

to  the  treaty  of  1875,  was  discovered  to  be  a  veritable 
treasure-house  of  natural  wealth.* 

The  economic  advantages  obtained  by  Japan  as  a 
result  of  the  Portsmouth  treaty  consisted  in  a  recog- 
nition by  Russia  of  the  right  of  Japanese  subjects  to 
engage  in  the  fishing  trade  along  the  coast  of  Siberia. 
The  provisions  of  the  treaty  with  this  regard  were 
indefinite,  consisting  merely  of  a  statement  of  the 
general  principle  involved,  and  looking  toward  a  more 
detailed  arrangement  to  be  arrived  at  later  on.  This 
arrangement  was  made  two  years  later  in  the  form  of 
the  Russo-Japanese  Fisheries  Convention,  signed  on 
July  28,  1907. 

The  fisheries  rights  given  the  Japanese  by  the  Ports- 
mouth treaty  were  sweeping  and  all-inclusive  in  their 
nature.  They  were,  however,  defined  and  somewhat 
curtailed  by  the  Fisheries  convention  of  1907.  This 
convention  and  the  General  Political  Convention,  signed 
about  the  same  time,  indicate  clearly  Japan's  change  of 
policy  in  her  relations  with  Russia  that  took  place  in 
the  course  of  less  than  two  years. 

By  virtue  of  the  Fisheries  convention,  the  Japanese 
received  the  right  to  engage  in  various  fishing  pursuits, 

*  As  we  shall  see  below,  fifteen  years  after  the  Portsmouth  Treaty 
Japan  found  a  pretext  for  occupying  the  northern  half  of  the  island 
and  is  now  in  full  military  control  of  the  whole  of  Salihalin.  OJ. 
Chapter  V. 


TKEATY  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  FAR  EAST  43 

both  in  the  catching  of  fish  and  of  other  aquatic  prod- 
ucts, and  in  manufacturing  processes  concerned  with  all 
such  products.  But  the  area  open  to  them  was  no  longer 
the  whole  of  the  Russian  coast,  as  in  the  Portsmouth 
treaty,  but  somewhat  restricted  areas.  A  Protocol,  atr 
tached  to  the  Fisheries  convention,  defined  these  areas. 
The  Japanese  were  specifically  prohibited  from  fishing 
in  the  mouths  of  rivers  and  in  a  half-hundred  or  more 
enumerated  bays  and  inlets.  These  exceptions  were 
found  to  be  necessary  by  Russia  for  both  economic  and 
strategic  reasons.  Moreover,  the  whole  coast  of  the 
Sea  of  Okhotsk,  which  had  not  as  yet  been  sufficiently 
explored,  was  subjected  to  a  generalized  restriction 
which  provided  that  the  Japanese  could  not  fish  in 
inlets  the  indentation  of  which  exceeded  by  three  times 
their  width  at  the  mouth. 

Outside  of  the  restricted  areas,  however,  the  Japanese 
received  full  right  to  engage  in  fishing  on  an  equal 
footing  with  the  Russian  subjects.  The  manner  of 
granting  concessions  to  the  exploitation  of  any  given 
fishing  area,  provided  in  the  Fisheries  convention,  was 
that  of  an  annual  public  auction,  held  by  Russian 
Government  officials  at  Vladivostok,  with  the  Japanese 
subjects  enjoying  at  these  auctions  the  same  rights  as 
the  Russian  subjects. 


44  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

In  order  to  assure  the  Japanese  this  position  of 
equality  with  the  Russians  in  the  exploitation  of  the 
fisheries  in  the  conventional  waters,  the  convention 
specifically  provided  that  the  Japanese  should  not  be 
subjected  to  any  restrictions  or  taxes,  from  which  the 
Russians  in  the  same  locality  may  be  exempt.  On  the 
other  hand,  of  course,  they  were  subjected  to  all  the 
Russian  laws  with  regard  to  the  manner  of  exploitation, 
the  employment  of  foreign  labor,  etc.  The  Russian 
Government  agreed  to  impose  no  taxes  on  fish  and 
aquatic  products  caught  or  prepared  in  the  Maritime 
and  the  Amur  Provinces,  when  intended  for  exportation 
to  Japan,  while  the  Japanese  Government  agreed  to 
admit  such  products  into  Japan  free  of  duty.  The 
restrictions  regarding  non-conventional  waters  were  to 
apply  only  to  the  process  of  fishing  proper,  but  not  to 
the  processes  of  preparation  and  manufacture  of  fish 
and  other  aquatic  products,  with  respect  to  which  the 
Japanese  were  granted  certain  rights. 

The  Fisheries  convention  was  concluded  for  twelve 
years,  and  provisions  were  made  for  its  renewal  or 
cnodification  at  the  expiration  of  that  period. 

Almost  simultaneously  with  the  Fisheries  convention 
a  General  Political  Convention  between  Russia  and 
Japan  was  signed  in  St.  Petersburg  on  July  30,  1907. 


TREATY  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  VAH  EAST  45 
This  convention  signified  the  complete  establishment  of 
amicable  relations  between  Kussia  and  Japan  and,  by 
its  Article  2,  pledged  both  Kussia  and  Japan  to  the 
principle  of  "open  door"  in  China.  This  convention, 
however,  was  merely  a  screen  to  conceal  the  secret 
arrangements  made  at  the  same  time  between  Eussia 
and  Japan,  which  were  of  an  entirely  different  nature. 

The  Convention  of  1907  was  very  short,  consisting  of 
only  two  articles.  In  Article  1  each  of  the  contracting 
parties  obligated  itself  to  "respect  the  territorial  in- 
tegrity of  the  other."  A  similar  obligation  was 
assumed  by  each  of  the  parties  to  respect  the  rights 
accruing  to  each  of  them  from  all  agreements  between 
them  and  China,  operative  on  the  date  of  the  signing 
of  the  convention,  as  well  as  from  the  Portsmouth 
treaty  and  subsequent  special  agreements  between 
Russia  and  Japan.  So  far,  the  convention  merely 
guaranteed  the  continuation  of  the  general  politico- 
economic  conditions  that  had  become  established  in  the 
Far  East,  in  so  far  as  they  concerned  the  interests  of 
Russia  and  Japan. 

Article  2  referred  to  China.  The  two  contracting 
parties  recognized  the  independence  of  China  and  the 
integrity  of  the  territory  of  the  Chinese  Empire.  But 
besides  this  they  also  recognized  "the  principle  of  the 


46  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAE  EAST 

general  equality  of  rights  with  regard  to  trade  and  in- 
dustry in  that  Empire  for  all  nations."  And  having  thus 
solemnly  proclaimed  the  principle  of  the  "open  door" 
in  China,  the  two  contracting  parties  undertook  to 
"preserve  and  defend  the  status  quo  and  the  ahove- 
mentioned  principle  hy  all  peaceful  means  at  their 
disposal."  * 

Together  with  this  Convention,  Russia  concluded  a 
secret  treaty  with  Japan,  signed  on  the  same  day.  The 
text  of  this  secret  treaty  is  not  available  at  the  present, 
though  its  existence  is  established  definitely  by  refer- 
ences to  it  found  in  the  text  of  other  secret  treaties,  as 
published  by  the  Bolsheviki  soon  after  their  accession 
to  power  in  Russia.  It  is  therefore  possible  only  to 
surmise  the  nature  of  the  arrangements  which  were 
being  concluded  between  the  erstwhile  enemies.  Refer- 
ences to  this  treaty,  found  in  other  secret  documents 
published  by  the  Bolsheviki,  indicate  very  clearly  that 
at  least  one  provision  of  the  secret  treaty  dealt  with  the 
question  of  the  division  of  Russian  and  Japanese 
spheres  of  influence  in  Manchuria,  which  was  obviously 
in  contradiction  to  the  establishment  of  the  principle 
of  the  "open  door"  in  China  in  Article  2  of  the  General 
Political  Convention,   since  by  the  provisions  of  the 

•  For  full  text  of  this  Convention  see  Appendix  I, 


TREATY  AERANGEMENTS  IN  FAR  EAST  47 

Portsmouth  treaty  Manchuria  was  to  be  completely 
restored  to  China,  and  consequently,  in  1907,  consti- 
tuted indisputably  a  part  of  the  Chinese  Empire. 

References  in  other  secret  documents  published  by  the 
Bolsheviki  indicate  also  the  existence  of  two  more  secret 
treaties  between  Russia  and  Japan,  concluded  before 
the  World  War,  on  July  4,  1910,  and  July  8,  1912. 
Again,  the  text  of  these  treaties  is  not  available,  and 
their  nature  may  be  only  surmised. 

One  feature  of  all  these  agreements,  however,  appears 
certain.  While  the  General  Political  Convention  of 
1907  provided  specifically  that  the  contracting  parties 
undertook  to  defend  their  interests  in  the  Far  East  by 
"all  peaceful  means  at  their  disposal,"  the  secret  treaties, 
concluded  simultaneously  with  the  Convention  and  on 
later  occasions,  dealt  with  distinctly  military  matters 
and  contained  provisions  for  martial  preparations.  The 
last  secret  agreement  between  Russia  and  Japan  was 
concluded  in  1916.  The  text  of  this  treaty  was  made 
available  by  its  publication  in  the  official  organ  of  the 
Soviet  Government  soon  after  the  Bolsheviki  came  to 
power.* 

The  secret  treaty  of  1916  sheds  a  most  interesting 


♦  Gazette  of  tJie  Provisional  Workmen-Peasants  Oovemment,  Decem- 
ber 8    (21),  1917. 


48  EUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

light  upon  the  relations  which  at  that  time  existed 
between  the  Russian  Imperial  Government  and  the 
Government  of  Japan,  as  well  as  on  the  nature  of  the 
preceding  secret  agreements.  The  treaty  began  as 
follows : 

''The  Russian  Imperial  Government  and  the  Japanese 
Imperial  Government,  for  the  purpose  of  further  streng'then- 
ing  their  close  friendship  established  between  them  by  the 
secret  agreements  of  July  17  (30),  1907,  June  21  (July  4), 
1910,  and  June  25  (July  8),  1912,  have  agreed  to  supplement 
the  above-mentioned  secret  agreements  with  the  following' 
articles." 

The  treaty  itself  dealt  with  the  situation  in  China 
and  the  manner  in  which  it  was  likely  to  affect  the 
interests  of  Russia  and  Japan.  Article  1  stated  the 
agreement  of  the  contracting  parties  on  the  need,  so 
far  as  the  "vital  interests"  of  each  of  them  was  con- 
cerned, of  preserving  China  "from  the  political  domi- 
nation of  any  third  power,  holding  inimical  aims 
against  Russia  or  Japan."  The  treaty  foresaw  an 
eventuality  in  which  an  attempt  at  such  a  dom- 
ination may  be  made,  in  which  case  one  or  the  other 
of  the  contracting  parties  would  consider  itself 
called  upon  to  take  measures  in  order  to  prevent  "the 
establishment  (in  China)  of  such  a  state  of  affairs." 
And  if  such  measures  should  lead  to  a  declaration  of 
war  upon  one  of  the  contracting  powers  by  a  third 


TEEATY  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  FAR  EAST  49 

power,  the  other  contracting  party  undertook,  by  the 
terms  of  the  treaty,  to  come  to  the  assistance  of  its  ally. 

The  secret  treaty  of  1916  was  thus  a  defensive  alli- 
ance between  Russia  and  Japan,  which  pledged  each 
of  them  to  a  war,  in  case  the  special  interests  that  each 
of  them  sought  to  acquire  in  China  should  at  any  time 
be  threatened.  The  two  contracting  Governments 
visualized  the  possibility  of  such  a  conflict  as  rather 
imminent  at  the  time,  for  the  agreement  was  concluded 
for  the  period  of  five  years,  to  expire  on  July  14,  1921, 
but  continue  automatically  after  that,  unless  denounced 
by  either  of  the  parties. 

This  agreement  could  have  been  directed  against  one 
of  two  groups  of  powers.  The  first  was  Germany  and 
her  allies,  at  that  time  still  holding  their  own  on  the 
battlefields  of  the  world  war.  But  it  is  rather  incon- 
ceivable that  Russia  and  Japan  should  have  felt  their 
interests  in  China  threatened  by  Germany.  In  the  first 
place,  Germany  was  never  particularly  interested  in  the 
Far  East,  but  preferred,  as  we  have  already  seen,  to 
push  Russia  into  dangerous  ventures  and  experiments 
there.  And  in  the  second  place,  Germany  could  have 
been  a  menace  only  if  victorious  in  the  war,  in  which 
case  both  Russia  and  Japan  would  have  been  at  her 
mercy  as  defeated  enemies.     There  is  no  doubt  that  the 


50  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

secret  Russo-Japanese  agreement  of  1916  was  directed 
against  tlie  United  States^  as  the  power  vitally  inter- 
ested in  the  affairs  of  the  Far  East,  particularly  basing 
her  whole  policy  there  on  the  strict  application  of  the 
principle  of  the  "open  door"  in  China.  And  it  is  inter- 
esting that  in  publishing  the  text  of  this  agreement  the 
Bolsheviki  gave  it  the  following  significant  title : 

"SECRET  AGREEMENT  BETWEEN  RUSSIA  AND 
JAPAN,  with  Reference  to  a  Possibility  of  Their  Armed 
Conflict  together  against  America  and  Great  Britain  in  the 
Far  East  before  the  Summer  of  1921."  * 

The  secret  treaty  of  1916  was  the  last  agreement 
concluded  between  Russia  and  Japan  before  the  Russian 
Revolution.  The  imperialist  elements  in  Russia  and 
in  Japan  were  close  friends,  akin  in  the  spirit  that 
actuated  them. 

It  is  very  interesting  also  to  watch  the  interplay  of 
Imperial  Russia's  network  of  diplomatic  intrigue  with 
Japan,  as  embodied  in  the  open  and  secret  agreements 
between  them,  against  the  background  of  the  activities 

*  For  full  text  of  this  treaty  see  Appendix  I.  While  the  explanation 
of  the  purpose  of  this  secret  treaty  given  in  the  text  is  the  current 
explanation,  I  have  been  informed  by  persons  who  have  discussed  the 
question  with  the  former  Russian  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Sazonov, 
that  the  Russian  Government  did  have  Germany  in  mind  and  that  its 
chief  purpose  in  signing  the  treaty  was  to  bind  Japan  to  the  Entente 
py  another  agreement.  Sazonov  is  reported  as  saying  that  Russia  was 
at  that  time  too  busy  with  the  problems  of  the  war  to  give  serious 
thought  to  possible  aggression  in  China.  Even  if  this  explanation  is 
true,  nevertheless,  by  signing  the  secret  treaty  with  Japan,  Russia  was 
giving  the  latter  a  powerful  instrument  for  possible  use  in  the  near 
future,  as  may  be  clearly  seen  from  the  secret  telegram  on  the  Lansing- 
Ishii  agreement,  the  text  of  which  may  also  be  found  in  Appendix  I. 


TREATY  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  FAR  EAST    51 

which  each  of  them  pursued  in  various  parts  of  China. 
Whether  by  tacit  understanding  or  as  a  result  of  one 
of  the  secret  agreements,  the  text  of  which  is  still  un- 
known to  us,  Russia  and  Japan  seem  to  have  had  no 
difficulty  in  delimiting  the  spheres  of  their  activities. 
Japan  maintained  her  paramount  domination  in  Korea, 
in  portions  of  Manchuria,  and  was  rapidly  and  insist- 
ently building  up  her  influence  in  other  parts  of  China. 
Russia  concentrated  all  her  attention  on  Outer  Mon- 
golia, where  the  Japanese  let  her  have  an  entirely  free 
hand. 

The  basic  agreement,  under  which  Russia  was  con- 
ducting her  diplomatic  relations  with  China  all  through 
this  period,  was  a  thirty-year  treaty,  concluded  in  1881, 
fundamentally  built  on  a  previous  convention,  viz.,  that 
of  1860.  By  virtue  of  these  two  agreements,  the  boun- 
dary line  between  Russia  and  China  was  well  defined, 
and  a  provision  was  made  for  the  establishment  of  a 
fifty-verst  zone  along  the  whole  frontier,  within  which 
there  were  to  be  collected  no  customs  duties.  This  pro- 
vision stimulated  greatly  the  penetration  of  Russia  into 
some  portions  of  the  Chinese  territory,  notably  in 
Mongolia. 

Prior  to  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  the  interest  which 
Mongolia  held  for  the  Russian  Imperial  Government 


53  ETJSSIA  m  THE  FAE  EAST 

was  primarily  commercial  and  economic  generally.  But 
after  the  war,  when  Russia  found  herself  out  of  Korea 
and  Manchuria,  Mongolia  began  to  loom  large  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Russian  Government  as  a  political  possi- 
bility. Russian  interest  in  Mongolia  increased  very 
greatly,  and  some  ambitious  Russian  diplomats  began 
even  to  dream  of  an  independent  Mongol  state,  under 
Russian  influence  and,  possibly,  suzerainty,  constituting 
a  living  barrier  between  Russia  and  China.  Such  a 
barrier  was  thought  necessary  and  desirable  for  two 
reasons.  In  the  first  place,  should  China  pass  through 
as  rapid  a  transformation  as  Japan  and  appear  on  the 
scene  as  an  active  power,  the  Mongolian  barrier  would 
prove  excellent  protection  to  Russia — so  ran  the  argu- 
ments of  the  protagonists  of  the  Mongolian  barrier. 
In  the  second  place,  as  a  base  for  economic  penetration 
into  China,  Russian-controlled  Mongolia  would  be  a 
most  valuable  asset  for  whatever  imperialistic  designs 
the  Russian  Government  still  entertained. 

In  1910-11,  as  the  time  drew  near  for  the  expiration 
of  the  treaty  of  1881,  the  Russian  Government  began 
to  urge  upon  the  Government  of  the  Chinese  Empire 
a  renewal  and  revision  of  the  treaty.  One  of  the  re- 
visions sought  by  the  Russian  Government  was  an 
enlargement    of    Russian    rights    in    Mongolia.      The 


TKEATY  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  FAR  EAST  53 

Chinese  Government,  however,  persistently  refused  to 
accede  to  the  Russian  requests  in  this  regard.  In  Octo- 
ber, 1911,  the  Chinese  Revolution  broke  out  and  intro- 
duced a  radical  change  in  the  whole  situation. 

Even  before  the  Revolution,  however,  in  July,  1911, 
Hu-tukh-tu,  the  Living  Buddha  of  Mongolia,  convoked 
a  council  of  Mongol  princes  to  discuss  the  question  of 
relations  with  the  Chinese.  Administratively,  Mon- 
golia was  part,  of  the  Chinese  territory  and  was  ruled 
by  Chinese  officials  who  were  despotic  and  oppressive. 
Their  rule  caused  widespread  dissatisfaction  among  the 
nomadic  population  of  Mongolia,  and  the  council  of 
princes  decided  to  seek  Russia's  protection.  A  delega- 
tion was  sent  to  St.  Petersburg,  and  the  Russian  Gov- 
ernment promised  the  Mongols  to  make  representations 
in  Peking.  In  accordance  with  this,  Russia  proposed 
to  China  an  arrangement  whereby  Mongolia  would  be 
given  administrative  autonomy.  But  this  proposal  was 
rejected  by  the  Chinese  Government. 

Immediately  following  the  Chinese  Revolution,  Mon- 
golia declared  her  independence,  claiming  that  the  over- 
throw of  the  Manchu  dynasty  absolved  the  Mongols  from 
their  allegiance  to  the  central  Government  of  China. 
Again  the  Mongols  turned  to  Russia  for  protection,  and 
the  Russian  Government  proposed  to  the  new  Chinese 


54  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

Government  an  arrangement  witli  Mongolia  similar  to 
that  of  the  preceding  year.  But  the  Chinese  Govern- 
ment again  rejected  the  Russian  proposal.  Then  the 
Russian  Government  declared  that  it  would  negotiate 
directly  with  the  Mongol  authorities  in  Urga,  the  capital 
of  Mongolia.  The  result  of  these  negotiations  was  a 
treaty,  concluded  between  Russia  and  Mongolia,  in 
September,  1912. 

While,  in  concluding  this  treaty,  Russia  formally 
acknowledged  the  independence  of  Mongolia,  she  never- 
theless declared  her  willingness  to  recognize  China's 
sovereignty  over  Mongolia  on  condition  of  the  accept- 
ance by  the  Government  at  Peking  of  the  conditions  of 
Mongolian  autonomy  proposed  originally  by  Russia. 
China  entered  a  formal  protest  against  the  Russo- 
Mongolian  treaty  and  refused  to  acknowledge  it.  Then 
negotiations  began  between  Peking  and  St.  Petersburg, 
and  finally  resulted  in  a  Russo-Chinese-Mongolian 
agreement,  signed  in  the  city  of  Kyakhta,  whereby  Mon- 
golia was  made  into  an  autonomous  state,  with  its 
Living  Buddha  as  the  supreme  ruler,  but  under  Chinese 
suzerainty.*  By  this  agreement  Russia  secured  valu- 
able rights  and  privileges  on  the  territory  of  autono- 
mous Mongolia. 

*  For  the  principal  provisions  of  this  tripartite  agreement  see 
Appendix  II. 


TEEATY  AERANGEMENTS  IN  FAE  EAST  55 

To  wliat  extent  tJie  events  in  Mongolia  ever  since 
1911  were  the  work  of  the  agents  of  the  Russian  Im- 
perial Government  is  not  known,  but  that  such  agents 
had  a  hand  in  their  unfolding,  especially  after  the  Chi- 
nese Revolution,  appears  fairly  certain.  After  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Russo-Chinese  Mongolian  agreement,  Rus- 
sian activities  in  Mongolia  increased.  And  while 
Russia  was  busy  with  her  Mongolian  venture,  Japan 
was  pushing  very  energetically  her  own  penetration  in 
other  parts  of  China.  The  open  agreements  between 
Imperial  Russia  and  Imperial  Japan  remained  merely 
the  screen  of  the  understanding  between  the  two  Gov- 
ernments; the  spirit  which  animated  the  relations  be- 
tween the  two  was  the  spirit  of  undisguised  imperial- 
ism that  permeated  their  secret  agreements. 

In  March,  1917,  came  the  Russian  Revolution  and 
swept  out  of  existence  the  Russian  member  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  imperialistic  partnership. 


CHAPTEE  V 

THE    BOLSHEVIKI   AND    THE    JAPANESE    IN    SIBERIA 

During  the  World  War  and  the  first  stages  of  the  Revo- 
lution, Siberia  acquired  a  great  importance  because  it 
provided  Russia  with  her  best  available  means  of  com- 
munication with  the  outside  world.  The  port  of  Vladi- 
vostok was  literally  the  door  to  'Russia.  Immense 
quantities  of  munitions  and  railroad  supplies  were 
brought  in  through  it. 

The  March  Revolution  affected  Siberia  at  the  same 
time  that  it  did  the  rest  of  Russia,  and  its  processes 
presented  nothing  novel.  The  authority  of  the  Pro- 
visional Government  was  readily  recognized,  and  the 
change  at  the  center  was  acclaimed  with  great  enthu- 
siasm. Then,  during  the  months  that  followed,  Siberia 
passed  through  the  same  process  of  the  disintegration  of 
the  revolutionary  ideas  through  which  European  Russia 
passed  and  which  eventually  culminated  in  the  over- 
throw of  the  Provisional  Government  in  November, 
1917,  and  the  establishment  of  the  so-called  Soviet 

regime. 

66 


BOLSHEVIKI  AND  JAPANESE  IN  SIBEEIA    57 

The  Soviet  authority  was  introduced  in  Siberia  soon 
after  the  establishment  of  the  Soviet  regime  in  European 
Kussia.  It  appeared  in  different  centers  at  different 
dates,  but  by  January,  1918,  it  was  established  in  all 
the  important  parts  of  Siberia  and  the  Far  East.  It 
existed  until  the  late  summer  of  that  year,  when  various 
isolated  uprisings,  coupled  with  the  appearance  in 
Siberia  of  Allied  forces  landing  from  the  East  and  the 
Czecho-Slovak  detachments  entering  Siberia  from  the 
West,  overthrew  the  Soviet  authority  everywhere.  The 
establishment  of  the  Omsk  Government,  by  the  removal 
thither  of  the  Directorate  elected  by  the  members  of  the 
former  Constituent  Assembly  at  Oufa,  furnished  a 
center  around  which  the  anti-Bolshevist  movement  in 
Siberia  began  to  gi-oup  itself.  On  November  18,  1918, 
the  Directorate  was  overthrown,  and  Admiral  Kolchak 
assumed  control.  His  rule  lasted  until  the  beginning 
of  1920,  when  his  forces  were  crushed  by  the  Red 
Armies,  while  he  himself  was  captured  and  executed. 
The  Bolshevist  armies  marched  nearly  as  far  as  Lake 
Baikal  and  there  halted,  pending  negotiations  with  the 
political  groups  of  Eastern  Siberia.* 

•  A  detailed  examination  of  the  anti-Bolshevist  movement  in  Siberia 
and  an  evaluation  of  its  various  factors  is  entirely  outside  the  scope 
of  this  book.  For  this  reason,  the  events  that  had  taken  place  la 
Siberia  and  in  the  Far  East  prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  Far 
Eastern  Republic  are  told  here  in  their  broad  outlines. 


58  ETJSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

The  Allies  withdrew  their  forces  eastward  with  the 
retreat  of  Kolchak's  armies,  and  eventually  took  them 
out  of  Siberia  altogether.  The  only  troops  that  re- 
mained over  in  Siberia  were  the  Japanese. 

Practically  all  the  Russian  groups  in  Siberia  are 
agreed  on  accusing  the  Allies  of  never  giving  full-fledged 
support  to  the  anti-Bolshevist  movements  in  Siberia. 
But  the  most  direct  accusation  was  against  the  Japa- 
nese, who  were  numerically  the  largest  foreign  power 
in  Siberia,  and,  for  obvious  reasons,  were  more 
directly  concerned  with  the  developments  in  Siberia 
than  any  of  the  others.  The  Japanese  are  specifically 
accused  of  never  giving  full  support  to  the  principal 
movement,  but  rather  staking  on  individual  leaders  and 
playing  them  against  each  other. 

The  part  of  Siberia  which  is  of  special  concern  to 
Japan  is  the  territory  lying  between  the  seaboard  and 
Lake  Baikal.  The  key  to  this  part  of  Siberia  is  the 
port  of  Vladivostok.  During  the  existence  of  the  Omsk 
Government  almost  this  whole  territority  was  only  under 
a  nominal  control  of  that  Government.  Different  parts 
of  it  were  held  by  leaders  of  armed  bands,  some  of 
them  commanding  rather  large  forces  and  enjoying 
outside  assistance.  The  most  important  of  these  were 
the  Atamans   Semenov   and  Kalmykov,   and   General 


BOLSHEVIKI  AND  JAPANESE  IN  SIBERIA    59 

Eosanov.  The  latter  was  stationed  in  Vladivostok. 
While  nominally  under  orders  from  Omsk,  he  acted, 
in  reality,  in  an  entirely  independent  manner,  and  his 
actions  were  offensive  to  all  democratic  elements.  Many 
attempts  were  made  at  Omsk  to  have  Eosanov  removed, 
and  finally,  on  October  25,  1919,  Admiral  Kolchak  or- 
dered Eosanov  to  give  up  his  command  and  come  to 
Omsk.  But  Eosanov  appealed  to  Semenov  and  Kalmy- 
kov  for  assistance,  and  having  been  assured  of  their 
support  and — so  the  Vladivostok  version  runs — of  the 
good-will  of  the  Japanese,  he  refused  to  obey  the  order 
from  Omsk. 

The  Omsk  Government  could  not  enforce  its  au- 
thority, and  Eosanov  remained  the  virtual  master  of 
the  situation.  His  rule  in  Vladivostok  lasted  until 
January  31,  1920,  by  which  time  his  authority  had 
degenerated  entirely  and  its  remnants  were  easily  over- 
thrown by  the  partisan  forces  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Vladivostok  Zemstvo,  which  then  set  up  a  Provisional 
Government. 

The  next  important  event  in  the  Eussian  Far  East 
occurred  on  April  4-5,  when  a  series  of  armed  clashes 
took  place  between  the  Eussian  and  Japanese  troops. 
During  the  two  montbs  which  preceded  the  clash  the 
relations  between  the  Japanese  and  the  Eussians  in 


60  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

Vladivostok  and  the  adjacent  territory  were  becoming 
more  and  more  strained.  The  allied  troops  were  being 
evacuated,  but  the  Japanese  made  no  preparations  for 
leaving.  The  Provisional  Government,  headed  by  the 
President  of  the  Zemstvo,  A.  S.  Medvyedev,  maintained 
cordial  relations  with  the  Japanese  political  mission  at 
Vladivostok,  although  its  relations  with  the  military 
command  were  strained.  The  Provisional  Government 
declared  as  its  object  the  ending  of  the  civil  war  and  the 
coming  to  some  understanding  with  Moscow,  and  its 
chief  objection  against  the  Japanese  was  that  they  were 
not  in  favor  of  such  a  program.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Japanese  objected  most  strenuously  to  the  manner 
in  which  Medvyedev's  Government  attempted  to  hasten 
the  evacuation  of  the  Japanese  troops. 

There  seems  to  be  no  doubt  that  the  hostility  against 
the  Japanese  was  something  that  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment could  not  control,  even  if  it  desired  to  do  so. 
It  was  growing  all  the  time  and  expressed  itself  more 
and  more  in  open  clashes. 

This  growing  hostility  against  the  Japanese  was 
accompanied  by  an  increasing  popularity  of  the  Bol- 
sheviki,  who  were  extremely  active  all  the  time.  The 
liberal  leaders  realized  that  the  Japanese  would  feel 
entirely  free  to  take  any  military  measures  they  chose, 


BOLSHEVIKI  AND  JAPANESE  IN  SIBERIA    61 

if  a  Soviet  regime  should  become  established  in  Vladi- 
vostok and  they  attempted  to  prevent  such  an  eventu- 
ality warning  the  extreme  elements  of  the  danger  of 
the  situation. 

These  warnings  were  not  heeded,  however,  by  the 
local  Bolshevist  groups,  while  the  departure  of  the 
American  troops  left  the  Japanese  alone  in  the  field,  who 
then  apparently  decided  to  take  effective  measures.  On 
April  2  an  ultimatum  was  presented  to  the  Provisional 
Government.  The  substance  of  the  ultimatum  was  that 
there  should  be  no  interference  with  the  actions  of  the 
Japanese  military  authorities,  so  far  as  those  actions 
concerned  military  affairs;  that  all  activities  of  secret 
groups  or  societies  considered  harmful  for  the  Japa- 
nese troops  or  for  Manchuria  and  Korea  should  be  for- 
bidden ;  that  all  publications  directed  against  the  Japa- 
nese Empire,  its  existence  or  its  army,  should  be  sup- 
pressed. 

On  April  3,  the  Soviet  of  Workmen's  and  Peasant's 
Deputies  met  in  Vladivostok,  as  if  in  answer  to  the  Jap- 
anese ultimatum.  On  the  next  day,  the  Provisional  Gov- 
ernment accepted  the  Japanese  ultimatum  in  its  entirety, 
but  it  was  already  too  late.  Everything  was  ready  for 
an  explosion;  only  the  first  spark  was  lacking,  and  it 
was  supplied  on  the  night  of  that  same  day.    Although 


62  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

the  Provisional  Govemment  officially  denied  it,  the 
Japanese  command  claimed  that  during  the  night  Jap- 
anese patrols  were  fired  upon  in  some  parts  of  the  city, 
and  on  the  following  morning,  General  Oi,  commanding 
the  troops  at  Vladivostok,  ordered  all  Russian  troops 
disarmed.  This  order  was  carried  out  with  considerable 
bloodshed,  both  in  Vladivostok  and  in  Nikolsk  and 
Khabarovsk. 

The  Provisional  Government  disclaimed  responsi- 
bility for  the  attacks  on  the  Japanese  patrols  and  en- 
tered into  negotiations  with  the  Japanese  military  com- 
mand for  the  adjustment  of  the  situation.  An  agree- 
ment was  finally  signed  in  Vladivostok  on  April  29. 
By  virtue  of  this  agreement  no  Russian  troops  were  to 
be  permitted  within  thirty  kilometers  of  the  Ussuriysk 
and  the  Suchansk  railroad  lines  and  of  the  China- 
Korea  border.  The  only  exception  was  made  in  the 
case  of  militia  on  police  duty,  but  its  number  was  to 
be  determined  only  by  agreement  with  the  Japanese 
command. 

Thus  the  Japanese  military  command  assumed 
absolute  control  of  all  the  means  of  transportation  and 
the  Suchansk  coal  mines.  The  Provisional  Govem- 
ment was  not  forbidden  to  have  troops  of  its  own,  but 
it  was  cut  off  from  all  sources  of  military  supplies. 


BOLSHEVIKI  AND  JAPANESE  IN  SIBERIA    63 

And  what  was  even  more  important,  practically  all  cities 
and  towns  of  importance,  with  the  exception  of  two  or 
three  small  ones,  came  under  the  military  control  of 
the  Japanese,  for  they  are  all  situated  on  or  near  the 
railroad  lines. 

No  wonder  that  the  chief  representative  of  the  Rus- 
sian command  said:  "It  is  with  a  heavy  feeling  that 
we,  the  representatives  of  the  Russian  military  com- 
mand, sign  this  agreement." 

Nor  was  this  all.  At  about  the  same  time,  a  band 
of  partisan  troops  was  reported  marching  toward  the 
city  on  Nikolayevsk,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Amur  river, 
which  had  a  considerable  Russian  population  and  a 
small  Japanese  garrison.  Various  and  conflicting 
stories  are  told  as  to  what  happened  during  the  strug- 
gle for  the  city,  some  accounts  even  making  the  Japa- 
nese command  in  Siberia  directly  responsible  for  the 
city's  inability  to  offer  sufficient  resistance.  In  any 
event,  the  occupation  of  the  city  was  accompanied  by  a 
horrible  massacre,  as  a  result  of  which  700  Japanese 
and  4,000  Russians  lost  their  lives. 

Whatever  were  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
Nikolayevsk  tragedy  took  place,  it  provided  the  Japa- 
nese with  an  excuse  for  occupying  the  city  and  thus 
acquiring  possession  of  the  mouth  of  the  Amur  river. 


64  RUSSIA  IN"  THE  FAR  EAST 

Moreover,  not  content  with  the  occupation  of  Nikolay- 
evsk,  the  Japanese  also  occupied  the  northern,  or  Rus- 
sian, half  of  the  island  of  Sakhalin,  which  lies  oppo- 
site the  mouth  of  the  Amur. 

A  little  later,  Japanese  warships  appeared  off  the 
coast  of  Kamchatka,  a  landing  of  military  forces  was 
effected,  and,  according  to  a  reliable  report,  a  military 
post  and  a  radio  station  was  constnicted  there. 

Thus,  by  the  summer  of  1920,  practically  the  whole 
seaboard  of  Siberia  was  in  the  hands  of  the  Japanese, 
held  by  them  on  terms  of  military  occupation. 

In  the  meantime,  while  all  this  was  going  on,  a  new 
plan  was  unfolding  itself  in  Eastern  Siberia,  a  plan  of 
creating  a  temporarily  independent  state  on  the  Rus- 
sian territory  lying  east  of  Lake  Baikal,  that  would 
act  as  a  "buffer"  between  Soviet  Russia  and  Japan. 
This  idea  grew  out  of  the  circumstances  that  charac- 
terized the  political  situation  in  Eastern  Siberia  prior 
to  the  overthrow  of  the  Kolchak  Government. 

Admiral  Kolchak  was  deposed  and  his  regime  was 
overthrown  in  Irkutsk  shortly  after  the  seat  of  gov- 
ernment was  removed  thither  from  Omsk.  The  over- 
throw was  effected  by  the  so-called  Political  Center, 
created  some  time  before  that  by  the  liberal  Zemstvo 
elements.     In  October,   1919,  a  conference  of  repre- 


BOLSHEVIKI  AND  JAPANESE  IN  SIBERIA    65 

sentatives  of  sixteen  Zemstvos  in  Eastern  Siberia  took 
place  and  decided  upon  the  overthrow  of  the  Kolchak 
Government  on  the  ground  that  it  had  degenerated  into 
an  utterly  reactionary  regime.  The  groups  represented 
at  this  conference  later  on  created  the  Political  Center, 
and  assumed  authority  on  the  deposing  of  the  Admiral. 
The  idea  of  creating  a  ''buffer"  state  was  originally 
brought  forward  by  these  groups. 

One  of  the  first  actions  of  the  Political  Center  after 
assuming  authority  was  to  enter  into  negotiations  with 
the  Soviet  authorities  concerning  the  idea  of  the  "buffer" 
state.  On  January  19,  1920,  a  conference  took  place 
at  Tomsk,  between  the  representatives  of  the  Irkutsk 
groups  and  the  Soviet  leaders.  It  was  decided  to  create 
such  a  state  with  its  capital  at  Irkutsk,  and  on  Sep- 
tember 21  Moscow  sanctioned  this  agreement  by  tele- 
graph. 

But  even  before  the  Irkutsk  delegates  returned  from 
Tomsk,  the  Government  which  they  represented  was 
overthrown  by  the  local  Bolsheviki,  and  the  whole 
western  part  of  the  proposed  "buffer"  state  was  offi- 
cially declared  part  of  the  Soviet  territory.  However, 
the  idea  of  the  "buffer"  state  was  not  given  up.  The 
city  of  Verkhneudinsk  was  declared  capital  of  the  new 
state,  and  Moscow  hastened  to  recognize  it. 


66  EUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

The  situation  that  became  established  as  a  result  of 
all  this  by  the  beginning  of  the  summer  of  1920,  was 
as  follows:  the  Soviet  authority  officially  extended  as 
far  as  the  Verkhneudinsk  "buffer"  state.  Beyond  the 
"buffer,"  which  was  controlled  from  Moscow,  was 
Chita  and  its  district,  controlled  by  Ataman  Semenov, 
who  resisted  all  pressure  from  the  west  and  from  the 
east  and  was  openly  supported  by  the  Japanese.  On 
the  coast  was  the  Provisional  Government  of  the  Mari- 
time Province,  located  in  Vladivostok,  but  practically 
powerless  because  of  the  conditions  of  the  Japanese 
control.  Besides  these  larger  centers,  there  were  sev- 
eral of  lesser  importance,  but  nevertheless  powers  unto 
themselves.  Such  were  Blagovyeshchensk  and  Khaba- 
rovsk. During  the  summer,  a  number  of  attempts  were 
made  to  unite  all  these  independent  groups  into  one 
state,  but  it  was  not  until  the  fall  of  1920  that  such  a 
unification  was  finally  effected. 

During  this  period  there  were  three  elements  in  the 
situation.  The  first  element  comprised  the  Bolshevist 
or  Communist  groups,  directed  from  Moscow.  The  sec- 
ond consisted  of  the  Japanese,  who  dominated  the  situ- 
ation. The  third  element  consisted  of  the  local  non- 
Bolshevist  groups,  finding  themselves  wedged  in  between 
their  fear  of  permanent  Japanese  control  of  the  terri- 


BOLSHEVIKI  AND  JAPANESE  IN  SIBERIA    67 

tory  and  its  consequent  loss  to  Russia,  and  tlie  alterna- 
tive of  making  peace  with  the  Bolsheviki.  They  chose 
the  second  course.  At  the  Tomsk  conference,  the 
leader  of  the  Irkutsk  delegation  expressed  the  views  of 
these  groups  in  the  following  way: 

"We  are  not  speaking  here  of  any  moral  or  academic 
considerations;  we  are  interested  in  a  mere  evaluation  of 
forces.  If  Soviet  Russia  has  at  the  present  time  sufficient 
strength  to  crush  the  Japanese  reaction  and  the  Japanese 
militarism,  then  the  question  is  very  simple:  let  the  Soviet 
troops  continue  their  march  to  Irkutsk  and  on  beyond 
Irkutsk.  Then  no  'buffer'  state  is  necessary.  But  if  Soviet 
Russia  does  not  possess  such  forces  at  the  present  time,  then, 
for  the  sake  of  preserving  the  unity  of  Russia  and  the  re- 
unification of  Eastern  Siberia  with  the  rest  of  Russia,  it  is 
necessary  to  create  a  special  democratic  formation.  As  far 
as  Soviet  Russia  is  concerned,  the  creation  of  such  a  ^buffer' 
state  would  be  rendered  easier  for  it  by  the  fact  that  the 
Siberian  democracy  will  not  conduct  a  struggle  against  it. 
The  Siberian  democracy  has  determined  quite  firmly  the  line 
it  is  to  follow:  the  giving  up  of  all  struggle  on  the  western 
frontier  of  Siberia,  and  the  concentration  of  all  forces  on 
the  eastern  frontier  for  a  struggle  against  the  reaction."  * 

In  the  negotiations  which  were  conducted  between 
the  Japanese  and  the  Soviet  representatives  during  this 
period,  the  former  were  inclined  to  accept  the  idea  of 
the  "buffer"  state,  provided  its  forms  of  organization 
would  not  be  Communistic.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Soviet   representatives   readily   assured   the   Japanese 

•  From  a  speech  by  E.  E.  Kolossov,  quoted  in  Bovremennyia  Zapiski, 
No.  3.  for  1921. 


68  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

that  the  "buffer"  would  have  forms  of  government  that 
would  be  quite  acceptable  to  them.  As  early  as  April, 
the  Soviet  Plenipotentiary  in  the  Far  East,  V.  D. 
Vilensky,  assured  the  head  of  the  Japanese  Diplomatic 
Mission,  Count  Mat^iudaira,  that  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment considered  the  "buffer"  state  as  "a  zone,  in  which 
the  capitalistic  activities  of  the  foreigners,  particularly 
the  Japanese,  could  be  carried  on  in  conditions  more 
customary  for  them  than  would  have  been  the  existence 
of  Soviet  forms."  * 

An  obstacle  to  the  creation  of  a  unified  "buffer"  in 
Eastern  Siberia  was  the  existence  of  the  barrier  between 
Verkhneudinsk  and  Vladivostok  in  the  form  of  the 
Semenov  Government  at  Chita.  The  Japanese  com- 
mand was  inclined  to  remain  on  friendly  terms  vdth 
the  Ataman,  and  as  late  as  June,  1920,  the  Central 
Information  Bureau  of  Vladivostok  reported  the  fol- 
lowing interview  with  General  Takayanaga,  Chief  of 
Staff  of  the  Japanese  expeditionary  forces: 

"The  General  considers  that  the  territory  controlled  by 
Semenov  must  be  considered  as  a  separate  political  entity  in 
the  negotiations  for  the  unification  of  the  Far  Eastern  forma- 
tions. According  to  Semenov's  claims,  his  authority  is  sup- 
ported by  at  least  75  per  cent,  of  the  population,  by  the 
Cossacks,  the  Buryats  and  a  part  of  the  Zemstvos.  The 
liquidation  of  the  barrier  is  desirable,  but  it  must  be  done 

*  Vladivostok  Dalnevoatochnoye  Obozreniye,  April  29,  1920. 


BOLSHEVIKI  AND  JAPANESE  IN  SIBEEIA    69 

without  violence,  through  agreement  on  the  part  of  the 
political  groups  and  a  free  expression  of  the  :will  of  the 
people."  * 


In  spite  of  this,  efforts  were  continued  to  call  a  con- 
ference, representing  the  whole  of  Eastern  Siberia. 
Finally,  arrangements  for  such  a  conference  were  com- 
pleted,  and  the  final  attempt  was  made  to  eliminate 
Semenov.  On  the  night  of  October  21,  a  surprise  at- 
tack was  undertaken  against  Chita,  Semenov  was  de- 
feated and  the  city  was  occupied  by  the  troops  of  the 
Verkhneudinsk  Government.  Several  days  later,  the 
conference  for  the  creation  of  the  "buffer"  state  met  in 
Chita.  It  consisted  of  representatives  of  Verkhneu- 
dinsk, Chita,  Blagovyeshchensk,  and  Vladivostok.  The 
result  of  the  conference  was  that  the  four  territories 
agreed  to  unite  into  a  state  to  be  known  as  the  Far 
Eastern  Republic,  and  that  elections  were  to  be  held  to 
elect  a  Constituent  Assembly. 

These  elections  were  held  at  the  beginning  of  1921, 
and  returned  a  peasant  majority,  though  the  elections 
were  so  manipulated  that  the  Communists  actually  con- 
trolled the  Assembly. 

To  what  extent  is  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  under 
the  control  of  Moscow?     This  is  the  question  that  ac- 

•  Vladivostok  Dalnevoatochnoye  Oboereniye,  June  2,  1920. 


70  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

quires  vital  importance  in  connection  with  the  whole 
situation  in  the  Far  East.  Speaking  at  the  Chita  con- 
ference, the  first  premier,  of  the  Far  Eastern  Re- 
public, Krasnoshchekov,  said: 

"Our  Republic  has  a  sign,  and  there  is  wrUing  on  both 
sides  of  the  sign.  On  one  side  it  is  written,  'Democracy/ 
What  is  inscribed  on  the  other  side  is  for  us,  for  our  own 
consumption." 

The  story  of  its  organization,  the  purpose  for  which  it 
has  been  organized,  and  the  activities  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Republic,  as  we  shall  see  later  on,  indicate  unmistakably 
that  it  is  completely  under  the  control  of  Moscow.  It 
is  a  truly  vassal  formation  of  Soviet  Russia. 

The  Far  Eastern  Republic  merely  represents  a  meth- 
od by  which  the  Bolsheviki  and  the  Japanese  are  at- 
tempting to  carry  out  their  policies  in  Siberia.  Of  and 
by  itself  it  is  of  comparatively  little  importance  and 
interest.  But  as  a  channel  for  the  activities  of  these 
two  elements  in  the  Russian  Far  East,  it  has  a  distinct 
significance  and  interest. 


CHAPTER  YI 

THE  THIED  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA 

Domination  in  Siberia  and  in  tlie  Russian  mid-Asiatic 
possessions  could  not,  of  course,  satisfy  the  Moscow 
leaders.  In  their  dreams  of  a  world  social  revolution, 
Asia  with  her  numberless  millions  always  loomed  very 
large.  And  soon  after  the  establishment  of  their  power 
in  Siberia  through  the  overthrow  of  t^e  Kolchak  Gov- 
ernment, the  Communist  leaders  turned  their  attention 
definitely  to  activities  in  different  parts  of  Asia. 

"Real  revolution  on  a  world  scale  will  not  begin  until 
Asia's  eight  hundred  millions  of  people  will  join  our  move- 
ment." 

With  these  words,  constituting  the  central  point  of 
his  address  at  the  Baku  Congress  of  the  ITations  of  the 
Orient,  G.  Zinoviev,  president  of  the  executive  commit- 
tee of  the  Third  or  Communist  International,  pro- 
claimed, in  the  summer  of  1920,  the  policy  and  the  aim 
of  the  Communist  movement  in  Asia. 

It  is  almost  a  paradox  that  a  group  of  men  who  have 

71 


72  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

thouglit  out,  in  the  very  heart  of  the  civilization  of  the 
West,  their  ideas  of  social  philosophy  and  the  methods 
of  applying  these  ideas  should  now  be  the  inspirers  and 
the  leaders  of  this  agitation  of  the  East  against  the 
West.  Yet  it  is  the  Third  International,  the  Moscow 
General  Staff  of  the  World  Revolution,  that  in  the 
summer  of  1920  began  to  make  attempts  to  organize, 
co-ordinate  and  lead  through  its  various  agencies  and 
instrumentalities  the  numerous  and  variegated  move- 
ments which  agitate  the  Orient.  And  today,  every- 
where in  Asia,  from  the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean  to 
the  utmost  reaches  of  China,  from  the  tundras  of 
Northern  Siberia  to  the  southernmost  point  of  India, 
the  agents  of  Communism  are  at  work,  bending  all  their 
energies  toward  the  consummation  of  their  ends. 

Movements  of  all  sorts  agitated  the  Orient  before  the 
leaders  of  the  world  Communism  thought  of  diverting 
the  energies  and  the  forces  thus  aroused  to  their  own 
ends.  But  these  movements  were  sporadic,  poorly  or- 
ganized, in  most  cases  mutually  antagonistic,  with 
scarcely  any  coordination,  either  in  the  aims  they  pur- 
sued or  the  methods  they  used.  Moreover,  the  aims  of 
most  of  these  movements  have  been  and  still  are  either 
not  in  correspondence  with  or  even  directly  opposed  to 
the  aims  which  the  world  Communism  sets  before  itself. 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     73 

Yet  these  difficulties  do  not  deter  the  Third  Inter- 
national from  making  an  attempt  to  befriend  and  con- 
trol all  these  movements.  For  the  tactics  of  Communism 
render  not  only  permissible  but  actually  necessary  the 
utilization  of  movements  that  are  not  Communistic  in 
their  nature,  provided  those  movements  are  working 
toward  the  disruption  or  the  destruction  of  institutions 
and  organizations  which  it  is  necessary  for  Communism 
to  disrupt  or  destroy  in  order  to  achieve  its  objects. 
And  so  confident  are  the  leaders  of  Communism  of  the 
ultimate  triumph  of  their  aims  that  they  are  willing, 
for  reasons  of  expediency,  to  permit  their  oftentimes 
incongruous  allies  to  enjoy  temporarily  a  triumph  of 
their  particular  aims,  achieved  with  the  assistance  of 
the  masters  of  Communism.  Nowhere  are  these  tactics 
illustrated  better  than  in  the  work  which  the  active 
agencies  of  Communism  are  doing  in  the  East. 

There  are  two  lines  of  activities  that  are  pursued 
there  by  the  general  staff  of  the  revolution  in  Moscow, 
and  out  of  the  two  there  rapidly  emerges  now  a  third, 
more  formidable  than  either  of  the  others.  Through 
its  various  channels  of  propaganda  the  Third  Interna-- 
tional  makes  every  effort  to  bring  down  to  the  widest 
possible  masses  of  the  Orient  the  simplest  of  the  ideas 
of  Communism,  the  doctrine  of  destruction,  that  would 


74  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

set  them  aflame  and  prepare  them  for  an  uprising,  in 
which  the  Communist  leaders  hope  their  trusted  agents 
will  be  the  guiding  spirits.  Through  the  diplomatic 
agencies  which  now  constitute  such  an  important  part 
of  the  Russian  Soviet  Government,  the  leaders  of  Com- 
munism make  active  efforts  to  bring  within  the  sphere 
of  their  influence  all  the  official  and  semi-official,  formu- 
lated and  half-formulated  governmental  centers  of  the 
Orient.  Finally,  under  the  protection  and  with  the 
complete  assistance  of  Moscow  and  its  military  organi- 
zation, armed  forces  are  being  brought  into  existence  in 
some  parts  of  the  Orient. 

In  order  to  co-ordinate  the  work  of  propaganda  in 
different  parts  of  Asia,  the  Third  International,  at  the 
time  of  its  Second  World  Congress,  held  in  Moscow  in 
July  and  August,  1920,  decided  to  call  a  special  con- 
ference of  the  representatives  of  the  various  movements 
in  the  countries  and  territories  of  the  l^ear  and  Far 
East  that  are  either  in  sympathy  or  at  least  in  contact 
with  the  Communist  movement.  For  the  seat  of  this 
conference,  the  city  of  Baku,  the  important  oil  port  on 
the  Caspian  Sea,  was  chosen.  An  appeal  was  issued  by 
the  executive  committee  of  the  Third  International, 
signed  by  its  president  and  also  by  delegates  to  the 


THE  THIED  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     75 

Second  Congress  from  the  most  important  countries  of 
the  world,  including  the  United  States. 

This  conference,  known  officially  as  the  Congress  of 
the  Nations  of  the  Orient,  opened  on  September  1,  1920, 
and  lasted  for  more  than  two  weeks.  It  represented 
twenty  nationalities  of  the  Near  East,  Central  Asia  and 
the  Far  East,  among  them  the  following:  Turkey, 
China,  Turkestan,  Hindustan,  Daghestan,  Khiva, 
Bokhara,  Armenia,  Persia,  Afghanistan,  Georgia, 
Azerbaijan. 

The  outstanding  figure  at  the  Baku  Congress  was 
G.  Zinoviev,  the  president  of  the  executive  committee 
of  the  Third  International  and  the  head  of  the  govern- 
ment in  Petrograd,  one  of  the  most  active  and  promi- 
nent leaders  of  the  Communist  movement.  Zinoviev 
was  chosen  honorary  president  of  the  congress,  and  de- 
livered an  address  at  the  opening  session  in  which  he 
stated  the  program  which  the  Third  International  ex- 
pected the  movements  represented  at  the  Baku  Congress 
to  carry  out. 

At  the  outset  of  his  address  Zinoviev  noted  particu- 
larly the  fact  that  the  congress  in  Baku,  organized  under 
the  auspices  of  the  Communist  International,  really 
represented,  as  far  as  the  majority  of  its  delegates  was 


76  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

concerned,  movements  that  are  not  Communistic  in 
their  nature.  But  this  circumstance  was  more  than 
offset,  in  the  opinion  of  the  International,  hy  the  fact 
that  the  congress  represented  for  the  first  time  at  least 
tentative  unity  of  purpose  and  action  on  the  part  of 
twenty  or  more  nations  of  the  Orient  which  had  been 
until  then  either  isolated  from  each  other  or  more  or 
less  hostile  to  each  other.  The  great  task  of  the  con- 
gress was  to  find  common  ground  upon  which  these  na- 
tions could  unite  for  co-operation  and  the  strength  of 
collective  effort. 

This  common  ground  the  Communist  movement 
makes  it  its  object  to  supply  and  develop.  The  nations 
of  the  Orient  have  differences  of  old  standing  and  mu- 
tual enmities  that  are  traditional.  But  at  the  same 
time  all  of  them  have  grievances  that  may  be  reduced 
to  simple  terms  and  a  common  denominator.  All  of 
them  find  themselves  in  a  condition  of  political  and 
economic  dependence  upon  the  so-called  great  powers 
of  the  world.  A  compounding  of  these  grievances,  an 
accumulation  of  hostilities  springing  from  these  griev- 
ances, and  a  consequent  releasing  of  forces  and  energies 
which  may  be  turned  against  the  dominating  powers — 
all  these,  if  properly  directed  and  handled,  may  be  or- 
ganized for  an  active  struggle.    This  work  of  organiz- 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     77 

ing  the  forces  in  the  Orient  is  the  aim  of  the  Third 
International  in  its  activities  in  Asia.  The  stimula- 
tion of  this  work  was  the  object  of  the  Baku  Congress. 

Revolution  in  the  Orient,  sweeping  like  wildfire 
through  all  the  expanses  of  Asia — that  is  the  ideal  of 
Communism.  Eevolution,  as  conceived  bj  the  Com- 
munist movement,  is  and  must  be  a  world-wide  affair. 
But  it  is  not  proceeding  at  an  even  pace  or  developing 
into  similar  forms  in  the  West  and  in  the  East.  There 
are  really  two  streams  of  the  world  revolution.  That 
of  the  West  Zinoviev  characterized  in  his  speech  as  rapid 
and  turbulent  and  direct,  hurling  itself  in  a  definite 
direction,  making  rapid  inroads  into  all  those  phases 
of  life  in  the  West  which  it  must  traverse  in  order  to 
reach  the  goal  toward  which  it  is  striving.  The  stream 
in  the  East  is  slow  and  hesitant.  The  nations  of  the 
West,  whose  powers  and  efforts  feed  the  stream  of  the 
revolution  there,  know  what  they  want  and  proceed  to 
get  it.  The  nations  of  the  East  have  not  as  yet  awak- 
ened to  definite  and  complete  desires.  The  stream  of 
the  revolution  fed  by  their  movements  has,  in  conse- 
quence, different  characteristics  from  the  stream  in  the 
West. 

It  is  the  object  of  the  directing  center  of  the  world 
Communist   movement,    the    Third    International,    to 


78  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

work  for  the  uniting  of  these  two  streams.  But  such  a 
union  is  possible  only  if  the  forces  which  direct,  stimu- 
late and  hurl  forward  the  stream  of  the  West  should 
turn  their  attention  to  the  stream  of  the  East,  in  order 
to  arouse  its  activities  and  bring  them  to  a  pitch  which 
would  make  the  movements  that  make  it  up  a  really 
effective  factor  for  the  world  revolution. 

Whatever  the  movements  in  the  East  which  were 
represented  at  the  Baku  Congress  have  now  as  their 
aim,  ultimately  their  efforts  must  result  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  Communism  there.  But  none  of  the  coun- 
tries of  the  Orient  or  of  the  territories  which  have  not 
as  yet  risen  to  the  dignity  of  statehood  has  anything 
like  the  degree  of  capitalistic  development  which  is 
usually  presupposed  as  a  necessary  condition  for  the 
establishment  of  Communism.  In  other  words,  is  it 
necessary  to  wait  until  capitalistic  development  should 
come  to  the  Orient  before  attempting  to  light  up  there 
the  fires  of  revolution  which  would  eventually  lead  to 
the  establishment  of  Communism? 

Zinoviev  answered  this  query  in  a  negative  sense,  and 
offered  a  very  general  and  simple  formula,  universally 
applicable  in  its  simplicity.  As  long  as  Soviet  power 
has  become  established  in  Russia  or  in  any  other  one 
country,  that  is  the  signal  and  the  guarantee  of  success 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     79 

for  any  movement  looking  to  the  establisliment  of 
Communism  in  any  country,  even  if  that  country  is 
economically  backward. 

In  its  application  to  the  countries  of  the  Orient  this 
formula  assumes  a  very  definite  political  form,  in  tacti- 
cal conformity  with  the  general  character  of  the  move- 
ments actually  existing  there.  These  movements  are 
either  agrarian  or  national-democratic  in  character. 
The  first  kind  of  movements  assures  the  participation  of 
the  great  masses  of  the  people,  for  the  vast  majority  of 
the  population  of  Asia  is  agricultural.  The  system  of 
landholding  in  most  of  the  countries  there  is  such  that 
the  best  lands  are  generally  held  by  large  land  proprie- 
tors on  the  basis  of  very  extensive  holdings  and  of  an 
exploitation  of  the  masses  of  the  people.  Resentment 
on  the  part  of  the  peasantry  against  such  an  agrarian 
scheme  may  easily  be  turned  to  account,  provided 
enough  propaganda  can  be  conducted  among  the  peas- 
antry with  the  view  of  convincing  them  that  the  chief 
cause  of  such  a  state  of  affairs  lies  in  the  fact  of  their 
economic  and  territorial  dependence  upon  the  particular 
great  power  which  holds  the  protectorate  over  their 
country.  In  this  way  the  agrarian  movements  which 
have  narrow  and  immediate  aims  may  be  used  as  a 
powerful  adjunct  of  the  other  kind  of  movements,  the 


80  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

control  over  whicli  the  leaders  of  the  Communist  move- 
ment are  striving  to  seize — namely,  movements  for  the 
political  independence  or  the  liberation  from  economic 
domination  of  the  countries  and  the  territories  of  the 
Orient. 

These  political  or  national-democratic  movements  are 
essentially  of  two  kinds.  In  countries  like  China,  Tur- 
key, Persia,  which  have  officially  independent  existence 
as  sovereign  states,  but  are  in  reality  politically  and 
economically  dependent  upon  one  or  another  of  the 
great  powers  active  in  the  affairs  of  Asia,  the  national- 
democratic  movements  have  the  character  of  a  struggle 
against  this  unofficial  but  nevertheless  real  political  and 
economic  dependence.  In  countries  like  India,  which 
even  officially  do  not  have  the  status  of  sovereign  states, 
these  movements,  in  their  political  aspects,  assume  the 
character  of  a  struggle  for  independence.  The  task  of 
Communism  is  to  render  sufficient  assistance  to  these 
movements  to  exact  from  them  in  return  pledges  to 
accept  the  Soviet  form  of  government,  once  their  inde- 
pendence or  complete  liberation  is  achieved. 

Soviets  must  bo  organized  throughout  the  Orient. 
This  is  the  order  of  the  day  from  the  general  staff  of 
the  world  revolution.  And  they  must  be  real  Soviets 
— so  Zinoviev  admonished  the  delegates  to  the  Baku 


.      THE  THIED  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     81 

Congress;  not  toy  Soviets  of  tlie  kind  that  exists  in 
Turkey.  Yet  the  Communists  in  Moscow  are  ready  to 
support  even  these  toy  Soviets  if  there  are  any  pros- 
pects of  utilizing  whatever  force  they  may  represent. 
Zinoviev  himself  illustrated  this  hy  giving  a  vivid  de- 
scription of  the  character  of  that  movement  in  Turkey 
which  had  then  the  support  of  the  Third  International 
and  of  the  Moscow  government,  the  peasant  movement 
in  Anatolia,  the  Turkish  province  in  Asia  Minor,  led 
by  Mustapha  Kemal.  This  movement  is  essentially 
religious  in  character  and  as  different  from  Communism 
as  day  from  night. 

According  to  Zinoviev  the  only  thing  that  Kemal  is 
fighting  for  is  the  re-estahlishment  of  the  religious  su- 
premacy of  the  Sultan.  To  Kemal  the  person  of  the 
Sultan  is  sacred,  although  in  deference  to  present-day 
tendencies  he  has  invented  a  title  for  him  that  is  in 
keeping  with  the  general  trend  of  modem  affairs.  The 
Sultan,  as  he  is  represented  by  Kemal  and  his  follow- 
ers to  the  peasants  whom  they  urge  to  rise  at  their  bid- 
ding, is  the  President  of  the  Democratic  Union  of  the 
Islamic  Nations.  But  at  the  present  time  the  Sultan 
has  fallen  into  the  power  of  foreign  non-believers,  and 
his  exalted  position  has  become  degraded.  Kemal  has 
declared  a  holy  war  against  the  invader  for  the  purpose 


83  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

of  saving  the  Sultan  from  this  degradation  and  freeing 
him  from  his  enemies. 

If  such  is  the  character  of  the  Kemal  movement  it 
is  logically  absurd  and  paradoxical  for  Communism  to 
support  it.  And  yet  it  has  enjoyed  that  support,  because 
there  is  one  element  in  it  which,  in  the  estimation  of 
the  Communist  leaders,  offsets  all  the  possible  contra- 
dictions to  the  Communist  movement  itself  that  there 
may  be  in  the  monarchic-religious  movement  led  by 
Kemal  and  disguised  but  very  thinly  by  his  clumsy 
adaptations  of  modern  terminology.  That  element  lies 
in  the  fact  that  the  Kemal  movement  is  primarily  di- 
rected against  Great  Britain  as  the  great  European 
power  with  extensive  interests  and  influence  in  the  Near 
East.  In  relating  the  circumstances  under  which  Com- 
munism finds  it  possible  to  support  such  a  movement  as 
that  led  by  Kemal,  Zinoviev  laid  down  the  most  impor- 
tant of  the  fundamental  theses  of  the  whole  policy  and 
program  of  Communism  in  Asia. 

In  his  own  words  this  policy  is:  "We  are  ready  to 
support  any  revolutionary  struggle  against  Great 
Britain." 

In  presenting  this  program  to  the  Baku  Congress 
and  in  laying  down  the  fundamentals  of  the  Communist 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN"  ASIA     83 

policy  in  the  East,  Zinoviev,  in  the  name  of  the  Third 
International,  appealed  to  the  nations  of  the  Orient  to 
co-ordinate  all  their  efforts  for  a  struggle  against  the 
European  power  in  the  East. 

The  watchword  under  which  this  struggle  was  to  be 
carried  on  was  presented  by  him  to  the  congress  in  the 
following  form :  "Declare  a  holy  war  against  European 
imperialism,  particularly  against  Great  Britain." 

This  watchword  was  adopted  by  the  congress,  and 
efforts  began  to  be  made  to  write  it  in  plain  letters 
upon  the  standards  of  every  revolutionary  movement  in 
the  East. 

The  Baku  Congress  resulted  in  two  definite  actions. 
The  first  consisted  in  a  signed  pledge  to  fight  the  world 
capitalism.  Besides  the  signatures  of  the  delegates 
from  the  Oriental  countries,  the  pledge  bears  also  those 
of  many  of  the  guests  at  the  congress — that  is,  of  promi- 
nent leaders  of  Communism  from  Soviet  Russia,  as  well 
as  other  countries  of  the  world,  including  the  United 
States,  who  attended  the  congress.  The  second  action 
of  the  Baku  Congress  was  the  organization  of  a  Council 
for  Propaganda  and  Action  in  the  Countries  of  the 
Orient.  This  Council  was  elected  at  the  congress  to 
act  as  the  agent  of  the  executive  committee  of  the  Third 


84  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

International,  which  now  issues  its  instructions  to  the 
various  leaders  of  the  movements  in  the  East  through 
this  Council. 

The  Baku  Congress  was  intended  particularly  to 
serve  the  purpose  of  organizing  an  apparatus  of  propa- 
ganda in  the  various  countries  of  Asia.  It  represented 
movements  which  are  essentially  revolutionary  in  char- 
acter. It  did  not,  of  course,  represent  the  nations 
themselves  in  which  these  movements  exist.  In  each 
one  of  these  countries  there  is  a  political  organization 
which  finds  its  expression  in  definite  governmental  in- 
stitutions. The  Baku  Congress  was  convoked  for  the 
purpose  of  reaching  the  movements,  but  Communism  is 
not  content  with  reaching  them  alone.  Wherever  pos- 
sible it  strives  to  exert  its  influence  also  over  the  gov- 
ernmental institutions. 

This  requires  the  work  of  diplomacy,  and  for  this 
purpose  the  Commissariat  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
Soviet  Government  and  its  various  diplomatic  agencies 
are  utilized  by  the  Third  International  to  the  largest 
extent  possible. 

During  the  months  following  the  first  steps  in  the 
organization  of  Communist  work  in  Asia,  the  Soviet 
diplomacy  devoted  considerable  attention  to  China,  as 
a  politically  independent  power,  presumably  amenable 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     85 

to  diplomatic  influences.  The  general  political  situa- 
tion in  China,  as  the  Soviet  diplomats  visualized  it,  was 
characterized  during  the  year  1920  by  the  fact  that  the 
government  which  existed  there  at  the  beginning  of  that 
year  was  pro-Japanese  in  its  sympathies  and  orienta- 
tion. The  Anfu  party,  which  was  in  power,  was  re- 
sponsible for  the  Japanese-Chinese  agreement  which 
rendered  possible  the  penetration  of  the  Japanese  influ- 
ence into  China,  and,  if  we  take  for  it  the  word  of  the 
Soviet  experts  on  Far  Eastern  affairs,  placed  China  en- 
tirely under  the  domination  of  Japan.  Through  its 
agencies  in  Siberia,  ever  since  the  collapse  of  the  Kol- 
chak  movement,  the  Soviet  Government  has  been  doing 
everything  in  its  power  to  effect  the  overthrow  of  this 
government. 

The  Soviet  diplomatic  plan  was  built  on  the  follow- 
ing considerations:  China  has  for  her  neighbors  two 
powers  which  are  antagonistic  to  each  other — namely, 
Japan  and  Soviet  Russia.  As  long  as  the  Anfu  group 
remained  in  power  and  continued  its  pro-Japanese 
orientation  the  chances  of  any  influence  in  the  affairs  of 
China  that  could  be  exerted  by  Soviet  Russia  were  very 
small.  On  the  other  hand,  the  policy  pursued  by  the 
Anfu  group  was  never  popular  among  the  masses 
of  the  people  in.  China;  there  has  been  a  growing  and 


86  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

widespread  opposition  to  tlie  Japanese.  This  opposi- 
tion was  counted  upon  by  the  Soviet  agents  as  a  possible 
instrument  for  the  overthrow  of  the  pro-Japanese 
regime.  They  expected  that  if  properly  stimulated  and 
directed  this  popular  opposition  would  eventually  trans- 
fer its  resentment  against  the  Japanese  to  the  whole 
Anfu  group  and  its  regime,  fastening  upon  it  the  blame 
for  the  Japanese  domination.  If  such  transferred  re- 
sentment could  result  in  an  overthrow  of  the  Anfu 
regime,  it  was  reasonable  to  expect,  according  to  the 
Soviet  diplomatic  plan,  that  its  successor  in  power,  hav- 
ing broken  with  the  Japanese  orientations,  would  have 
to  seek  a  rapprochement  with  the  other  of  China's 
neighbors — that  is,  with  Soviet  Russia. 

When  the  Anfu  regime  fell,  its  place  was  taken  by  a 
strongly  anti-Japanese  regime,  in  which  the  power  be- 
hind the  throne  was,  for  the  time  being.  General  Wu- 
Pei-Fu.  The  Soviet  diplomats  interpreted  this  change 
as  signifying  unquestionably  the  imminence  of  a  defi- 
nite Chinese  orientation  in  favor  of  and  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Soviet  Russia.  V.  Vilensky,  the  former  high 
commissary  of  the  Soviet  Government  in  Siberia  and 
one  of  the  most  prominent  Soviet  experts  on  the  Far 
East,  in  an  article  devoted  to  this  phase  of  the  Far 


THE  THIED  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     87 

Eastern   situation,*   characterized  the  change  in  the 
Chinese  regime  in  the  following  terms : 

"Wu-Pei-Fu  has  hung  out  his  flag  over  the  events  which 
are  taking  place  in  China,  and  it  is  clear  that  under  this  flag 
the  new  Chinese  cabinet  must  take  an  orientation  in  favor 
of  Soviet  Russia." 

In  arguing  for  what  he  called  the  "logical  and  ob- 
jective necessity"  of  such  a  step  on  the  part  of  the 
Chinese  Government,  Vilenskj  cited  three  definite  ac- 
tions then  already  taken  by  the  latter  in  the  direction 
of  establishing  friendly  relations  with  Moscow.  The 
first  step  was  initiated  by  Moscow,  and  sanctioned  by 
Peking.  It  consisted  of  a  commercial  treaty  signed  by 
the  representatives  of  the  Soviet  authorities  in  Russian 
Turkestan  and  the  group  in  power  in  Chinese  Turkes- 
tan. The  treaty  provided  for  the  establishment  of 
diplomatic  as  well  as  commercial  representation  in  both 
territories,  and  the  total  mutual  abrogation  of  exterri- 
torial rights.  The  contact  thus  established  provided 
Soviet  Russia  with  an  unmolested  access  into  China. 
Officially  the  Turkestan  treaty  was  not  valid  until  ap- 
proved by  Moscow  and  Peking,  The  Moscow  sanction 
was  naturally  not  long  in  coming.  The  sanction  from 
Peking,  given  September,  1920,  finally  settled  the  mat- 

•  Moscow  Izvestiya,  October  9,  1920. 


88  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

ter,  and  Soviet  Russia  acquired  a  recognized  frontier 
with  China,  regulated  by  treaty. 

The  second  step  of  the  Chinese  Government  in  the 
direction  of  a  rapprochement  with  Soviet  Russia,  ac- 
cording to  Vilensky,  indicated  still  further  the  correct- 
ness of  the  Moscow  analysis  of  the  diplomatic  situa- 
tion in  the  Far  East.  Under  the  Anfu  regime  China 
still  continued  to  recognize  officially  the  Russian  am- 
bassador remaining  there  after  the  overthrow  of  the 
Provisional  Government.  All  diplomatic  courtesy  was 
extended  to  him,  and  his  status  was  more  or  less  for- 
mally acknowledged.  The  action  of  the  Peking  govern- 
ment in  refusing  to  continue  the  recognition  of  this 
status  of  the  Russian  ambassador,  announced  on  Sep- 
tember 23,  1920,  was  logically  a  preliminary  step  to 
the  negotiations  which  China  was  expected  to  inaugu- 
rate with  Moscow. 

This  second  step  was  almost  immediately  followed 
by  the  third,  for  which  it  obviously  cleared  the  way.  A 
Chinese  military-diplomatic  mission  was  sent  to  Soviet 
Russia,  reaching  Moscow  at  the  end  of  September.  This 
mission,  headed  by  General  Chjan-Si-Lin,  one  of  the 
younger  followers  of  Wu-Pei-Fu  was  charged  with  the 
task  of  negotiating  with  the  Commissariat  of  Foreign 
Affairs.    The  tenor  of  these  negotiations  was  obviously 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     89 

an  attempt  to  push  China  into  an  armed  conflict  with 
Japan,  with  which,  incidentally,  the  Soviet  diplomats 
were  at  that  time  negotiating  for  an  agreement  through 
the  instrumentality  of  their  diplomatic  agents  in  the 
Far  East  and  through  the  Far  Eastern  Republic. 

But  it  was  not  merely  as  a  cat's-paw  against  Japan 
that  the  Soviet  Government  is  ready  to  use  China  and 
her  possibilities.  We  must  always  remember  when 
dealing  with  any  of  the  activities  of  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment that  it  has  no  policies  of  its  own,  but  that  what- 
ever step  it  undertakes  is  of  necessity  in  furtherance 
of  the  larger  plans  of  the  Third  International,  that  gen- 
eral staff  of  the  world  revolution.  The  International 
and  the  Soviet  Government  are  parts  of  the  same 
mechanism;  the  International  therefore  is  behind  the 
activities  of  the  Moscow  Commissariat  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs. Now  what  is  the  situation  in  China  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  Communist  International  ? 

According  to  the  report  presented  to  the  Second 
Congress  of  the  Third  International  by  the  Chinese 
delegate,  Lai,*  the  nationalist-revolutionary  movement 
in  China  has  been  stimulated  particularly  by  the  fact 
that,  as  he  expressed  it,  ''China  was  refused  everything 

•  For  text  of  this  report,  as  well  as  other  reports  on  the  Communist 
situation  in  various  countries  of  Asia,  mentioned  below,  see  a  Memo- 
randum, entitl<^  "The  2nd  Congress  of  the  Third  or  Communist  Inter- 
national," published  by  the  Department  of  State  in  1920. 


90  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

at  the  Peace  Conference."  This  movement  of  resent- 
ment, headed  very  largely  by  students  and  by  the  indus- 
trial elements  of  Shanghai,  took  the  form  of  strikes 
and  of  similar  manifestations  of  discontent  and  protest. 
The  shifting  in  the  political  scenery  of  China,  of  which 
we  have  already  spoken  and  which  took  place  since  the 
congress,  indicates  what  forms  the  activities  of  these 
elements  in  China  have  assumed. 

Delegate  Lai's  report  discussed  also  the  agrarian  and 
the  industrial  situation  from  the  point  of  view  of  Com- 
munism. The  two  outstanding  features  of  the  agrarian 
situation  in  China  are  the  absence  of  large  landed 
estates  and  the  general  shortage  of  land.  The  over- 
whelming majority  of  the  population  in  China  is  agri- 
cultural, and  the  problem  of  land  shortage  is  a  very 
real  one  there.  An  agrarian  movement  therefore  is 
scarcely  possible,  because  it  would  have  nothing  to 
strive  for.  The  solution  of  the  problem  resulting  from 
the  agricultural  and  agrarian  crisis  is  obviously  in  in- 
dustrial development,  which  would  divert  large  num- 
bers of  the  surplus  rural  population  to  the  industrial 
centers  and  relieve  the  land  shortage  as  far  as  possible. 
At  the  present  time,  however,  China's  industrial  devel- 
opment is  a  thing  that  scarcely  has  any  existence  at  all. 
According  to  Lai's  statement,  the  industrial  proletariat 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     91 

in  China  is  just  beginning  to  come  into  existence.  But 
whatever  there  is  of  it,  weak  as  it  is  in  numbers,  the 
industrial  proletariat  of  China  is  violently  revolution- 
ary in  its  tendencies. 

The  intensity  of  the  nationalist  revolutionary  move- 
ment and  the  revolutionary  nature  of  the  Chinese  pro- 
letariat constitute  the  basis  of  the  work  which  the  lead- 
ers of  the  Third  International  consider  possible  in 
China.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  methods  and 
tactics  of  Communism,  the  situation  in  China  presents 
conditions  that  are  almost  ideal.  China  is  a  country 
of  tremendous  potential  resources.  The  vast  bulk  of 
her  population  is  agitated  by  various  kinds  of  resent- 
ment, swept  by  different  kinds  of  discontent.  There  is 
a  small  minority  of  the  population,  very  active,  very 
determined,  very  ambitious.  If  this  minority  could  be 
won  over  to  try  an  experiment  in  Communism  in  an 
attempt  to  further  its  own  aims  the  Third  Interna- 
tional would  have  just  what  it  desires  in  China — a 
Soviet  Government,  organized  and  run  by  a  determined 
minority,  with  the  masses  of  the  population  induced  to 
unprotesting  acquiescence  by  the  methods  of  dema- 
goguery,  of  which  the  Communist  leaders  are  such  past 
masters. 

In  other  countries  of  the  Far  East  preparations  for 


92  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

a  revolution  are  being  made  similar  in  kind  to  those 
in  China,  except  that  there  the  diplomatic  activities  of 
the  Soviet  Government  are  not  available  as  an  adjunct 
of  the  propaganda  work  of  the  Third  International. 
But  ever)^where  the  scheme  is  the  same.  A  determined 
minority  is  called  into  being,  organized  and  prepared 
for  the  eventualities  which  the  Third  International 
foresees  as  possible. 

Looking  at  the  situation  in  these  countries,  again 
through  the  eyes  of  the  reports  presented  to  the  con- 
gress of  the  Third  International,  we  find  that  in  the 
Dutch  Indies,  for  example,  the  Socialist  propaganda, 
which  has  been  going  on  for  the  last  five  years,  is  now 
rapidly  growing  in  intensity  and  gaining  in  the  influence 
it  exerts  by  being  directed  primarily  against  foreign  cap- 
ital. In  Java,  where  of  its  thirty  million  population 
three  millions  are  proletarians,  the  mass  movement  of 
the  latter  began  as  far  back  as  1912.  But  in  the  course 
of  the  past  three  years  this  movement  has  been  rapidly 
gathering  momentum  as  far  as  its  revolutionary  inten- 
sity is  concerned.  Special  attention  is  being  given  to 
the  organization  of  railroad  workmen.  Out  of  the  forty 
thousand  railroad  workmen  on  the  island,  ten  thousand 
have  already  been  organized.  Though  the  revolutionary 
Socialist  party  numbers  only  sixteen  hundred  members, 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     93 

of  whom  fifteen  hundred  are  natives,  it  is  a  very  com- 
pact and  very  active  body.  In  Korea  a  revolutionary 
movement  of  a  purely  political  nature  began  in  1914, 
and  included  in  its  ranks  at  the  beginning  only  the 
nobility  and  the  richer  elements.  But  now  the  revo- 
lutionary tendencies  have  begun  to  penetrate  into  the 
masses  of  the  people.  For  the  past  year  and  a  half  this 
latter  phase  of  the  movement  has  been  developing  quite 
satisfactorily  from  the  point  of  view  of  Communism. 

In  India  the  situation  appears  to  be  almost  least 
promising  of  all.  Judging  by  the  report  of  the  Hindu 
delegate  to  the  congress  of  the  Third  International, 
Roy,  though  a  movement  of  a  political  and  nationalist 
character  began  in  India  in  the  eighties  of  the  past  cen- 
tury, this  movement  has  been  centered  almost  exclu- 
sively among  the  students  and  the  middle  classes,  find- 
ing very  small  response  in  the  masses  of  the  people. 
The  latter  are  interested  exclusively  in  problems  of 
narrowly  economic  character.  The  agrarian  question 
plays  a  very  important  role  and  is  characterized  by  the 
existence  of  large  landed  estates,  the  shortage  of  land 
among  the  great  masses  of  the  population  and  the  fact 
that  the  exports  of  foodstuffs  from  India  are  too  great 
in  proportion  to  the  agricultural  production  of  the  coun- 
try.    Because  of  the  last  circumstance,  very  largely, 


94  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

there  are  frequent  famines  in  India.  The  industrial 
proletariat  is  very  small  numerically,  and  is  very  poorly 
organized.  There  is  as  yet  no  Communist  party,  al- 
though there  exists  a  movement  for  the  creation  of  one. 
However,  this  movement  makes  every  effort  to  isolate 
itself  from  the  movement  for  national  independence, 
looking  upon  the  latter  as  bourgeois  in  character.  In 
this  the  Communist  leaders  in  India  present  a  rather 
marked  opposition  to  the  general  policies  of  the  Third 
International  in  the  East.  Their  attitude  on  this  quesr 
tion  constitutes  a  rather  important  problem  for  Mos- 
cow, since  it  weakens  considerably  the  position  of  the 
Third  International  in  India. 

However,  the  situation  in  India,  though  it  would  be 
affected  profoundly  by  any  events  that  may  take  place  in 
China,  is  not  expected  to  be  directly  affected  by  the 
conditions  there.  In  1920  the  situation  in  India  was 
expected  to  be  affected  from  the  Communist  storm  cen- 
ter in  the  Near  East,  which  was  then  rapidly  being 
built  up  in  Afghanistan. 

In  their  work  of  organizing  this  storm  center  in 
the  Near  East,  the  Third  International  and  the  Russian 
Soviet  Government  followed  the  same  methods  as  those 
they  pursued  in  the  Far  East.  Propaganda  was  carried 
on  actively,  and  wherever  possible  diplomatic  alliances 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     95 

were  attempted.  A  very  important  alliance  of  this  kind 
was  effected  in  Afghanistan.  But  to  these  two  weapons 
of  the  Communist  movement  a  third  one  was  added  here, 
which  rendered  the  activities  in  the  Near  East  far  more 
formidable  and  important,  at  least  for  the  time  being, 
than  those  in  the  Far  East.  There  the  Communists 
found  an  opportunity  for  actually  creating  armed  forces 
that  would  be  directly  under  Moscow's  control  and 
orders. 

N^ext  to  Zinoviev,  the  most  prominent  figure  at  the 
Baku  Congress  was  the  former  Turkish  general,  Enver 
Pasha,  who  in  the  course  of  the  past  three  years  has 
gone  through  a  most  amazing  transformation.  From 
a  trusty  agent  of  the  German  Imperial  Government  and 
the  military  genius  of  the  Turkish  armed  forces  at  the 
time  when  they  were  controlled  from  Berlin,  Enver  has 
become  converted  into  a  no  less  trusty  agent  of  the  Rus- 
sian Soviet  Government,  and  was  intrusted  with  a  mili- 
tary mission  of  high  importance.  Driven  out  of  Turkey 
by  the  eventualities  of  the  war,  Enver  Pasha  found 
refuge  and  warm  welcome  in  Moscow.  In  the  fall  of 
1920  he  was  again  in  the  Near  East,  charged  with  the 
execution  of  plans  which  were  much  more  vast  than 
anything  he  had  ever  dreamed  of  under  the  Sultans  and 
their  protectors  in  Berlin, 


96  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Enver  did  not  arrive  in  Baku  in  time  to  attend  the 
congress.  He  reached  Baku  only  a  day  or  two  before 
the  congress  ended,  but  he  was  received  with  all  the 
pomp  and  enthusiasm  accorded  to  the  most  prominent 
representatives  there.  He  made  his  views  known  by 
addressing  a  large  meeting  held  in  his  honor.  Enver 
Pasha  has  now  two  ambitions  in  life.  His  first  ambi- 
tion is  an  old  one — to  fight  Great  Britain  and  the 
British  to  the  last  ditch.  To  this  ambition  he  was 
devoted  all  through  the  war,  stimulated  in  his  per- 
severance in  it  by  the  German  gold  that  flowed  so 
freely  into  the  Turkish  coffers.  His  second  ambition 
is  new — ^he  is  now  fighting  for  the  overthrow  of  the 
Sultan  and  his  power.  And  in  both  of  these  ambitions 
Enver  is  strongly  supported  by  the  masters  of  Moscow. 

Enver  Pasha  left  Moscow  accompanied  by  a  large 
group  of  military  and  civil  specialists.  His  destina- 
tion was  Afghanistan,  and  his  route  lay  through  the 
Caucasus;  hence  his  presence  in  Baku  at  the  time  of 
the  congress.  The  task  intrusted  to  him  consisted  in 
organizing  and  coordinating  the  military  efforts  of  the 
various  movements  in  the  Near  East. 

Ever  since  the  Soviet  troops  helped  the  natives  of 
Afghanistan  practically  to  free  themselves  from  the 


THE  THIRD  INTERNATIONAL  IN  ASIA     97 

British  control  the  little  country  in  Central  Asia  became 
a  special  object  of  attention  for  the  leaders  in  Moscow. 
From  dependence  upon  the  British,  Afghanistan  fell 
into  a  still  greater  dependence  upon  Soviet  Russia.  It 
is  a  sort  of  connecting  link  between  the  former  Russian 
possessions  in  Central  Asia  which  are  still  entirely  con- 
trolled by  Soviet  Russia  on  the  one  hand  and  India  and 
Persia  on  the  other.  It  constitutes,  therefore,  an  ex- 
cellent base  for  Communist  operations  in  these  two 
important  outposts  of  the  British  interests.  It  is  an 
ideal  center  from  which  to  direct  the  struggle  against 
the  European — particularly  the  British — supremacy  in 
the  Near  East.  Moreover,  ever  since  its  falling  under 
the  virtual  protectorate  of  Soviet  Russia,  Afghanistan 
has  become  a  refuge  for  all  kinds  of  malcontents  in 
India,  Persia,  Turkey  and  other  countries  of  the 
Orient.  All  these  refugees  constitute  inflammable  ma- 
terial for  the  revolution  and  an  excellent  foundation 
for  a  military  force. 

The  immediate  purpose  of  Enver's  mission  in  Af- 
ghanistan was  the  recruiting  of  these  refugees,  particu- 
larly those  from  India,  for  the  Soviet  armies.  It  was 
reported  that  he  had  been  officially  designated  as  chief 
of  staff  of  the  various   revolutionary   armies   of  the 


98  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

Orient,  and  that  there  were  under  his  command  and 
direction  considerable  bodies  of  troops,  whose  equip- 
ment and  armament  came  from  Soviet  Russia. 

For  several  months,  the  agents  of  Communism  car- 
ried on  feverish  activities  in  the  Near  East,  no  doubt, 
to  some  extent  for  political  purposes,  involved  in  their 
negotiations  with  Great  Britain  for  trade  relations  and 
possible  recognition.  One  of  the  British  stipulations 
was  a  cessation  of  Communist  propaganda  in  the  coun- 
tries of  the  Near  East.  Partly  for  this  reason  and 
part.y  for  other  reasons,  which  we  shall  take  up  in  the 
next  chapter,  the  Communist  activities  in  the  Near 
East  slackened  considerably  in  the  spring  of  1921,  and 
the  main  emphasis  of  the  Communist  work  in  Asia  was 
transferred  definitely  to  the  Far  East. 


CHAPTER  YII 

THE    SOVIET    STRATEGY   IN    THE   FAR   EAST 

On  July  12,  1921,  the  Soviet  radio  service  in  Moscow 
announced  to  the  world  the  fact  that  a  revolutionary 
government  had  just  heen  formed  in  Mongolia.  This 
simple  announcement  passed  practically  unnoticed  by 
the  world  at  large.  And  yet  the  event  it  described 
represented  a  most  important  achievement  of  the  Com- 
munist work  in  Asia.  Of  itself,  wind-swept  and  bar- 
ren, Mongolia,  lost  in  the  mountains  of  Asia,  has  no 
special  significance.  But  it  happens  to  have  been  the 
storm-center  of  some  very  acute  problems  in  the  Far 
East  and  is  particularly  important  to-day,  because  it 
is  the  center  of  the  Soviet  strategy  in  the  Far  East, 
which  is  unmistakably  the  most  important  phase  now 
of  all  the  Communist  activities  in  the  Orient. 

In  1920,  the  main  emphasis  of  the  Communist  work 
in  Asia  was  on  the  Near  East;  in  1921,  this  emphasis 
became  transferred  to  the  Far  East. 

This  does  not  mean,  of  course,  that  the  Soviets  have 

abandoned  their  work  in  other  parts  of  Asia  or  even 

99 


100  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

curtailed  their  activities  there.  On  the  contrary,  in 
all  their  latest  discussions  of  the  world  situation,  their 
activities  in  the  Orient  loom  even  larger  than  before. 
For  example,  in  describing  the  world  situation  from 
the  viewpoint  of  aggressive  Communism,  no  less  an 
authority  than  Trotsky  *  has  stated  that  from  now  on 
the  chief  struggle  against  the  "world  imperialism"  will 
be  in  the  East,  rather  than  in  Western  Europe  as  here- 
tofore. A  writer  in  the  official  organ  of  the  Soviet 
Government  f  in  discussing  the  Soviet  policy  in  the 
East,  stated  that  this  policy  is  based  on  the  fact  that 
"Soviet  Eussia  and  the  East  really  complement  each 
other."  Soviet  Russia,  according  to  this  writer,  is  a 
"support  for  the  East"  in  the  latter's  struggle  against 
the  great  European  powers;  while  the  East  is  the 
Soviet's  "powerful  ally  in  the  struggle  against  the 
world  imperialism." 

And  if  the  Soviets  now  transfer  the  emphasis  of 
their  activities  to  the  Far  East,  it  is  because,  in  the 
first  place,  they  have  very  definite  and  pressing  aims 
in  that  part  of  the  world,  and  in  the  second  place,  be- 
cause they  are  rather  disappointed  with  their  work  in 
the  Central  and  Near  East. 

•  Speech  before  the  3rd  World  Congress  of  the  Third  International, 
in  July,   1921. 

t  Moscow  Izvestiya,  July  17,  1921. 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    101 

The  Baku  Conference  last  summer  had  for  its  object 
the  organization  of  the  work  of  anti- Allied,  particularly 
anti-British,  propaganda  in  the  countries  of  Central 
Asia  and  of  the  ISTear  East.  As  we  saw  above,*  the 
Soviets  were  not,  however,  satisfied  with  the  work  of 
propaganda  alone.  Their  agents  were  laying  the  foun- 
dation for  aggressive  activities  all  through  these  por- 
tions of  Asia.  But  by  the  time  of  the  Third  Congress 
of  the  International  in  July,  1921,  it  was  already  quite 
apparent  that  all  these  efforts  had  failed. 

It  has  been  reported  that  the  Soviet  plans  in  Cen- 
tral Asia  called  for  an  armed  expedition  into  India, 
calculated  to  arouse  whatever  revolutionary  fires  may 
be  smouldering  in  that  land.  For  this  purpose  a  num- 
ber of  measures  were  taken.  Special  detachments  of 
reliable  troops  were  being  trained  in  Turkestan  and 
recruiting  efforts  were  made  in  Afghanistan.  A  school 
of  propaganda  instruction  was  organized  in  Samarkand, 
and  by  the  summer  of  1921,  916  Hindu  and  500  Afghan 
instructors  were  graduated  from  it.  A  great  deal  of 
work  was  done  for  the  organization  of  transportation 
and  liaison  service  in  Afghanistan.  But  when  all  these 
military  preparations  were  already  well  under  way, 
in  fact,  practically  completed,  it  was  suddenly  discov- 

•  Se«  the  preceding  chapter. 

UNIVERSITY  Cr  CALiFGKf^ 


102  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAK  EAST 

ered  that  the  political  situation  in  Afghanistan  was 
most  unfavorable  for  the  carrying  out  of  the  original 
plans.  The  fires  of  nationalism  there  are  reported  as 
having  subsided  very  considerably.  In  view  of  this, 
the  ambitious  expedition  into  India  had  to  be  post- 
poned indefinitely. 

Afghanistan  was  also  to  be  used  as  a  base  for  work 
in  Persia  and  Turkey.  But  here,  too,  the  results  so 
far  have  not  been  altogether  gratifying  to  the  Soviets. 
The  new  Persian  Government,  established  after  the 
"revolutionary"  outbreak  of  the  bands  of  Persian  Cosr 
sacks,  was  headed  by  Seid  Zia  as  Prime  Minister,  who 
has  behind  him  a  long  period  of  pro-English  activities.* 
Two  years  ago  he  was  an  ardent  supporter  of  an  al- 
liance with  Great  Britain.  It  is  true  that  after  his 
elevation  to  power,  he  refused  definitely  to  sign  any 
agreement  with  the  British  and  has  demanded  an 
evacuation  of  Persia  by  the  British  troops,  still  his 
rule  causes  considerable  uneasiness  to  the  Soviets. 

The  new  Persian  Government  rests  particularly  on 
the  support  of  the  bourgeois  class,  i.e.^  principally  the 
trading  elements,  who  are  anti-British  for  purely  com- 
mercial reasons.  The  whole  coup  d'etat  was  directed 
against  the  landed  aristocracy,  for  one  of  the  first  acts 

*  Moscow  Izveatiya,  May  21,  1921. 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    103 

of  Seid  Zia  was  the  nationalization  of  the  large  estates, 
the  division  of  state  lands  among  the  peasantry,  and 
the  arrest  of  practically  the  whole  aristocracy  of  Te- 
heran, the  capital  of  Persia.  It  is  interesting  that 
among  those  arrested  were  the  Shah's  uncle  and  a  well- 
known  pro-British  leader,  Ferman,  a  close  personal 
friend  of  Lord  Curzon.  According  to  the  Soviet  re- 
ports from  Persia,  the  Shah  asked  Seid  Zia  for  the 
release  of  his  uncle,  while  Lord  Curzon  similarly  asked 
for  the  release  of  his  friend;  but  both  requests  were 
refused. 

At  the  present  time,  the  Soviet  Government  is  doing 
everything  in  its  power  to  keep  the  new  Persian  Gov- 
ernment under  its  influence.  It  has  concluded  a  treaty 
with  it,  which  was  signed  in  Moscow.  Moreover,  as 
a  sort  of  token  of  good  will,  it  has  formally  handed  over 
to  it  the  Bank  of  Persia,  formerly  owned  by  the  Rus- 
sian Government.  It  is  doing  everything  in  its  power 
to  promote  trade  relations  with  Persia.  But  with  all 
that,  it  is  rather  uneasy  about  the  "revolutionary'' 
Government,  especially  about  its  present  head.  Once 
so  easy  a  convert  from  a  pro-British  to  a  violently  anti- 
British  orientation,  Seid  Zia  may  perform  the  somer- 
sault over  again,  only  reversing  the  directioiL  It  has 
been  intimated  that  the  radical  groups  in  Persia  have 


104  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

promised  his  Govermnent  support  just  so  long  as  it 
remains  anti-British. 

With  the  situation  in  Turkey,  {.  e.,  principally  in 
Anatolia,  the  seat  of  the  ''Nationalist  Government" 
and  the  headquarters  of  Mustapha  Kemal,  the  Soviets 
are  thoroughly  disgusted.  They  knew  all  the  time 
and  admitted  it  readily  enough  that  the  Kemal  move- 
ment is  far  from  being  Communistic  in  its  aims  or 
purposes.  However,  to  the  extent  to  which  it  was  vio- 
lently anti-European,  particularly  anti-British,  it  en- 
joyed the  good  graces  and  the  support  of  the  Soviets. 
But  it  now  appears  that  the  estimates  of  the  -"revolu- 
tionary" value  of  the  Anatolia  movement  have  been 
very  grossly  exaggerated.  Writers  in  the  official  Soviet 
press  seem  to  stand  aghast  before  some  of  Kemal's  ac- 
tivities. For  example,  in  discussing  the  budget  of  the 
"Nationalist  Government"  they  point  out  the  fact  that 
huge  sums  of  money  are  spent  for  the  maintenance  of 
the  Sultan's  Government  and  household,*  and  they 
must  be  wondering  what  part  of  the  subsidies  that  the 
Anatolian  "nationalists"  had  obtained  from  Moscow 
at  one  time  or  another  had  been  used  for  this  worthy 
purpose. 

All  through  this  time  the  Soviets  were  rather  quies- 

•  Moscow  Izveatiya,  July  13,  1921. 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    105 

cent  in  the  Far  East.  Propaganda,  of  course,  was  car- 
ried on,  especially  in  China  and  Korea,  but,  generally 
speaking,  the  policy  of  the  Soviets  there  was  one  of 
"watchful  waiting."  As  the  People's  Commissar  of 
National  Minorities  recently  explained  it,  the  Soviets 
did  not  feel  that  they  had  enough  forces,  particularly 
from  the  point  of  view  of  Communist  leadership,  to  do 
active  work  at  both  ends  of  the  vast  Asiatic  continent. 

Until  the  spring  of  1921,  the  situation  in  the  Rus- 
sian Far  East  remained  very  much  the  same  as  it 
finally  crystallized  during  the  months  following  the 
defeat  of  Admiral  Kolchak's  armies  and  the  overthrow 
of  the  Omsk  Government.  The  power  of  Moscow  of- 
ficially extended  only  to  Lake  Baikal.  All  the  terri- 
tory east  of  that,  stretching  clear  to  the  Pacific  Ocean, 
was  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  or  the  "buffer"  state, 
as  it  is  usually  termed. 

In  the  spring  of  1921,  the  Soviet  Government  began 
to  show  very  considerable  interest  in  the  affairs  of  the 
Far  East.  The  first  notable  indication  of  this  in- 
creased interest  came  in  the  form  of  a  formal  cession 
by  the  National  Assembly  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic 
to  Soviet  Russia  of  the  peninsula  of  Kamchatka.  This 
act  was,  no  doubt,  dictated  by  a  number  of  considera- 
tions, the  most  important  of  which  seems  to  lie  in  the 


106  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

fact  that  tlie  Moscow  leaders  suddenly  discovered  that 
by  recognizing  the  independence  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Eepublic  they  had  officially  rendered  Eussia  no  longer 
a  power  on  the  Pacific  Ocean.  As  such,  Soviet  Eussia 
would  have  no  claim  whatever  to  participation  in  any 
discussions  dealing  with  the  Pacific  problems.  The 
cession  of  Kamchatka  was  one  of  the  ways  of  repairing 
this  situation  so  far  as  the  possible  Soviet  claims  were 
concerned.  Moreover,  the  re-acquisition  of  Kamchatka 
was  important  to  the  Soviets  in  view  of  their  notion, 
frankly  expressed  by  Lenin  and  other  responsible  lead- 
ers, that  by  granting  concessions  in  Kamchatka  to  the 
Vanderlip  group  and  to  other  American  capitalists 
they  would  be  able  to  embroil  the  United  States  in  a 
war  with  Japan. 

The  Kamchatka  incident  was  followed  by  a  rather 
important  development  in  the  Maritime  or  Primorsk 
Province  of  the  Far  Eastern  Eepublic,  which  stretches 
for  thousands  of  miles  along  the  coast.  This  develop- 
ment consisted  of  a  revolt  against  the  authority  of  the 
Far  Eastern  Eepublic  in  the  city  of  Vladivostok, 
which  was  successful  and  spread  to  several  other  im- 
portant towns.  On  May  26,  1921,  a  new  government 
was  established  there,  consisting  of  non-Socialistic 
elements. 


SOVIET  STEATEGY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    107 

What  part  the  Japanese  played  in  this  revolt  it  is 
very  diflScult  to  determine  with  any  degree  of  precision. 
Both  the  Soviet  Government  in  Moscow  and  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  of  course,  lay 
the  blame  on  the  Japanese.  On  May  30,  I.  L.  Yurin, 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Republic,  sent  a  note  to  Tokyo,  demanding  the  imme- 
diate cessation  of  all  Japanese  interference  with  the 
affairs  of  the  Russian  Far  East.*  He  asked  the  Japa- 
nese whether  or  not  they  want  friendly  relations  with 
the  Far  Eastern  Republic  and  the  consummation  of 
a  trade  agreement  with  it,  and  if  so  why  Japan  does 
not  withdraw  her  troops  from  the  Siberian  territory 
and  give  the  Government  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic 
a  free  hand  in  dealing  with  the  situation.  Specifically, 
he  demanded  an  open  and  definite  declaration  of  the 
Japanese  Government  and  of  the  Japanese  Conmaand 
in  Siberia  on  their  attitude  with  regard  to  the  new 
Vladivostok  Government,  headed  by  Merkulov;  the 
return  of  arms  to  the  militia  of  popular  defense  (troops 
of  the  Far  Eastern  Government)  which  had  been  dis- 
armed by  the  Japanese;  and  no  interference  on  the 
part  of  the  Japanese  with  any  action  that  the  emis- 


•  The  text  of   this  Note  waa  published   in  the  Moscow  Izveatiya, 
June  9,  1921. 


108  RUSSIA  IK  THE  FAE  EAST 

saries  of  the  Far  Eastern  Government  may  take  for 
the  purpose  of  putting  down  Merkulov's  revolt  and  pun- 
ishing its  leaders. 

At  the  same  time,  George  Chicherin,  the  Commissar 
of  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Moscow  Government,  sent  a 
wireless  note  on  the  Far  Eastern  situation  to  the  Gov- 
ernments of  Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy.  In  this 
note,*  Chicherin  cited  a  number  of  actions  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government,  interpreted  as  inimical  by  the  Soviets. 
The  most  important  of  these  actions  consisted  of  alleged 
usurpation  of  Russian  fishing  rights  in  Kamchatka  by 
the  Japanese  authorities  and  their  allotment  to  Japa- 
nese subjects,  rather  than  to  Russian  citizens,  and  of 
the  rendering  of  assistance  by  the  Japanese  to  various 
Russian  anti-Soviet  groups  in  the  Far  East,  notably 
those  of  Ataman  Semenov  and  Baron  Ungem  in  Mon- 
golia and  the  remnants  of  the  Kappel  troops,  which 
were  instrumental  in  bringing  about  the  Vladivostok 
overthrow.  In  this  connection  Chicherin  issued  the 
following  warning  to  Japan: 

"The  Soviet  Government,  expressing  the  will  of  the 
Russian  masses,  warns  the  Japanese  Government  that  the 
masses  of  the  Russian  people,  having  taken  their  fate  into 
their  own  hands  and  having  repelled  all  attacks  of  their 
enemies,    will    be    able    to    conduct    victoriously    this    new 

•  For  complete  text  of  this  Note  see  Appendix  I. 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    109 

struggle  and  will  make  those  who  have  attacked  them  feel 
their  strength." 

But  the  Soviet  Govenmient  was  not  satisfied  with 
merely  issuing  this  warning  to  Japan.  It  sought  at 
the  same  time  to  fasten  the  blame  for  the  events  in  the 
Far  East  upon  the  Allied  powers  generally;  for  this 
reason  the  Chicherin  note  was  addressed  to  the  three 
great  European  powers.  The  Moscow  Commissar 
stated  that  the  Soviet  Government  considers  these 
powers  "morally  responsible  for  this  new  link  in  the 
chain  of  intervention."  This  statement  he  an- 
nounced as  applying  particularly  to  Great  Britain, 
which  he  accused  of  hostile  acts  with  respect  to  the 
Soviet  Government,  "entirely  out  of  keeping  with  the 
Anglo-Kussian  agreement."  The  note  ended  with  the 
following  significant  words,  which  state  with  all  clarity 
the  vassal  position  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  with 
respect  to  the  Moscow  Government : 

"The  Russian  Government  protests  most  energetically 
against  these  acts  directed  against  Soviet  Russia  as  such 
or  through  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  which  is  friendly  with 
her,  as  an  intermediary  step." 

However,  about  the  time  that  the  Yurin  not©  went 
to  Tokyo  and  the  Chicherin  note  was  put  on  the  Soviet 
radio,  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  Embassy  in  Moscow 


110  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

issued  an  official  statement,  summarizing  the  situation 
for  the  period  ending  June  1.*  In  this  statement  it  was 
announced  that  although  the  authority  in  the  Primorsk 
Province  is  in  the  hands  of  the  Merkulov  Government, 
the  attitude  of  the  Japanese  towards  this  group  is  nega- 
tive, since  it  not  only  refuses  to  furnish  it  with  arms, 
but  even  avoids  all  contact  with  it.  According  to  the 
statement,  the  Merkulov  forces  consist  of  600  bayonets 
in  Vladivostok  and  of  345  bayonets  in  Nikolsk- 
Ussuriysk.  Moreover,  the  .statement  announced  that  a 
conference  took  place  between  Comrade  Tseitlin,  the 
representative  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  and  the 
Japanese  representatives,  in  the  course  of  which  the 
latter  declared  that  the  events  in  the  Primorsk  Prov- 
ince will  have  no  influence  upon  the  relations  between 
Japan  and  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  and  were  disposed 
to  blame  the  Military  Command  for  what  had  actually 
taken  place. 

But  the  events  in  Vladivostok  and  the  Primorsk 
Province  generally  were  by  no  means  the  most  im- 
portant feature  of  the  Far  Eastern  situation.  Of  far 
greater  significance  were  the  events  that  took  place 
in  Mongolia  during  the  spring  and  summer  of  1921. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  general  political  im- 

•  Published  in  Moscow  Izveatiya,  June  9,  1921. 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    111 

portanc©  of  Mongolia  lies  in  the  fact  that  its  geo- 
graphical position  makes  of  it  a  barrier  between  Siberia 
and  China  proper.  Its  immediate  political  importance 
last  summer  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  had  become  the 
refuge  for  the  remnants  of  anti-Bolshevist  forces  that 
had  operated  in  Siberia  against  the  Bolsheviki,  princi- 
pally under  Ataman  Semenov.  In  the  spring  of  1921, 
one  of  the  more  energetic  of  Semenov's  officers,  Baron 
Ungem,  made  his  way  into  Mongolia  with  small  de- 
tachments of  troops  and  entered  into  an  agreement 
with  the  Living  Buddha^  the  ruler  of  Mongolia,  to  free 
the  country  of  the  Chinese,  who  had  occupied  it  some 
time  previously,  in  violation  of  the  officially  recognized 
autonomy  of  Mongolia.  With  the  aid  of  the  Mongolian 
troops,  Ungem  drove  out  the  Chinese  division  which 
constituted  the  army  of  occupation,  and  arrived  at 
Urga,  the  capital  of  Mongolia,  where  he  entered  into 
a  more  definite  arrangement  with  the  Living  Buddha. 
Ungern  became  a  Mongolian  subject  and  was  given 
a  very  high  position;  according  to  one  report,  he  was 
made  Minister  of  War  and  was  given  complete  au- 
thority to  recruit  an  army  for  the  purpose  of  recover- 
ing from  China  the  portion  of  Mongolia  known  as 
Inner  Mongolia.*     The  Peking  Government  instructed 

•  Vladivostok  Daily  News,  June  24,  1921. 


112  ETJSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

the  Inspector-General  of  Chinese  forces  in  Northern 
Manchuria,  Chan-Tso-Lin,  to  send  troops  into  Mon- 
golia. But  these  instructions  were  not  carried  out,  the 
current  explanation  being  that  the  Inspector-General, 
who  has  great  ambitions  for  the  acquisition  of  power 
in  the  internal  affairs  of  China,  was  not  willing  to 
weaken  his  forces  by  an  expedition  into  Mongolia, 
especially  since  the  Ungem  activities  represented  no 
direct  menace  to  him. 

The  Soviet  explanation  of  the  whole  affair,  however, 
is  different.  In  spite  of  an  official  denial  of  the  Japa- 
nese Government  of  any  connection  with  the  Ungem 
affair,  the  Soviet  explanation  makes  the  whole  incident 
the  result  of  Japanese  intrigue  and  part  of  the  general 
Japanese  plans.  An  editorial  article  in  the  Moscow 
Izvestiya  of  June  7,  signed  by  U.  Steklov,  the  respon- 
sible editor  of  the  paper,  described  these  plans  as  con- 
sisting primarily  of  two  parts.  The  first  is  the  creation 
of  a  base  of  operations  against  Soviet  Russia  in  the 
southern  part  of  the  Primorsk  Province,  i.  e.,  in  Vladi- 
vostok and  Nikolsk-Ussuriysk.  The  second  is  the 
creation  of  a  similar  base  in  Mongolia,  which  would 
make  it  possible  for  the  Japanese  to  invade  Siberia  in 
the  direction  of  Lake  Baikal  and  cut  off  the  Far 
Eastern  Republic  from  the  Soviet  territory  proper. 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAE  EAST    113 

A  more  detailed  version  of  the  Soviet  explanation, 
more  specially  witli  reference  to  Mongolia,  is  found  in 
an  article  by  Vilensky,  which  was  published  in 
the  Moscow  Izvestiya  of  July  13.  According  to  Vi- 
lensky, Baron  Ungem,  in  his  operations  in  Mongolia, 
was  simply  carrying  out  the  plans  of  the  Japanese. 
He  says  that  Japanese  agents  had  been  working  in 
Mongolia  for  a  long  time  and  had  succeeded  in  bribing 
the  Living  Buddha  and  most  of  his  dignitaries,  while 
at  the  same  time,  even  before  the  final  defeat  of  Ataman 
Semenov,  who  was  notoriously  supported  by  the  Japa- 
nese, the  TJngem  groups  were  concentrating  arms  and 
munitions  on  the  Mongolian  border.  He  quoted  Chi- 
nese newspapers  as  having  reported  contraband  deliv- 
eries of  rifles,  ammunition,  and  even  machine  guns, 
concealed  in  bags  of  rice,  to  the  palace  of  the  Living 
Buddha. 

The  reason  why  Marshal  Chan-Tso-Lin  made  no  ef- 
fort to  move  against  Mongolia,  according  to  Vilensky, 
was  that  he  is  pro-Japanese  and  represents  the  groups 
of  Chinese  reactionaries  who  are  banking  on  Japanese 
assistance  for  the  furtherance  of  their  political  ambi- 
tions in  internal  politics.  Japan's  interest  in  Mon- 
golia he  explained  on  the  basis  of  her  plans  of  imperial- 
istic control  of  Eastern  Asia,   which,   says  Vilensky, 


114  EUSSIA  m  THE  FAE  EAST 

call  for  tlie  creation  of  a  living  barrier  between  China 
and  Soviet  Russia  along  the  line  Manchuria-Mongolia, 
both  under  Japanese  control. 

The  policy  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  with  regard 
to  this  situation  was  described  in  the  Steklov  editorial. 
In  its  military  phases,  it  was  to  consist  of  energetic 
efforts  to  crush  oppositionary  armed  bands,  while  polit- 
ically it  was  to  be  a  "struggle  against  the  monarchists 
of  Northern  China  and  the  reactionaries  of  Mongolia 
by  a  close  contact  with  the  working  masses  of  China 
and  Mongolia."  Steklov  particularly  emphasized  the 
fact  that  the  various  activities  of  the  Far  Eastern  Re- 
public along  these  lines  should  be  carefully  coordinated 
with  the  revolutionary  activities  of  the  Chinese  and 
Mongolian  masses.  And  a  month  later,  Vilensky  re- 
ported the  formation  of  a  "popular-revolutionary  party 
in  Mongolia  organized  to  fight  for  self-determination." 
It  can  be  very  easily  surmised  that  the  appearance  of 
this  party  was  a  direct  result  of  the  policy  of  "coordina- 
tion of  activities." 

There  was  a  special  reason,  too,  for  the  formation  of 
such  a  party.  The  Soviet  technique  of  promoting  revo- 
lutions in  territories  bordering  on  Russia  consists  of 
bringing  into  life  in  such  a  territory  a  Communist 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAE  EAST    115 

group,  however  small  and  insignificant;  of  inducing 
such  a  group  to  proclaim  itself  the  provisional  revolu- 
tionary government  of  the  territory  in  question  and  to 
appeal  to  Moscow  for  military  assistance,  which  would 
be  immediately  furnished.  This  was  the  program 
gone  through  in  the  Caucasus  and  elsewhere.  And  this 
was  precisely  the  plan  worked  out  for  Mongolia. 

The  Soviets  made  an  attempt  to  do  this  sort  of  thing 
in  November,  1920.  The  following  note,  sent  by  the 
Peking  Government  to  the  Chinese  ambassador  in  Lon- 
don and  handed  by  the  latter  to  Krassin  on  December 
31,  1920,  tells  the  story  of  this  first  attempt  of  the 
Soviet  Government  to  send  its  troops  into  China : 

"In  his  telegram  of  November  10,  the  Russian  Commissar 
of  Foreign  Affairs  stated  that  the  Soviet  Government,  upon 
the  request  of  the  Chinese  authorities  in  Urga,  ordered  the 
Siberian  Command  to  dispatch  troops  to  Mongolia  in  order 
to  assist  in  the  liquidation  of  the  Semenov  bands,  whereupon 
those  troops  were  to  return  to  the  Russian  Soviet  territory. 
On  November  27,  another  telegram  stated  that,  since  the 
Chinese  troops  had  already  driven  out  the  Semenov  bands, 
the  Soviet  Government  did  not  intend  any  longer  to  send 
troops  there;  however,  should  the  followers  of  Semenov  be 
found  again  within  the  boundaries  of  Mongolia,  and  should 
the  Chinese  authorities  apply  to  Russia  for  assistance,  such 
assistance  will  be  given. 

"We  consider  it  necessary  to  state  that  the  crossing  of  the 
frontiers  of  one  country  by  the  troops  of  another  violates  the 
sovereignty  of  that  country,  and  that  the  statement  in  the 
first  telegram  to  the  effect  that  we  asked  for  assistance  is  not 


116  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

true.  Thougli  the  dispatching  of  troops  did  not  actually  take 
place,  there  still  remains  the  offer  of  military  assistance, 
•which  we  should  not  accept."  * 

Five  months  after  this  incident,  however,  the  Red 
troops  actually  crossed  the  Chinese  frontier.  Again 
the  reason  given  for  this  was  a  request  for  assistance  on 
the  part  of  Chinese  authorities,  which  would  seem  ratter 
doubtful  in  view  of  the  above-quoted  note.  The  os- 
tensible objective  of  the  expedition  was  an  attack  upon 
some  detachments  of  anti-Soviet  forces  in  Eastern  Si- 
beria which  had  fled  to  China  and  had  been  interned 
by  the  Chinese  in  the  district  of  Chuguchak.  These 
troops  were  commanded  by  General  Bakich  and  were 
joined  in  May  by  remnants  of  the  detachments  under 
the  command  of  Gnoyev,  which  were  until  then  still 
operating  in  the  Semipalatinsk  district  of  Siberia. 

On  May  24,  the  Eed  troops  attacked  the  Bakich 
forces  and  surrounded  the  city  of  Chuguchak.  Forced 
to  retreat,  Bakich  turned  in  the  direction  of  Mongolia 
and  was  reported  in  June  as  attempting  to  eifect  a 
juncture  with  the  forces  of  Baron  Ungem,  operating 
on  the  Mongolian  territory — with  the  Red  troops  in 
pursuit,  f 

♦  The  Russian  text  of  this  note  was  published  in  Moscow  Jzvettiya, 
January  5,  1921. 
t  Moscow  Izvestiya,  June  11,   1921. 


SOVIET  STKATEGY  IN  THE  FAE  EAST    117 

All  this  cleared  the  way  for  an  effective  Soviet  expe- 
dition to  Mongolia  and  furnished  the  first  impetus  to 
such  an  expedition.  The  "popular-revolutionary  party" 
proclaimed  itself  Government  and  attempted  to  capture 
the  capital  of  Mongolia,  TJrga.  It  already  had  an 
army,  organized  and  equipped  on  Russian  territory.* 
At  its  request,  the  Red  troops  in  the  Baikal  region  im- 
mediately concentrated  all  their  attention  on  Mongolia. 
The  troops  commanded  by  Ungem  were  defeated  and 
were  forced  to  retreat  into  the  Eastern  steppes.  And 
soon  after  that,  the  Soviets  staged  the  most  farcical 
feature  of  the  whole  Mongolian  incident. 

At  the  end  of  July  the  Mongolian  People's  Revolu- 
tionary Government  addressed  an  official  appeal  to  the 
Moscow  Government,  in  which  it  requested  the  latter 
"not  to  withdraw  the  Soviet  troops  from  the  territory 
of  Mongolia,"  until  there  can  he  effected  a  "complete 
removal  of  the  menace  from  the  common  enemy."  The 
appeal  explained  that  the  Mongolian's  People's  Revolu- 
tionary Government  had  not  as  yet  succeeded  in  organ- 
izing and  perfecting  its  apparatus  of  governmental 
authority  and  need  the  aid  of  the  Red  troops  for  the 
purpose  of  maintaining  the  security  of  the  Mongolian 

•  Moscow  Izveatiya,  November  6,  1921. 


118  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

territory  and  of  the  frontiers  of  the  Eussian  Socialist 
Federated  Soviet  Republic.  * 

The  Moscow  Government  immediately  and  most  gra- 
ciously acceded  to  this  request.  Through  the  repre- 
sentative of  the  Commissariat  of  Foreign  Affairs  at 
Irkutsk,  Chicherin  transmitted  to  the  Revolutionary 
Government  of  Mongolia  a  pompous  note,  which  began 
as  follows: 

"The  Russian  Soviet  Government,  in  alliance  with  the 
Government  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  ordered  its 
troops,  operating  side  by  side  with  the  revolutionary  army 
of  the  Provisional  Government  of  Mongolia,  to  deal  a  crush- 
ing blow  to  the  common  enemy,  the  Tsarist  General  TJngern, 
who  has  subjected  the  Mongolian  people  to  unprecedented 
enslavement  and  oppression;  violated  the  rights  of  autono- 
mous Mongolia;  at  the  same  time  threatening  the  security 
of  Soviet  Russia,  and  the  inviolability  of  the  territory  of  the 
fraternal  Far  Eastern  Republic." 

This  is  the  explanation  Chicherin  offers  for  the  ap- 
pearance, in  the  first  place,  of  the  Soviet  troops  on  the 
territory  of  Mongolia.  The  Russian  Soviet  Govern- 
ment "notes  with  great  satisfaction"  the  appeal  ad- 
dressed to  it  by  the  Mongolian  Provisional  Revolution- 
ary Government  "that  the  Soviet  troops  should  not 
be  removed  from  the  territory  of  Mongolia."  The 
Soviet  Government  considers  this  appeal  a  manifesta- 
tion of   "close   and   friendly   bonds"   that  now  unite 

•  For  full  text  of  this  note  see  Appeodix  II. 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    119 

the  people  of  Russia  with  the  people  of  Mongolia.  It 
announces  its  firm  decision  to  withdraw  the  Red  troops 
just  as  soon  "as  the  menace  to  the  free  development  of 
the  Mongolian  people  and  to  the  security  of  the  Russian 
Eepuhlic  and  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  shall  have 
been  removed."  But  the  Russian  Government  is  in 
complete  agreement  with  the  Revolutionary  Govern- 
ment of  Mongolia  on  the  fact  that  the  moment  when 
such  withdrawal  of  its  troops  may  be  possible  "has  not 
yet  arrived."  And  for  this  reason,  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment has  decided  to  accede  to  the  request  of  the  Revo- 
lutionary Government  of  Mongolia  and  order  its  troops 
to  remain  on  the  territory  of  Mongolia.* 

Several  days  after  the  dispatching  of  this  note,  the 
Soviet  press  reported  new  successes  of  the  Red  troops 
operating  in  Mongolia.  It  was  stated  that  after  the 
capture  of  Urga  by  the  Red  troops,  Ungern  retreated 
east  and  was  pursued  for  over  100  versts,  where  he  was 
finally  defeated  by  the  pursuers.  A  large  number  of 
prisoners  was  taken,  including  many  of  Ungem's  im- 
mediate assistants.  Baron  Ungern  himself  was  captured 
soon  after  that,  and  on  September  10  the  Moscow  wire- 
less announced  his  execution  together  with  sixty-one  of 
his  officers. 

•  For  fuU  text  of  this  note  see  Appendix  II. 


120  KUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  BAST 

The  Mongolian  incident,  however;  is  far  from  being 
closed.  Nevertheless,  its  culmination  is,  undoubtedly, 
a  brilliant  victory  for  the  Soviet'policy  in  the  Far  East. 
Another  state  with  a  definite  Moscow  orientation  has 
been  created,  and  the  territory  controlled  by  the  Third 
International  has  been  pushed  to  the  very  boundaries  of 
China  proper. 

There  is  one  more  phase  of  the  Soviet  Far  Eastern 
strategy  that  deserves  attention  in  this  connection.  The 
Chicherin  note  of  protest  against  the  Japanese  activities 
in  the  Far  East  was  addressed  to  the  Governments  of 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy,  and  against  these 
countries  the  accusation  of  support  of  the  Japanese  was 
directed.  The  United  States  was  omitted  from  the  list 
of  the  accused  powers  and,  apparently,  by  implication 
exonerated  from  the  accusation.  This  was  not,  by  any 
means,  an  oversight  or  an  accident  on  the  part  of  the 
Soviet  diplomacy.  It  was  entirely  in  keeping  with  the 
whole  Soviet  view  of  the  American  position  in  the  Far 
East. 

The  Soviets  are  frankly  banking  on  a  possibility  of  a 
war  between  the  United  States  and  Japan.  Whatever 
the  outcome  of  such  a  war,  the  Soviet  leaders  believe 
that  the  war  would  exhaust  both  sides  and,  possibly, 
lead  to  a  social  revolution  in  both,  and  even  if  the  revo- 


SOVIET  STRATEGY  IN  THE  FAR  EAST    121 

lution  should  not  take  place,  both  sides  would  be  weak- 
ened very  greatly  by  the  effort.  This  is  particularly 
important  for  the  Soviets  in  the  case  of  Japan,  as  in 
that  manner  their  only  strong  adversary  in  the  Far 
East  would  be  eliminated.  Thus,  whatever  the  outcome 
of  an  armed  encounter  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan,  the  Soviet  leaders  feel  that  they  would  be  the 
only  and  the  real  winners.  And  they  are  ready  to  spare 
no  efforts  for  the  consummation  of  this  end. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  SOVIET  FAR  EASTERN  CONFERENCE 

The  sovietization  of  Mongolia  was  not  only  a  distinct 
triumph  for  tlie  Soviet  strategy  in  the  Far  East,  but  it 
opened  before  the  Moscow  leaders  rather  alluring  and 
timely  possibilities  in  connection  with  the  Washington 
Conference  on  the  Limitation  of  Armaments.  The 
Soviet  Government  never  had  any  illusions  as  to  the 
possibility  of  its  being  asked  to  send  representatives  to 
the  Conference  in  Washington.  Its  July  note  of  pro- 
test against  not  being  invited  was  merely  a  matter  of 
form  and  of  rhetorical  exercise  for  the  facile  and  elo- 
quent Soviet  Commissar  of  Foreign  Affairs.  For  a 
time,  the  Soviet  Government  rather  hoped  that  the 
representatives  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  might  be 
invited  to  attend  the  Washington  parley.  Then  the 
Moscow  Government  would  be  able  to  speak  through 
them,  in  the  same  way  in  which  it  had  thus  conducted 
indirect   negotiations   with    China   and   Japan.      The 

agent  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  in  Peking  even 

122 


SOVIET  FAR  EASTERN  CONFERENCE     123 

applied  for  an  invitation  to  Washington,  but  the  posi- 
tion taken  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
which  issued  the  invitations,  was  one  of  inalterable 
opposition  to  this. 

It  so  happens  that  this  is  not  the  first  time  that  the 
Soviet  Government  fails  to  receive  an  invitation  to  a 
world  parley.  When  the  Peace  Conference  was  in 
progress  and  the  Moscow  Government  found  itself  un- 
invited to  it,  it  immediately  organized  a  world  congress 
of  Communist  groups  and  hastened  to  organize  them 
into  the  Third  International,  which  it  pronounced  as 
an  "antidote"  to  the  League  of  Nations.  This  Interna- 
tional has  proven  to  be  a  most  valuable  instrument  in 
the  hands  of  the  Soviet  Government.  It  is  brought  into 
play  whenever  the  Soviet  Government  wishes  something 
done  for  which  it  can,  if  necessary,  disclaim  responsi- 
bility. So  the  Third  International  is  now  being  pushed 
forward  in  the  Far  East  for  the  purpose  of  organizing 
a  Soviet  Far  Eastern  Conference  in  competition  with 
the  Washington  Conference,  in  so  far  as  it  deals  pri- 
marily with  the  problems  of  the  Far  East. 

The  question  of  a  possible  Far  Eastern  conference 
to  be  called  by  Moscow  was  first  raised  in  the  Soviet 
press  by  V.  Vilensky.  In  an  article,  published  in  the 
official  organ  of  the  Executive  Committee  of  Soviets, 


124  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

i.e.,  the  political  organ  of  the  Government,*  he  urged 
the  need  of  such  a  conference,  to  oppose  the  Washington 
Conference.  According  to  his  analysis  of  the  situation, 
the  four  great  powers  to  be  represented  in  Washington 
— ^the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  Japan  and  France 
— are  primarily  interested  in  a  division  of  their  control 
over  the  Pacific  ocean  and  the  territories  lying  on  the 
Pacific.  The  Washington  Conference  is  bound  to  be- 
come a  conflict  of  "the  contradictions  which  exist 
among  these  four  pretenders  to  hegemony  in  the 
Pacific." 

Whatever  compromises  or  decisions  may  be  reached 
at  the  Washington  Conference  are  bound,  according  to 
Vilensky,  to  be  at  the  expense  of  the  interests  of  the 
peoples  which  inhabit  the  Far  East,  viz.,  China,  Mon- 
golia, the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  and  Soviet  Russia. 
Consequently,  a  counter-conference  of  these  four  na- 
tions is  not  only  desirable  but  essential  from  the  point 
of  view  of  safeguarding  the  interests  of  these  nations. 

The  next  step  in  the  development  of  this  idea  was  a 
discussion  of  the  question,  taken  up  where  Vilensky  left 
it  off,  in  the  leading  article  in  the  official  economic  organ 
of  the  Soviet  Government,  f     This  article  approached 


•  Moscow  Izveatiya,  August  2,  1921. 

t  Moscow  Ekonomicheskaya  Zhian,  August  10,  1921. 


SOVIET  FAR  EASTERN  CONFERENCE     125 

the  question  entirely  from  tlie  economic  viewpoint.  Its 
thesis  was  that  "if  the  peoples  of  the  Far  East  are  to 
be  able  to  offer  sufficient  resistance  to  imperialistic 
aggression,  no  matter  whence  it  comes,  it  is  necessary 
for  them  to  determine  and  unify  their  own  interests." 
This  unification  of  interests  has  to  proceed  along  two 
lines,  the  external  and  the  internal. 

The  external  unity  of  interests  lies  in  a  coordination 
of  the  forces  of  these  nations  for  defense  against  direct 
imperialistic  aggression.  But  this  external  unity  can 
never  be  effective,  unless  it  is  based  upon  a  mutuality 
of  economic  interests,  which  would  act  as  a  force  of 
internal  cohesion. 

There  are  three  stages,  maintains  the  author  of  the 
article,  in  the  process  of  effecting  such  internal  unity. 
The  first  is  the  establishment  of  close  economic  rela- 
tions between  Soviet  Russia  and  the  Far  Eastern  Ee- 
public.  This  is  the  easiest  of  the  three  stages,  for  what 
is  called  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  has  been  carved  out 
of  Russian  territory,  and,  by  the  very  nature  of  its 
development  since  the  first  days  of  its  settlement  by 
Russia,  constitutes  an  integral  part  of  the  rest  of  Siberia 
and  of  the  whole  of  Russia.  The  second  stage  is  more 
difficult,  consisting  of  a  similar  unification  of  the 
economic  interests  of  Soviet  Russia  and  the  Far  Eastern 


126  EUSSIA  m  THE  FAE  EAST 

Eepublic  on  the  one  hand  and  of  Mongolia  on  the 
other. 

This  task — according  to  the  Soviet  analysis  we  are 
quoting — is  facilitated  by  two  circumstances.  In  the 
first  place,  Mongolia  is  more  easily  accessible  to  Russia 
than  to  any  other  country,  including  China  herself,  of 
which  Mongolia  was  until  recently  a  component  part; 
and  in  the  second  place,  the  primitive  character  of  the 
Mongolian  market  makes  it  possible  for  Russia,  even 
in  her  present  state  of  industrial  collapse,  to  satisfy  its 
needs,  while  Mongolia's  exports,  consisting  of  meat  and 
hides,  can  easily  be  consumed  by  the  Russian  markets. 
Moreover,  the  recent  events  in  Mongolia  and  the  con- 
trol, which  Soviet  Russia  now  has  over  the  country, 
renders  quite  possible  very  close  relations  between 
Soviet  Russia,  its  Far  Eastern  vassal,  and  Mongolia. 
But  there  is  also  one  disturbing  factor,  viz.^  the  attitude 
on  the  part  of  China,  of  which  we  shall  speak  below. 

With  regard  to  China,  there  is  a  number  of  important 
questions  which  require  solution  in  any  event,  i.e.,  even 
apart  from  the  possibility  of  a  conference,  and  which 
would  determine  the  inter-relations  among  her,  Soviet 
Russia  and  the  Far  Eastern  Republic.  These  are  ques- 
tions of  customs;  trade  routes,  overland  as  well  as  by 
water;  the  status  of  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railroad,  etc. 


SOVIET  FAR  EASTERN  CONFERENCE     127 

The  article  we  are  quoting  ended  with  the  hopeful 
assertion  that  the  solution  of  all  these  questions  is  not 
only  possible,  but  inevitable,  and  that  a  Soviet  Far 
Eastern  Conference  would  be  the  best  method  of  weld- 
ing the  four  territories  enumerated  into  an  economic 
unity.  The  conference  would  have  to  define  their 
common  aims,  determine  their  common  interests,  and 
lay  down  the  fundamentals  of  a  plan  of  collaboration 
and  of  coordination  of  forces. 

In  all  this  preliminary  discussion  of  a  possible  Far 
Eastern  Conference,  the  distinguishing  feature  was 
that  it  was  to  be  a  conference  of  nations,  in  which  the 
representatives  of  the  governments  of  the  four  coun- 
tries would  gather  around  a  conference  table.  But, 
apparently,  something  was  going  on  behind  the  scenes 
of  the  Soviet  diplomacy  all  this  time,  and  before  long 
the  idea  of  the  Far  Eastern  Conference  reappeared  in 
a  new  guise. 

The  next  step  in  the  development  of  the  idea  was  the 
publication  of  the  Theses  of  the  Executive  Committee 
of  the  Third  International  on  the  Washington  Confer- 
ence, in  the  official  organ  of  the  Russian  Communist 
Party.*     These  theses  give  the  view  which  the  Third 


*  Moscow  Pravda,   September  1,   1921.     The  Theses  are  signed  by 
Carl   Kadek,   Secretary   of  the  Executive  Committee. 


128  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

International  takes  of  the  situation  and  the  position 
which  it  intends  to  take  with  regard  to  the  whole 
matter. 

The  Washington  Conference  is  defined  in  these  theses 
as  "an  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  take 
away  from  Japan  by  diplomatic  means  the  fruits  of 
the  latter's  victory,"  which  consist  of  economic  ad- 
vantages in  China  and  Siberia.  The  Conference  may 
result  in  a  compromise,  in  which  case  Great  Britain 
will  side  with  the  United  States,  and  the  two  together 
will  force  Japan  to  give  up  the  advantages  which  the 
United  States  seeks  for  herself.  In  that  case,  just  as 
it  happened  when  Russia,  Great  Britain  and  France 
forced  Japan  to  give  up  the  advantages  she  had  wrested 
from  China  by  the  Simonoseki  treaty,  such  an  enforced 
compromise  will  be  the  basis  for  new  international 
groupings  and  for  new  world  conflicts.  Or  else,  the 
Washington  Conference  may  settle  nothing,  in  which 
case  the  economic  competition  and  the  armament  rivalry 
will  go  on  at  an  even  more  rapid  tempo  than  heretofore. 
But  in  either  case,  the  fundamental  contradictions 
which  exist  among  the  great  capitalistic  powers  will 
remain  uncomposed,  and  consequently,  the  Conference 
as  such  is  doomed  to  failure. 

The  concluding  paragraphs  of  these  theses  are  in  the 


SOVIET  FAR  EASTERN  CONFERENCE  129 

form  of  a  warning,  issued  by  the  Executive  Committee 
of  the  International  "to  the  laboring  masses  and  to  the 
enslaved  peoples  of  the  colonies",  that  they  should  ex- 
pect no  alleviation  from  the  Washington  Conference 
in  the  way  of  removing  militaristic  dangers.  At  the 
same  time,  the  Executive  Committee  appealed  to  the 
Communist  parties  and  labor  organizations  in  all  coun- 
tries "to  increase  their  agitation  and  struggle  against 
the  imperialistic  states,"  and  to  the  masses  of  the  popu- 
lation of  Eastern  Siberia,  China,  and  Korea,  "to  unite 
more  closely  with  Soviet  Russia." 

For  a  whole  month  after  that,  the  question  of  a 
Soviet  Far  Eastern  Conference  was  not  discussed  in  the 
Moscow  press.  Then  V.  Vilensky  again  took  up  the 
question,*  and  his  discussion  disclosed  a  very  important 
and  interesting  fact.  In  that  interval,  the  question  of 
calling  a  counter-conference  was  settled  by  the  Soviet 
leaders,  and  the  decision  was  to  have  the  Executive 
Committee  of  the  Third  International,  rather  than  the 
Soviet  Government,  call  this  conference.  It  is  to  be  a 
"congress  of  the  toiling  masses  of  Eastern  Asia,"  not 
a  conference  of  the  representatives  of  governments. 

The  reason  for  this  decision  does  not  appear 
clearly,  but  some  of  the  events  that  have  taken  place 

♦  Moscow  Izvestiya,  September  30,  1921. 


130  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

in  the  Far  East  during  the  interval  shed  a  very  inter- 
esting light  on  what  is  going  on  behind  the  scenes  of 
the  Soviet  diplomacy.  For  it  was  certainly  not  with- 
out a  reason  that  the  Soviet  leaders  gave  up  the  idea  of 
staging  a  regular  diplomatic  conference,  with  four 
nations  represented,  to  offer  to  the  world  their  own 
solution  of  the  problems  which  stand  out  in  such  sharp 
relief  at  the  present  time. 

Ever  since  the  creation  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic 
at  Chita,  the  Soviet  Government  has  been  doing  every- 
thing in  its  power  to  arrange  for  an  official  conference 
between  the  representatives  of  that  Eepublic  and  Japan. 
That  was  really  the  primary  purpose  for  which  the 
Soviet  leaders  agreed  in  the  first  place  to  the  creation 
of  the  "buffer"  state,  for  they  hoped  to  be  able  to  use 
it  as  a  channel  for  an  understanding  which  it  wanted 
with  Japan.  On  the  other  hand,  Japan  quite  obviously 
consented  to  the  creation  of  this  "buffer"  between  her- 
self and  Soviet  Russia,  because  she  expected  to  derive 
advantages  out  of  the  situation  that  would  have  thus 
come  about. 

But  at  the  same  time,  Japan  continued  her  old  policy 
of  making  no  definite  and  clear-cut  declarations  of  her 
position  with  regard  to  the  Russian  Far  East.  She 
continued  to  hold  the  coast  and  the  island  of  Sakhalin 


SOVIET  FAR  EASTERN  CONFERENCE  131 

on  the  plea  of  defending  her  interests,  and  yet  ostensibly 
preserved  a  state  of  neutrality  with  regard  to  the  Far 
Eastern  Eepublic  itself. 

Finally,  a  conference  took  place  early  in  September 
between  the  representatives  of  Chita  and  of  Tokyo  in 
the  city  of  Dairen,  in  Manchuria.  What  took  place  at 
the  Dairen  Conference  is  not  known.  The  Conference 
was  interrupted  about  the  middle  of  October,  and  then 
resumed  in  November. 

The  questions  of  a  trade  agreement  and  of  the 
evacuation  of  the  Russian  Far  East  were  taken  up 
seriously  in  Dairen,  and  the  Japanese  representatives 
showed  themselves  quite  willing  to  settle  both  of  these 
questions  quite  satisfactorily  to  the  Chita  Government. 
These  two  points  appear  obvious  from  Vilensky's  dis- 
cussion. He  took  this  apparent  change  of  front  on 
the  part  of  the  Japanese  diplomats  in  conjunction  with 
the  Japanese  negotiations  with  China  regarding  the 
Shantung  question.  And  the  point  of  his  argument  was 
that  all  this  does  not,  necessarily,  indicate  a  reversal 
of  Japan's  postwar  policy  with  regard  to  the  continental 
Far  East.  His  explanation  of  Japan's  motives  ran 
as  follows: 

"With  the  aid  of  all  these  'conferences'  and  'negotiations' 
Japan  merely  attempts,  on  the  eve  of  the  Washington  Con- 


132  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

ference,  to  safeguard  her  rear  so  far  as  the  continent  of  Asia 
is  concerned.  The  current  task  of  the  Japanese  diplomacy 
is  to  bind  China  or  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  by  means  of 
some  sort  of  agreements.  The  Hara  Cabinet  wants  to  be  able 
to  say  that  all  the  acute  problems  of  the  Far  East  have 
already  been  settled  by  Japan's  direct  negotiations  with  the 
Far  Eastern  Republic  and  with  China," 

In  accordance  with  this  analysis,  Vilenskj  forecast 
the  following  as  the  basic  object  of  the  congress  of  the 
toiling  masses  of  Eastern  Asia,  that  is  being  convoked 
by  the  Third  International: 

"To  disclose  the  schemes  of  the  Japanese  imperialism, 
which  is  the  chief  oppressor  of  the  nations  of  the  Far  East, 
and  to  oppose  to  it  the  organized  will  of  the  toiling  masses 
of  Eastern  Asia." 

The  Dairen  negotiations  were  not  broken  off,  however, 
and  the  Soviet  Government  does  not  risk  the  calling 
of  a  diplomatic  Far  Eastern  conference.  It  is  so  much 
simpler  to  relegate  the  task  to  the  Third  International, 
to  make  the  conference  serve  the  agitation  and  propa- 
ganda purposes  which,  in  any  event,  would  have  been 
the  only  possible  outcome  of  any  Soviet  Far  Eastern 
Conference,  and  then,  if  necessary,  to  disclaim  all  of- 
ficial responsibility  for  any  criticism  or  decisions  in 
which  the  conference  might  indulge. 

There  is  another  reason  why  the  Soviet  diplomats  are 
rather  diffident  about  lauching  a  diplomatic  counter- 
conference.    The  position  of  China,  the  participation  of 


SOVIET  FAR  EASTERN"  CONFERENCE     133 

which  in  such  a  conference  is  vital,  is  far  from  being 
favorable  to  the  Soviet  plans.  The  Peking  Government 
is  not  at  all  in  sympathy  with  the  efforts  made  in  the 
course  of  the  past  months  by  Moscow  to  reach  a  friendly 
understanding  with  it.  After  the  overthrow  of  the 
Anfu  party  and  the  accession  to  power  of  the  present 
regime,  the  Soviet  diplomats,  as  we  saw  above,  had 
great  hopes  of  reaching  such  an  understanding  with  the 
new  Government.  Their  calculations  were  based  on 
the  strongly  anti-Japanese  position  of  General  Wu-Pei- 
Fu,  whose  antagonism  to  Japan  they  expected  to  turn 
into  friendship  for  Soviet  Russia.  But  their  anticipa- 
tions in  this  regard  failed  of  materialization  almost 
completely,  while  Wu-Pei-Fu's  own  influence  in  Peking 
lasted  but  a  very  short  time.  The  present  Peking  Gov- 
ernment is  very  cold  to  the  Soviet  advances. 

This  coldness  on  the  part'Of  Peking  toward  Moscow 
was  not,  of  course,  dispelled  by  the  recent  activities  of 
the  Soviets  on  the  Chinese  frontier;  rather  was  it  in- 
creased. Ever  since  the  Chinese  revolution  furnished 
an  opportunity  for  the  Imperial  Russian  Government 
to  establish  its  ascendency  in  Mongolia  and  elsewhere 
along  the  Chinese  boundary,  there  have  been  constant 
difficulties  between  Peking  and  Petrograd  regarding 
the  status  of  these  territories.    The  Mongolian  question 


134  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAE  EAST 

was  finally  regulated  by  the  tri-partite  Kyakhta  agree- 
ment in  1915,*  but  tbe  question  of  the  TJrankhai  Terri- 
tory, for  example,  was  never  settled  even  tentatively. 
The  establishment  in  Mongolia,  in  the  summer  of  1921, 
of  a  government  that  rests  almost  exclusively  on  the 
bayonets  of  the  Russian  Red  troops  can  scarcely  be  con- 
sidered by  the  Peking  Government  as  furthering  its 
own  aims. 

The  Kyakhta  agreement  made  Mongolia  an  autono- 
mous state  under  China's  suzerainty.  The  Mongols 
were  not  satisfied  with  this  agreement,  for  they  de- 
manded complete  independence.  But  such  as  it  was, 
the  agreement  stood  until  1919,  when  it  was  abrogated 
by  China,  and  Mongolia  was  included  in  the  territory 
of  the  Chinese  Republic.  This  state  of  affairs  lasted 
until  the  events  which  we  described  in  the  last  chapter 
unfolded  themselves,  and  the  People's  Revolutionary 
Government  of  Mongolia,  established  with  the  aid  of 
the  Russian  Red  troops,  placed  itself  under  the  pro- 
tection of  Soviet  Russia. 

Peking's  reply  to  this  was  expressed  in  new  instruc- 
tions to  Marshal  Chan-Tso-Lin  to  march  against  Mon- 
golia. This  time  Chan-Tso-Lin  decided  to  carry  out  the 
instructions,  and  began  making  preparations  for  the 

•  For  the  important  provisions  of  this  agreement  see  Appendix  II. 


SOVIET  FAR  EASTEEN  CONFERENCE  135 

expedition.  But  these  preparations  were  halted  when 
the  Canton  Government  began  its  war  against  Peking. 
In  the  meantime  the  Soviets  have  done  everything 
in  their  power  to  reach  an  understanding  with  China 
over  the  Mongolian  question.  All  the  means  at  its 
disposal  have  been  utilized  to  this  end.  In  a  note, 
addressed  on  September  14,  1921,  to  the  head  of  the 
People's  Revolutionary  Government  of  Mongolia,  its 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Bodo,  George  Chicherin, 
the  Soviet  Commissar  of  Foreign  Affairs,  said: 

"More  than  once  has  the  Russian  Government  approached 
the  Government  of  China,  both  directly  and  through  the 
representatives  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  who  were  in 
communication  with  the  latter,  with  offers  to  begin  nego- 
tiations on  these  questions  (relations  between  Mongolia  and 
China)." 

All  these  efforts  failed,  however,  and  in  September, 
1921,  the  Soviet  Government  decided  to  send  a  special 
mission  to  take  up  this  question.  In  order  to  have  a 
pretext  for  this  mission,  which  was  to  go  in  the  guise 
of  a  trade  delegation,  the  Mongolian  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  was  inspired  from  Moscow  to  request 
the  Soviet  Government  to  present  to  the  Chinese  Gov- 
ernment an  offer  of  the  new  rulers  of  Mongolia  to  enter 
into  negotiations  with  Peking. 

•  For  complete  text  of  this  note  see  Appendix  II. 


136  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

In  the  meantime  the  Soviet  troops  had  occupied  not 
only  Mongolia  but  also  the  TJrankhai  Territory.  Here, 
again,  the  pretext  was  the  need  for  the  Soviet  Govern- 
ment to  defend  its  frontiers  from  "white  guard  bands" 
which  were  claimed  to  have  found  refuge  in  the  moun- 
tains of  Urankhai.  And  just  as  with  Mongolia,  the 
Soviet  Commissar  of  Foreign  Affairs  dispatched  an 
official  note  to  the  shepherds  of  Urankhai,  assuring  the 
"people  of  the  Urankhai  Territory"  that  the  sole  object 
of  the  occupation  of  their  land  by  the  Russian  Red 
troops  was  to  defend  them  from  the  "reactionary  tsarist 
officers  who  had  found  refuge  among  them"  and  to 
protect  the  territory  of  Soviet  Russia  from  these 
"bands."  The  note  also  contains  assurances  that  the 
Soviet  troops  would  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  these 
dangers  would  be  removed.* 

Knowing  only  too  well  the  Soviet  technique  of  over- 
throwing governments  in  territories  contiguous  with 
Soviet  Russia,  the  Peking  Government  has  been  watch- 
ing with  considerable  apprehension  this  massing  of 
Russian  Red  troops  in  the  vicinity  of  Northern  China. 
Its  leaders  know  that  the  possibility  is  not  precluded 
that   some   group   may   appear  there,    subsidized   and 


•  The   text   of   this  note  was    published   in   the  Moscow   Izveatiya, 
September  17,   1921. 


SOVIET  FAR  EASTERN  CONFERENCE     137 

instructed  from  Moscow,  declare  itself  a  govenunent 
and  immediately  apply  to  Soviet  Russia*  for  military 
assistance. 

Under  these  conditions  it  is  more  than  likely  that 
the  Peking  Government  would  rather  trust  itself  to 
the  "imperialistic  intrigue"  of  the  Washington  'Con- 
ference than  participate  in  a  Soviet  diplomatic  confer- 
ence. And  without  China  such  a  conference  would  be 
worthless,  as  the  Soviet  leaders  themselves  fully  realize. 

But  neither  were  the  Soviet  leaders  willing  to  let  such 
ah  opportunity  of  general  international  interest  in  the 
affairs  of  the  Far  East  as  presents  itself  in  connection 
with  the  Washington  Conference  pass  unutilized  by 
them.  The  Congress  of  the  Toiling  Masses  of  Eastern 
Asia  was  the  natural  outcome  of  the  situation  that  had 
thus  unfolded  itself  in  the  Far  East  on  the  eve  of  the 
Washington  Conference. 


CHAPTER  IX 

Russia's  national  interests  in  the  fab  east 

The  story  of  the  Russian  phase  of  the  Far  Eastern 
question,  given  in  the  preceding  chapters,  incomplete 
though  it  be,  brings  out  two  import.ant  things.  The 
first  is  that  the  interplay  of  a  number  of  factors  opera- 
tive in  the 'Course  of  the  past  quarter  of  a  century  has 
obscured  and  rendered  confusingly  complex  the  basic 
elements  of  Russia's  position  in  the  Far  East.  The 
second  is  that  it  is  most  important  to  distinguish  in  the 
situation  between  the  fundamental  structure  of  Russia's 
real  national  interests  and  the  confusing  superstructures 
of  the  highly  questionable  policies  followed  by  the 
Russian  Imperial  regime  during  the  years  of  its 
imperialistic  aggression  and  by  the  Soviet  regime  in 
its  present-day  activities.  Let  us  attempt  to  make  such 
a  differentiation. 

The  elemental  eastward  movement  of  Russian  colon- 
ization through  the  centuries,  in  the  course  of  which 

Russia  had  made  her  way  across  the  virgin  stretches 

138 


NATIONAL  INTERESTS  IN  FAR  EAST     139 

of  Siberia  and  finally  came  to  rest  on  the  shores  of  the 
Pacific,  is  the  first  and  the  most  important  element  in 
the  situation.  To  settle  this  vast  territory  and  introduce 
into  it  modem  civilization  has  been  a  truly  stupendous 
task  that  required  sturdy  colonizing  genius  and  colossal 
expenditures  of  effort,  human  life,  and  material  wealth. 

The  Russian  settlers  in  Siberia  came  to  an  economic- 
ally virgin  land  that  had  very  little  native  population. 
There  were  no  organized  states  to  conquer,  no  foreign 
nations  to  absorb.  Russia  came  into  these  vast  Asiatic 
stretches,  bringing  with  her  the  arts  of  civilization, 
millions  of  her  own  population,  and  the  resources  of 
a  powerful,  organized  state.  She  developed  the  coun- 
try and  made  of  it  an  organic  part  of  her  own  politico- 
economic  whole.  This  applies  to  the  Far  East  with 
even  greater  justice  than  to  the  rest  of  Siberia,  for  the 
conditions  that  Russia  encountered  there  were  even 
more  difficult  to  overcome  than  those  with  which  she  met 
in  the  western  portions  of  the  country. 

Toward  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  violent 
imperialism  of  the  Russian  Government  intruded  itself 
upon  this  process  of  peaceful  colonization.  Fed  by 
inordinate  ambitions  and  by  questionable  intrigue,  this 
Russian  imperialism  proceeded  to  wrest  for  itself  ad- 
vantages in  places  where  such  acquisitions  could  be  of 


140  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

no  possible  good  to  the  national  interests  of  Eussia. 
The  whole  Manchurian  episode  of  Russia's  history, 
ending  so  ingloriously  with  the  Russo-Japanese  War, 
involved  no  national  interests  and  could  not  possibly 
have  brought  Russia  any  permanent  and  necessary 
advantages. 

Of  equally  questionable  value  were  the  advantages 
which  the  Imperial  Russian  Government  wrested  from 
China  after  the  revolution  took  place  there  in  1911. 
There  seems  little  doubt  that  the  manner  in  which  the 
Russian  Imperial  Government  handled  the  Mongolian 
situation  was  merely  an  echo  of  the  methods  it  had 
employed  on  a  larger  scale  in  Korea  and  Manchuria 
ten  years  before. 

But  if  the  Far  Eastern  imperialism  of  the  Tsar's 
Government  was  entirely  foreign  to  the  national  inter- 
ests of  Russia,  the  present-day  activities  of  the  Soviet 
regime  in  the  Far  East  are  even  more  foreign  to  these 
interests.  Of  what  possible  interest  to  the  people  of 
Russia  can  be  the  question  of  the  sort  of  government 
that  exists  in  Mongolia,  when  this  question  presents  no 
threat  whatever  to  the  honor  or  the  prosperity  of 
Russia  ?  Russia  is  being  frankly  used  by  her  Com- 
munist rulers  as  merely  the  base  for  a  world  revolution, 
and  the  foreign  ventures  of  the  Soviet  Government  and 


NATIONAL  INTERESTS  IN  FAR  EAST     141 

of  the  Third  International  cannot  be  regarded  as  having 
in  view  any  national  interests  of  Russia. 

Moreover,  the  Soviets  are  doing  on  the  territory  of 
China  precisely  what  they  accuse  Japan  of  doing  on 
the  territory  of  Siberia.  They  demand  from  the 
Japanese  the  evacuation  of  the  Maritime  Province,  and 
at  the  same  time  occupy  Mongolia,  offering  the  same 
excuse  that  the  Japanese  had  given  for  their  acts  and 
making  the  same  sort  of  solemn  promises  of  withdrawal. 
Anyone  reading  carefully  the  Chicherin  notes  on  the 
Far  Eastern  Republic  and  on  Mongolia,  given  in  the 
Appendix,  cannot  but  be  struck  by  this  similarity. 

So  after  all  it  is  not  so  difficult  to  distinguish  between 
Russia's  national  interests  and  the  activities  which  have 
been  and  are  carried  on  in  her  name  by  her  Imperial 
or  Soviet  masters.  In  Russia's  present  situation  these 
fundamental  interests  seem  to  be  divided  into  two  broad 
classes:  those  of  territorial  integrity,  and  those  of  na- 
tional sovereignty.  Both  of  these  two  classes  of  inter- 
ests are  involved  in  the  Russian  Far  Eastern  situation. 

The  boundaries  of  the  Russian  empire  were  well 
defined.  These  boundaries  remained  defined  as  the 
frontiers  of  Russia  when  the  Provisional  Government 
was  in  existence.  Since  the  overthrow  of  that  govern- 
ment and  the  disappearance  in  Russia  of  any  legal  and 


142  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

recognized  government,  numerous  attempts  have  been 
made  to  dismember  Russia.  Only  a  Russia  restored  to 
national  statehood  can  deal  authoritatively  with  the 
question  of  the  preservation  or  non-preservation  of  the 
territorial  integrity  of  what  was  formerly  the  Russian 
empire.  Therefore  the  interests  of  Russia's  national 
integrity  demand  that  no  power,  friendly  to  Russia, 
should  make  attempts  to  enter  into  agreements  with  the 
governments  which  now  exist  unrecognized  on  any 
portion  of  the  former  Russian  empire  concerning  per- 
manent disposition  of  any  portion  of  this  territory. 
Specifically,  so  far  as  the  Far  Eastern  question  is  con- 
cerned, the  interests  of  Russia's  territorial  integrity 
require  that  the  great  powers  sanction  or  accept  no 
permanent  separation  from  Russia  of  any  territory 
within  the  frontiers  of  the  former  Russian  empire. 

The  interests  of  national  sovereignty  are  concerned 
with  the  rights  which  have  accrued  to  Russia  by  virtue 
of  the  international  agreements  that  had  been  made  by 
her  recognized  governments.  This  means,  first  of  all, 
the  application  to  Russia  of  the  principle  of  the  sanctity 
of  treaties. 

On  September  23,  1920,  the  Chinese  Government 
violated  all  the  treaties  which  had  existed  between 
Russia  and  China.     This  act  undoubtedly  constituted 


NATIONAL  INTEEESTS  IN  FAR  EAST     143 

a  direct  violation  of  the  interests  of  Russia's  national 
sovereignty.  The  treaties  which  had  existed  between 
Russia  and  China  may  or  may  not  have  been  inter- 
nationally just.  They  may  or  may  not  have  been  to 
the  best  interests  of  Russia.  But  whatever  they  were, 
they  cannot  be  abrogated  arbitrarily  by  one  of  the 
signatories. 

One  of  these  agreements  between  Russia  and  China 
was  concerned  with  the  Russian  control  of  the  Chinese 
Eastern  Railroad.  Aside  from  the  legal  considerations 
involved  in  this  question,  the  continuation  of  this  con- 
trol constitutes  a  matter  of  gi'eat  economic  importance 
to  Russia. 

The  economic  development  of  Siberia  depends  to  a 
large  extent  upon  the  country's  unhampered  and  con- 
venient exit  to  the  sea.  This  exit  is  provided  by  the 
port  of  Vladivostok,  and  the  Chinese  Eastern  Railroad, 
the  construction  of  which  cost  Russia  over  300,000,000 
roubles,  has  its  vital  importance  in  the  fact  that  it  pro- 
vides the  only  possible  convenient  and  economical  con- 
nection between  the  interior  of  Siberia  and  the  port 
terminal.  The  railroad  was  originally  conceived  of  as 
an  economic  necessity,  and  Count  Witte  in  his  Memoirs 
spoke  of  it  as  "designed  exclusively  for  cultural  and 
peaceful  purposes,"  though  "jingoist  adventurers  turned 


144  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

it  into  a  means  of  political  aggression."  Even  the 
Japanese  recognized  the  economic  need  to  Russia  of  this 
railroad,  and  the  Portsmouth  treaty  specifically  pro- 
vided for  the  continuation  of  Russia's  economic  use  of 
the  railroad,  while  precluding  just  as  specifically  any 
utilization  of  it  for  political  purposes. 

But  apart  from  these  general  interests  which  must 
enter  properly  within  the  category  of  Russia's  "legiti- 
mate" interests,  over  which  a  "moral  trusteeship"  has 
been  proposed  by  the  Government  of  the  United  States, 
Russia's  national  interests  in  the  Far  East  require 
permanent  peace  there.  The  economic  havoc  wrought 
there,  as  well  as  elsewhere  in  the  country,  by  the  Com- 
munist experiments,  can  be  repaired  only  by  means  of 
rapid  and  energetic  development,  and  such  development 
is  possible  only  if  Russia  succeeds  in  enlisting  for  it 
the  aid  of  foreign  capital,  and  if  such  capital  can  work 
in  conditions  of  free  and  unhampered  activity. 

There  are  two  nations  that  can  engage  in  such  eco- 
nomic activity  in  the  Russian  Far  East  on  a  large 
enough  scale  to  be  commensurate  with  the  needs  of  the 
situation.  These  two  nations  are  the  United  States 
and  Japan.  And  there  is  no  doubt  that  restored  Russia 
would  be  willing  to  open  her  door  wide  to  both  of  them, 
if  they  came  in  the  proper  spirit. 


NATIONAL  INTERESTS  IN  FAR  EAST     145 

It  is  not  only  conceivable  but,  in  the  long  run,  in- 
evitable that  Eussia  and  Japan  should  be  friends.  True, 
in  order  that  this  should  take  place,  Japan  would  have 
to  undergo  something  of  a  transformation.  It  would 
have  to  be  a  different  Japan,  just  as  it  would  be  a 
different  Eussia.  It  would  have  to  be  a  Japan  that 
will  have  learnt  the  lesson  which  Germany's  experi- 
ence in  the  course  of  the  past  decade  taught  the  world — 
a  Japan  that  will  realize  that  one  hundred  thousand 
bayonets  cannot  give  her  one  hundred  satisfied  cus- 
tomers or  friends.  That  such  a  Japan  is  possible  there 
seems  to  be  very  little  doubt.  And  with  such  a  Japan, 
Eussia  can,  and,  no  doubt,  will  be  friends. 

Freedom  of  economic  opportunities  in  Siberia,  which 
a  restored  Eussia  would  undoubtedly  offer  to  the  world, 
would  place  Japan  in  a  position  of  advantage  which 
nothing  short  of  specific  restrictions  against  her  can 
take  away.  Her  geographical  proximity,  her  knowl- 
edge of  the  local  conditions  and  her  ability  to  adapt 
herself  to  these  peculiar  conditions  presented  by  Siberia, 
are  bound  to  put  her  in  the  same  position  with  regard 
to  Asiatic  Eussia  that  Germany  is  certain  to  enjoy  with 
regard  to  European  Eussia. 

But  whatever  scope  Japan's  economic  activities  may 
assume  in  Siberia,  the  greatest  share  in  the  development 


146  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

of  that  country  would  still  go  to  the  United  States. 
The  United  States  is  the  only  country  in  the  world  to- 
day that  possesses  the  necessary  resources  for  financing 
the  large  phases  of  the  constructive  work  which  would 
have  to  proceed  in  Siberia  in  the  near  future  on  a  truly 
gigantic  scale.  The  similarity  of  the  problems  which 
Siberia  faces  today  with  the  problems  which  America 
faced  during  the  past  fifty  years  in  the  development  of 
her  own  West,  coupled  with  the  accumulation  of 
capitalistic  resources  in  America,  which  has  come  about 
as  a  result  of  the  World  War,  renders  the  United  States 
unmistakably  the  most  important  factor  in  the  economic 
development  of  Siberia.  And  the  traditional  friend- 
ship which  has  existed  between  Russia  and  the  United 
States  for  generations,  and  which  was  greatly  accentu- 
ated by  America's  friendship  for  Russia  since  the 
revolution,  make  such  an  economic  partnership  between 
Russia  and  America  a  certainty. 


CHAPTER  X 

Russia's  role  in  a  world  balance  of  powers 

It  is  not  only  in  their  attitude  toward  each  other  as 
nation  to  nation,  however,  that  lies  the  importance  of 
the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  Eussia. 
The  world  political  situation  of  the  present  time  places 
demands  of  vastly  more  far-reaching  importance  upon 
their  possible  accord  and  a  harmony  of  their  views  on 
certain  fundamental  questions  of  policy  and  action. 
The  role  that  each  of  them  plays  or  is  likely  to  play 
in  the  new  political  equilibrium  of  the  world  which  is 
coming  about  as  a  result  of  the  World  War  is  a  question 
to  which  scarcely  any  other  is  superior  today  in  para- 
mount importance. 

At  the  time  of  the  Peace  Conference  in  Paris,  a 
French  diplomat  was  complaining  on  one  occasion  to 
an  eminent  Russian  statesman  of  the  diflS.culties  en- 
countered by  the  Preliminary  Conference  of  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers,  and  of  the  lack  of  steadiness 

of  purpose  that  characterized  so  prominently  that  con- 

147 


148  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAE  EAST 

clave  of  nations.     The  Russian   statesman   gave  the 
following  reply  to  his  French  colleague: 

"What  would  you  expect?  Russia  is  not  represented  at  the 
Conference.  In  former  European  conferences,  it  was  she, 
with  her  massive  strength  of  two  hundred  milHons  of  people, 
that  supplied  the  steadying  and  stabilizing  influence.  Now 
there  is  nothing  to  take  her  place." 

The  Russian  statesman,  watching  the  work  of  the 
Peace  Conference,  visualized  it  from  the  viewpoint  of 
what  he  rightly  interpreted  as  an  irreparable  disturb- 
ance of  that  European  balance  of  powers,  which  existed 
so  prominently  before  the  war  and  which  was  shattered 
forever  when  the  first  shot  of  the  war  was  fired.  He 
himself  had  taken  a  very  important  part  in  the  network 
of  diplomatic  intrigue  which  had  created  and  main- 
tained that  balance.  The  negative  factor  of  Russia's 
absence  from  the  Paris  Conference,  which  of  itself 
rendered  the  reestablishment  of  the  old  balance  im- 
possible, naturally  loomed  in  his  eyes  as  the  outstanding 
feature  of  the  situation. 

Yet  there  was  another  factor  in  the  situation  as  it 
unfolded  itself  at  the  Paris  Conference,  and  this  factor 
was  even  more  important,  positively,  than  the  absence 
of  Russia  was  negatively.  It  was  the  presence  of  the 
United  States,  for  the  first  time  in  history  projecting 
herself  into  a  world  situation  and  placed  by  the  circum- 


WORLD  BALANCE  OF  POWERS  149 

stances  attending  that  situation  in  a  position  of  un- 
precedented dominance. 

There  is  no  doubt  that  at  the  time  of  the  Paris 
Conference,  i.  e.,  in  the  spring  and  the  summer  of  1919, 
this  position  of  the  United  States  was  not,  by  any 
means,  as  clearly  defined  and  as  widely  accepted  as  it 
is  today.  On  the  contrary,  ostensibly  the  European 
diplomats  of  the  old  school,  instinct  with  the  psychology 
of  a  European  balance  of  powers,  were  in  control  of  the 
situation. 

But  whether  or  not  the  leaders  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference realized  the  new  importance  which  America  was 
destined  by  the  war  to  play  in  the  affairs  of  the  world, 
the  two  years  that  have  elapsed  since  that  Conference 
have  offered  ample  demonstration  of  America's  new 
role.  The  alacrity  and  readiness  with  which  the  great 
powers  consented  to  attend  the  new  world  confer- 
ence, proposed  by  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
furnish  the  most  convincing  proof  of  this  acceptance  of 
America's  leadership,  while  the  almost  complete  absence 
of  opposition  to  having  the  capital  of  the  United  States 
as  the  seat  of  the  conference  was  the  crowning  manifes- 
tation of  America's  position.  And  it  is  most  important 
to  note  that  this  supreme  importance  of  the  new  role  of 
the  United  States  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  is  America's 


150  EUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

larger  interests  that  now  hold  the  center  of  the  world 
stage  and  that  the  incidence  of  these  interests,  coupled, 
of  course,  with  a  numher  of  other  factors,  constitutes 
the  decisive  influence  in  the  determination  of  what  and 
where  that  center  is  to  he. 

The  Paris  Conference  worked  in  an  atmosphere  which 
radiated  from  a  tradition  of  Europe  as  the  center  of 
world  affairs  and  the  European  balance  of  powers  as 
the  most  important  factor  in  the  world  situation.  The 
Washington  Conference  meets  in  an  atmosphere  that 
radiates  from  a  center  of  world  affairs  which  has  moved 
to  the  vast  reaches  of  the  Pacific  ocean  and  a  balance 
of  powers  that  is  truly  world-wide  in  its  scope,  rather 
than  essentially  European. 

The  war  and  the  storm  of  acute  social  unrest  which 
followed  in  its  wake  have  left  the  continent  of  Europe 
a  panting  wreck.  Europe's  sources  of  basic  raw  mate- 
rials are  less  accessible  than  before — partly  because  of 
war's  devastations,  as  in  Northern  France;  partly  be^- 
cause  of  general  disorganization,  as  in  some  of  the  newly 
created  states;  partly  because  of  sporadic  political  con- 
troversies, as  in  Silesia  or  Western  Germany.  Its 
mechanical  industrial  equipment  was  almost  everywhere 
impaired  by  the  war.  Its  manpower  deteriorated  dur- 
ing the  war  and  the  war's  aftermath  from  the  point  of 


WORLD  BALANCE  OF  POWERS  151 

view  of  both  physical  strength  and  psychological  attitude 
toward  the  processes  of  economic  production.  The 
spoliation  and  ruin  of  Russia  by  her  Communist  vivi- 
sectionists  have  left  a  breach  in  the  continental  economy 
of  Europe  that  will  not  be  repaired  for  a  long  time  to 
come.  Finally,  the  creation  of  a  number  of  new  states 
on  the  continent  and  the  status  in  which  the  war  left 
the  two  great  continental  states,  France  and  Germany, 
render  the  internal  political  situation  in  Europe  one  of 
confusion  and  uncertainty. 

At  the  same  time  the  war,  by  its  very  demands  upon 
the  economy  of  the  whole  world,  expressed  in  the  far- 
flung  processes  of  its  conduct,  has  crystallized  the 
politico-economic  status  on  a  world  scope  of  that  part 
of  the  earth  upon  which  at  least  one  side  in  the  conflict 
drew  for  its  resources.  The  United  States  and  the 
British  Overseas  Dominions  were  to  a  large  extent  the 
inexhaustible  source  of  strength  from  which  the  Allies 
drew  the  possibility  of  victory.  The  war  forced  these 
countries  into  a  new  attitude  toward  the  world  problems. 
It  left  them  in  a  politico-economic  status  that  renders 
them  the  active  bases  of  the  world  reconstruction  after 
the  ravages  of  the  conflict.  At  the  same  time,  the  war 
increased  the  importance  of  the  undeveloped  countries 
of  the  East  as  the  passive  bases  of  such  reconstruction. 


153  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

And  all  these  countries  have  the  Pacific  ocean  for  their 
center  of  interests  and  the  world  comity  that  is  now 
formulating  itself  about  the  problems  of  the  Pacific 
as  a  nucleus  for  their  principal  concern.* 

Thus,  the  importance  acquired  by  the  Pacific  in  the 
affairs  of  the  world  is  no  longer  due  primarily  to  a 
menacing  or  even  a  significant  awakening  of  the  Orient 
— a  "Yellow  Peril,"  with  the  specter  of  which  the 
former  German  Emperor  strove  so  hard  to  frighten  the 
world.  Rather  is  it  due  to  a  new  projection  of  the 
Occident  into  the  possibilities  of  development  held  by 
the  Orient.  This  projection  is  not  a  new  thing,  of 
course.  But  the  crystallization  of  the  Occident's 
strength  in  the  Orient  has  been  rapid  and  spectacular 
in  recent  years  through  its  emergence  out  of  the  World 
War.  ISTot  only  has  this  process  taken  place  under  the 
conditions  and  in  terms  of  a  rapidly  growing  vital 
economic  dependence  of  the  war-wrecked  Europe  upon 
the  war-developed  basin  of  the  Pacific  ocean,  but  this 
basin  has  acquired  its  new  world  significance,  because 
the  Pacific  has  become,  to  a  very  important  extent,  the 
white  man's   sea — no   longer   solely   as   an   object   of 


*  I  am  indebted  for  some  of  the  ideas  expressed  here  to  an  excellent 
series  of  articles  on  the  general  subject  of  "Europe's  Decline,"  by 
Alexander  Keronsky,  former  head  of  the  Provisional  Government  of 
Russia,  published  in  the  Prague  Volya  RossU  and  translated  in  part 
in  The  Living  Age. 


WORLD  BALANCE  OF  POWERS  153 

exploitation,  but  as  a  place  in  whicli  the  white  man 
makes  his  habitat  and  begins  to  build  up  great  national 
states.  To  this  kind  of  white  man's  appearance  in  the 
Pacific  there  is  very  strenuous  opposition  on  the  part 
of  one  Oriental  power — Japan — which  has  adopted  the 
European  technique  and  is  bent  on  using  it  for  the 
establishment  of  its  hegemony  in  some  parts  of  the 
Orient,  besides  making  quite  a  definite  bid  for  a  control 
of  the  Pacific. 

To  the  extent  to  which  it  deals  primarily  with  the 
problems  of  the  Pacific,  the  Washington  Conference  is 
confronted  by  this  very  complex  and  inherently  unstable 
situation,  in  which  the  following  are  the  principal 
national  factors: 

1.  Japan,  which  is  for  the  present  moment  still 
dominated  by  ambitions,  imperialistic  elements  that 
are  striving  to  secure  and  maintain  a  hegemony  in  the 
East  and  a  control  of  the  Pacific,  and  at  the  same  time 
confronted  by  such  vital  internal  problems  as  the  growth 
and  the  distribution  of  her  population  and  a  danger  of 
economic  exhaustion  due  to  the  staggering  drain  on  her 
resources  of  her  stupendous  military  and  naval  prep- 
arations. 

2.  Great  Britain,  faced  by  disturbing  internal  diflS- 
culties  due  to  the  war's  aftermath,  and  still  more  dis- 


154  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

tttrbing  symptoms  exhibited  by  the  radical  changes 
which  have  taken  place  in  her  intra-Imperial  relations, 
as  between  the  Metropolis  and  the  Dominions,  striving 
at  the  same  time  to  secure  her  colonial  empire  and 
looking  to  Japan  for  at  least  temporary  assistance  in 
this  regard. 

3.  The  British  Dominions,  finding  themselves  on 
terms  of  competition  with  Japan,  rather  than  of  the 
possible  cooperation  sought  by  the  mother-country,  con- 
fronted by  what  appears  to  be  an  inevitability  of  serious 
conflicts  with  Japan  on  the  questions  of  racial  migra- 
tions and  economic  rivalry. 

4.  China,  over  which  Japan  seeks  to  establish  dom- 
inating control  in  order  to  use  her  as  a  powerful  base 
for  a  possible  carrying  out  of  her  own  ambitions. 

5.  Continental  Europe,  temporarily  passive  because 
of  its  internal  economic  situation  and  the  rapidly  re- 
emerging  rivalry  between  France  and  Germany  for 
continental  hegemony,  but  vitally  interested  in  the 
eastern  developments. 

6.  The  United  States,  finding  herself  in  a  position 
with  regard  to  Japan  practically  identical  with  that  of 
the  British  Dominions,  but  faced  at  the  same  time  by 
the  realization  that  America  alone  can  and  must  act  as 
the  stabilizing  factor  in  this  highly  unstable  situation. 


WORLD  BALANCE  OF  POWERS  155 

These  are  the  six  principal  factors  in  the  world 
situation.  Out  of  them  the  Washington  Conference 
is  making  an  attempt  to  create  a  world  balance  of 
powers.  But  here  again,  as  in  Paris  in  1919,  one  factor 
is  absent,  which  by  its  very  absence  makes  the  creation 
of  a  world  balance  of  powers  in  Washington  just  as  im- 
possible as  its  absence  in  Paris  rendered  untbinkable  a 
re-creation  there  of  a  European  balance.  This  absentee 
is  Russia,  the  seventh  factor  in  the  world  situation. 

Russia  is  not  represented  at  the  Washington  Con- 
ference, but  it  is  impossible  to  strike  out  of  the  world 
situation  her  one-seventh  of  the  earth's  surface,  which 
includes  one-third  of  the  total  continent  of  Asia,  or  the 
massive  strength  of  her  teeming  millions,  or  her  cen- 
turies of  active  international  history.  All  this  gives 
her  a  place  in  the  world  balance  of  powers,  the  impor- 
tance of  which  can  neither  be  gainsaid  nor  minimized 
with  immunity. 

The  existence  of  the  Communist  regime  in  Russia 
sets  her  apart  from  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  six 
factors  in  the  world  situation  which  we  enumerated 
above  are  moved  by  national  and  international  con- 
siderations. The  present  regime  in  Russia  is  actuated 
by  what  may  be  termed  super-national  considerations. 
It  wants  to  change  the  whole  fabric  of  political  and 


156  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

economic  relations,  and  it  has  no  vital  or  basic  interest 
in  relations  among  separate  national  units.  Certainly 
it  has  no  interest  whatever  in  any  efforts  to  reconstruct 
these  relations  on  a  different  plan  from  that  which 
exists  today. 

From  the  story  of  the  activities  of  the  Third  Inter- 
national in  Asia  generally,  and  of  its  more  recent 
strategic  moves  in  the  Far  East,  as  told  in  the  chapters 
of  this  book  devoted  to  those  topics,  it  is  quite  apparent 
that,  in  the  best  case,  individual  and  group  arrange- 
ments among  the  various  national  units  interest  the 
leaders  of  Russian  Communism  only  to  the  extent  to 
which  these  arrangements  and  the  consequent  relations 
may  be  utilized  by  them  for  purposes  of  their  own. 
Their  tactics  are  plain.  They  are  ready  to  make  the 
most  incongruous  alliances,  provided  those  alliances 
afford  them  an  opportunity  for  stimulating  discord  and 
conflicts  among  nations.  In  this  regard,  their  aims  are 
inherently  antagonistic  to  the  aims  which  actuate  the 
Washington  Conference. 

But  while  this  condition  is  the  inevitable  consequence 
of  the  very  nature  of  Communism,  there  is  no  doubt 
that  there  are  only  two  outcomes  possible  for  the 
processes  which  the  Moscow  regime  brings  into  being: 
either  Communism  will  spread  to  the  rest  of  the  world, 


WORLD  BALANCE  OF  POWERS  157 

or  it  will  disappear  in  Russia  herself.  The  national 
existence  of  the  Communistic  and  the  non-Communistic 
systems  side  by  side  is  rendered  impossible  by  the  very 
nature  of  Communism;  the  Communist  leaders  them- 
selves are  most  emphatic  in  the  statement  of  this  fact. 
To  the  extent  to  v^hich  we  believe  that  the  second,  rather 
than  the  first,  of  the  two  outcomes  will  be  the  fate  of 
Russian  Communism,  it  is  a  matter  of  certainty  that 
Russia  is  bound  to  return  to  the  status  of  a  national 
state,  rather  than  remain  merely  a  base  for  the  super- 
national  activities  of  the  Soviet  Government  and  the 
Third  International.  Until  that  time  comes,  Russia 
cannot  be  a  part  of  any  world  balance  of  powers ;  but  at 
the  same  time  any  such  balance  that  may  be  established 
can  be  merely  tentative,  pending  the  determination  of 
what  will  be  Russia's  role  in  it. 

By  all  signs  of  logic  and  all  tests  of  politico-economic 
prognosis,  Communism  is  bound  to  disappear  in  Russia. 
But  the  years  of  its  existence  and  the  far-flung  nature 
of  its  activities  cannot  pass  unnoticed  in  the  history  of 
the  world.  And  nowhere  will  these  effects  be  felt  more 
than  in  the  situation  which  is  rapidly  ghaping  itself  in 
Asia  under  the  influence  of  a  number  of  important 
factors. 

The  two  outstanding  results  of  the  existence  and  the 


158  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAE  EAST 

activities  of  Russian  Communism  in  Asia  are  as 
follows:  First,  the  stimulus  that  these  activities  have 
given  to  military  ambitions  on  the  part  of  Japan ;  and, 
second,  the  general  agitation  of  the  East  against  the 
West,  for  which  the  Communist  propaganda  and  activ- 
ities have  served  as  an  active  ferment.  Both  of  these 
heritages  of  Russian  Communism  the  world  has  to  face 
as  a  whole. 

It  is  hoped  that  the  first  of  these  conditions  will  be 
met  at  the  Washington  Conference.  Allured  by  the 
possibilities  which  seemed  to  have  opened  before  them 
for  playing  a  lone  hand  in  the  field  of  imperialistic 
intrigue  in  the  Far  East  by  the  disappearance  of  Im- 
perial Russia,  Japan's  militaristic  elements  eagerly 
seized  the  excuse  given  them  by  the  Communist  activi- 
ties in  the  Far  East  to  push  forward  a  bold  policy  of 
military  imperialism.  Under  such  circumstances  a  per- 
manent weakening  of  Russia  would  have  been  a  most 
welcome  contingency  so  far  as  Japan  is  concerned. 

But  Japan's  military  imperialism  may — and,  it  is 
hoped,  will — evolve  into  virile  economic  energy,  which 
would  be  a  most  welcome  change  for 'the  peace  of  the 
world.  In  that  case  she  will  have  no  occasion  to  fear 
a  regeneration  of  Russia,  for  economically  she  has  more 
to  gain  from  a  peaceful  cooperation  with  Siberia  than 


WORLD  BALANCE  OF  POWERS  159 

from  military  control  there,  backed  by  a  policy  of  snarl- 
ing at  the  rest  of  the  world  and,  incidentally,  exhausting 
herself  by  an  insupportable  burden  of  naval  armament. 
As  for  the  revolutionary  feiTaent  in  the  East  gener- 
ally, stimulated  so  powerfully  by  the  agents  of  Com- 
munism, that  may  or  may  not  develop  into  a  serious 
menace.  Sooner  or  later  it  must  become  clear  to  the 
peoples  of  the  Orient,  which  are  goaded  into  a  blind  and 
unreasoning  fury  by  the  Communist  propaganda,  that 
they  have  chosen  very  poor  allies  for  the  consummation 
of  their  national  aims.  Communism  has  no  more 
sympathy  with  their  fierce  and  revolutionary  national- 
ism than  it  has  with  any  other  movement,  not  conform- 
ing to  its  own  dogma.  With  the  disappearance  of 
Russian  Communism  much  of  this  revolutionary  activity 
in  the  East  will,  of  necessity,  have  to  subside.  But 
there  is  no  doubt  that  at  least  some  of  its  effects  will 
not  wear  off.  The  present  fermentation  will  un- 
doubtedly crystallize,  all  through  the  Orient,  forces  that 
will  be  active  in  r&-shaping  the  views  and  the  policies 
of  the  various  territories  affected  by  the  process.  The 
development  of  these  processes  it  is  difficult  to  foren 
cast  at  the  present  time  with  any  degree  of  precision, 
but  it  would  be  most  unwise  to  disregard  them  as  very- 
imminent  possibilities,  and  certainly  disastrous  to  fail 


160  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

to  lay  a  foundation  for  meeting  them.  For  even  now 
their  general  outlines  are  quite  distinct:  economic 
rivalry,  from  beyond  which  appear  possible  racial 
conflicts. 

The  Washington  Conference  will  not  be  able  to  solve 
all  the  problems  that  agitate  the  world.  It  may  solve 
some.  It  may  merely  bring  them  out  in  more  or  less 
sharp  relief.  But  there  is  one  thing  that  the  Confer- 
ence can  doj  and,  it  is  hoped,  will  accomplish.  It  can 
lay  down  the  fundamentals  of  an  idealistic  international 
policy,  which  has  been  so  characteristic  of  America's 
view  of  the  world  ever  since  she  appeared  as  a  factor 
in  the  world  situation.  Only  such  a  policy,  if  con- 
sistently carried  out,  can  really  bring  into  the  world 
situation,  rendered  complex  and  highly  unstable  by  the 
war  and  its  aftermath,  the  stabilizing  influence  that  the 
United  States  can,  and,  no  doubt,  will  exert. 

But  to  the  extent  to  which  this  stabilized  equilibrium 
of  the  world  depends  upon  peace  in  the  Far  East,  the 
United  States  will  scarcely  be  able  to  exert  a  sufficiently 
powerful  influence  in  this  direction  unless  she  has, 
working  side  by  side  with  her,  a  strong,  democratic 
Russia,  actuated  by  the  same  international  idealism, 
working  toward  the  same  ends.     And  such  a  Russia  can 


WOELD  BALANCE  OF  POWERS  161 

be  neither  the  Imperial  Russia,  with  its  aggressive 
imperialism,  nor  the  Soviet  Russia,  with  its  irrevocable 
pledge  to  a  world  revolution.  It  can  be  only  the  third 
Russia,  the  Russia  that  is  really  representative  of  the 
country's  national  character  and  shapes  her  policies  in 
correspondence  with  the  people's  actual  needs,  and  not 
in  conformity  with  aggressive,  predatory  aims. 

What  reasons  are  there  to  believe  that  it  will  be  such 
a  Russia  that  will  emerge  out  of  the  country's  present 
trials  ?  These  reasons  lie  in  the  tasks  which  a  nation- 
ally reconstructed  Russia  will  inevitably  have  to  face, 
after  she  will  have  reacquired  her  political  status  as  an 
organized  state  with  a  recognized  government. 

The  first  of  these  tasks  will  be  internal  reconstruction. 
Too  much  has  been  torn  down  in  the  mad  orgy  of  the 
various  phases  of  her  revolution.  She  must  turn  her 
attention  to  actual  rebuilding,  or  else  go  down  in  a 
welter  of  utter  chaos  and  ruin.  She  must  have  peace 
with  her  neighbors,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  because 
she  will  have  no  strength  to  fight  and  build  at  the  same 
time.  And  since  these  two  conditions  are  fundamental, 
even  apart  from  the  natural  inclinations  of  the  Russian 
people,  traditionally  prone  to  idealism,  reconstructed 
Russia  is  bound  to  be  most  sympathetic  in  her  partici- 


162  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAE  EAST 

pation  in  all  international  agreements  looking  toward 
universal  peace,  the  reduction  of  the  burden  of  arma- 
ments, etc. 

Russia's  future  is  still  before  her.  Her  historic 
destiny  has  not  yet  run  out.  And  it  is  most  significant 
that  the  United  States,  the  giant  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere, should  be  so  clear  in  her  realization  of  this 
fact  and  so  emphatic  in  expressing  the  need  of  concerted 
international  action  to  conserve  the  national  heritage 
of  the  temporarily  prostrate  giant  of  the  Eastern  Hemi- 
sphere. The  world  still  needs,  even  more  than  ever, 
the  stabilizing  effect  of  Russia's  massive  strength — 
this  time  on  a  truly  world  scale.  The  paths  of  Russia's 
and  America's  historic  destiny  have  converged,  and 
their  common  path  is  the  road  of  the  world  peace. 


RUSSIA   IN   THE   FAR  EAST 

APPENDIX 

TEXT  OF  TREATIES  AND  DOCUMENTS 


1.    RUSSIA  AND  JAPAN. 

A.    POLITICAL  CONVENTION  OF  1907. 

[Translation  from  the  Official  Text  published  bj  the 
Russian  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.] 

The  Government  of  His  Majesty,  the  Emperor  of 
All  Russia,  and  the  Government  of  His  Majesty,  the 
Emperor  of  Japan,  desirous  of  strengthening  the  peace- 
ful and  neighborly  relations  so  happily  established 
between  Russia  and  Japan,  and  of  removing  all  cause 
of  misunderstandings  in  the  future  between  the  two 
Empires,  have  agreed  to  the  following: 

Article  1. 

Each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  obligates  itself 
to  respect  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  other  and  all 

163 


164  RUSSIA  m  THE  FAR  EAST 

the  rights  accruing  to  each  of  the  Parties  by  virtue  of 
all  treaties,  conventions,  and  contracts,  existing  between 
them  and  China,  copies  of  which  have  been  exchanged 
by  the  High  Contracting  Parties  (in  so  far  as  these 
rights  are  compatible  with  the  principle  of  the  general 
equality  of  rights)  ;  by  virtue  of  the  Portsmouth  Treaty 
of  August  23  (September  5),  1905  ;  as  well  as  by  virtue 
of  all  special  agreements  concluded  between  Kussia  and 
Japan. 

Article  2. 

Both  High  Contracting  Parties  recognize  the  inde- 
pendence and  the  territorial  integi'ity  of  the  Chinese 
Empire  and  the  principle  of  the  general  equality  of 
rights  with  regard  to  trade  and  industry  in  that  Empire 
for  all  nations,  and  undertake  to  preserve  and  defend 
the  status  quo  and  the  above-mentioned  principle  by  all 
peaceful  means  at  their  disposal. 

In  witness  of  this,  the  signatories  hereto,  properly 
authorized  by  their  respective  Governments,  have  affixed 
their  signatures  and  seals  to  this  Convention. 

Concluded  in  St.  Petersburg,  on  July  17  (30),  1907, 
which  corresponds  to  the  30th  day  of  the  7th  month  of 
the  4:0th  year  of  Meidji. 

IZVOLSKT. 
MOTONO. 


APPENDIX  165 

B.     SECEET   TREATY   OF   1916. 

[Translation  from  the  text  published  in  the  Gazette  of 

the  Provisional  Worhmen-Peasants  Government, 

December  8  (21),  1917.] 

The  Russian  Imperial  Government  and  the  Japanese 
Imperial  Goverament,  for  the  purpose  of  further 
strengthening  their  close  friendship  established  between 
them  by  the  Secret  Agreements  of  July  17  (30),  1907; 
June  21  (July  4),  1910;  and  June  25  (July  8),  1912, 
have  agreed  to  supplement  the  above-mentioned  Agree- 
ments by  the  following  Articles: 

/ 

Article  1. 

Both  High  Contracting  Parties  recognize  that  the 
vital  interests  of  each  of  them  demand  the  preservation 
of  China  from  political  domination  by  any  third 
power  holding  inimical  aims  against  Russia  or  Japan 
and  therefore  mutually  obligate  themselves  in  the  future, 
every  time  when  circumstances  would  make  it  necessary, 
to  enter  with  each  other  into  frank  and  sincere  relations 
based  upon  complete  trust,  in  order  to  take  together  all 
measures  necessary  for  the  prevention  of  the  possibility 
of  the  establishment  (in  China)  of  such  a  state  of 
affairs. 

Article  2. 

In  case  that,  as  a  result  of  measures  taken  by  mutual 
consent  by  Russia  and  Japan  on  the  basis  of  the  pre- 


166  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

ceding  Article,  there  should  come  about  a  declaration  of 
war  against  one  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  by  any 
third  power  contemplated  in  Article  1  of  this  Agree- 
ment, the  other  High  Contracting  Party  must  come  to 
the  assistance  of  its  ally  at  the  latter's  first  request; 
each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  hereby  obligates 
itself,  in  case  of  such  a  contingency,  not  to  conclude 
peace  with  the  common  enemy  without  the  preliminary 
consent  to  it  of  its  ally. 

Article  3. 

The  conditions  under  which  each  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  shall  render  armed  assistance  to  the 
other  in  accordance  with  the  preceding  Article,  as  well 
as  the  methods  by  means  of  which  such  assistance  shall 
be  rendered,  must  be  determined  by  common  agreement 
of  the  proper  authorities  of  both  High  Contracting 
Parties. 

Article  4. 

It  must  be  especially  noted  that  neither  the  one  nor 
the  other  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  shall  consider 
itself  bound  by  Aj-ticle  2  of  this  Agreement  to  render 
its  ally  armed  assistance  *  to  the  extent  to  which  it  itself 
shall  be  given  guarantees  by  its  own  allies  that  they 
would  render  it  assistance  corresponding  in  scope  to 
the  seriousness  of  the  impending  conflict. 

*  The  word  "except"  is  obviously  omitted  in  the  Russian  text,  from 
which   this  translation  has  been  made. — Li.   P. 


APPEITBIX  167 

Article  5. 

The  present  Agreement  goes  into  effect  from  tlie 
moment  of  its  signing  and  will  remain  in  force  until 
July  1  (14),  1921.  In  case  neither  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  would  consider  it  necessary  to  declare 
its  unwillingness  to  prolong  this  Agreement  twelve 
months  before  its  expiration,  the  same  shall  continue 
in  force  until  one  year  shall  have  elapsed  from  the 
moment  of  the  declaration  of  one  of  the  High  Con- 
tracting Parties  concerning  its  renouncing. 

Article  6. 

The  present  Agreement  must  remain  a  profound 
secret  for  all,  except  the  two  High  Contracting  Parties. 

In  witness  of  this,  the  representatives  of  the  two 
Parties  have  set  their  signatures  and  seals  to  this  Agree- 
ment in  the  city  of  Petrograd,  on  June  20  (July  3), 
1916,  which  corresponds  to  the  following  Japanese  date: 
the  third  day  of  the  seventh  month  of  the  fifth  year  of 
the  rule  of  Taisse. 

Sazonov. 

MOTONO. 


168  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

C.   SECRET  TELEGRAM  FROM  THE  RUSSIAN 

AMBASSADOR    AT    TOKYO    REGARDING 

THE    LANSING-ISHII    AGREEMENT. 

[Translation  from  tlie  Gazette  of  the  Provisional  Work- 
men-Peasants Government,  December 
2   (15),  1917.] 

To  the  Minister:  October  19,  1917. 

Having  invited  me  to  call  on  bim  today,  tbe  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs  communicated  to  me  confidentially, 
but  at  tbe  same  time  quite  officially,  tbe  text  (trans- 
mitted by  me  in  telegram  No.  2)  of  tbe  Notes  wbicb 
will  be  excbanged  in  Wasbington  on  November  2  or  3, 
new  style,  between  tbe  American  Secretary  of  State 
and  Viscount  Isbii.  A  similar  communication  was 
made  today  to  tbe  Britisb  Ambassador  bere.  Tbe  text 
of  tbe  Notes  will  be  communicated  in  a  few  days  pri- 
vately for  tbeir  information  to  tbe  Frencb  and  tbe 
Italian  ambassadors.  Tbe  publication  will  take  place, 
probably,  on  November  7.  Until  tbat  time,  tbe  Min- 
ister requests  tbat  tbis  communication  be  kept  secret. 

In  communicating  to  me  tbe  text  of  tbe  Notes, 
Viscount  Motono  stated  tbat  be  bad  received  it  in  its 
final  form  only  yesterday  by  telegrapb  from  Wasbington, 
and  since  Viscount  Isbii  must  leave  in  tbe  evening  of 
tbe  day  after  tomorrow,  in  spite  of  tbe  (desire)  on  tbe 
part  of  tbe  Japanese  Government  to  acquaint  itself  witb 


APPENDIX  169 

the  opinion  of  the  Russian  Government  on  this  matter 
before  the  signing  of  the  ]N'otes,  the  affixing  of  the  sig- 
natures could  not  be  postponed.  The  Minister  hopes 
that  no  blame  will  be  attached  to  him  in  Petrograd, 
especially  since  he  is  certain  that  the  Japanese-American 
Agreement  in  question  cannot  meet  with  any  opposition 
on  our  part.     Viscount  Motono  mentioned  then  that  in 

the  conclusion *  among  other  things, 

with  the  view  of  putting  an  end  to  the  German  intrigues, 
directed  toward  inciting  distrust  between  Japan  and  the 
United  States  of  North  America,  and  thus  show  most 
clearly  to  China  that  there  is  between  these  two  powers 
complete  agreement  with  regard  to  China,  which,  there- 
fore, should  not  expect  to  gain  anything  for  herself  by 
playing  them  against  each  other. 

To  my  question  whether  he  does  not  apprehend  mis- 
understandings in  the  future  that  may  spring  from  a 
difference  of  interpretation  on  the  part  of  Japan  and 
of  the  United  States  of  the  phrases  "special  position" 
and  "special  interests"  of  Japan  in  China,  Viscount 
Motono  replied  that  *  Neverthe- 
less, the  impression  produced  on  me  by  the  Minister's 
words  was  to  the  effect  that  he  realizes  the  possibility 
of  misunderstandings  also  in  the  future,  but  considers 
that  in  such  a  case  Japan  would  have  at  her  disposal 


*  Omission  in  the  original,  indicated  by  dota.  It  is  most  regret- 
table that  the  Bolsheviki,  in  publishing  the  text  of  this  telegram, 
omitted  such  obviously  important  portions  of  it. — L.  P. 


170  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

better  means  for  applying  in  practice  her  interpretation, 
than  would  the  United  States. 

Krupensky. 


D.     CHICHERIN'S  NOTE  ON  THE  FAK  EAST. 

[Translation  from  the  Russian  text  published  in  the 

Moscow  Izvestiya,  June  3,  1921,]    Note  addressed 

to    the    Governments    of    Great    Britain, 

France,  and  Italy,  dated  June  1,  1921. 

The  struggle  of  the  toiling  masses  of  Russia  for  peace 
and  for  the  right  of  disposing  independently  of  their 
own  fate  has  entered  upon  a  stage  of  new  trials.  Having 
gloriously  repulsed,  by  gigantic  effort  and  miracles  of 
heroism,  the  combined  attacks  of  the  counter-revolution 
from  within  and  of  the  majority  of  foreign  powers  from 
without,  the  toiling  masses  have  won  the  right  to  govern 
themselves  by  means  of  their  own  Soviets  of  workmen 
and  peasants.  They  had  hoped  to  assure  for  themselves 
a  free  opportunity  to  devote  their  forces  to  an  internal 
reconstruction  of  Russia,  in  collaboration  with  other 
countries  for  mutual  interests  and  for  the  achievement 
of  the  economic  aims  that  confront  them. 

Unfortunately,  their  hopes  have  been  blasted  by  a 
new  attempt  at  external  interference  and  a  new  coordi- 
nated attack  of  the  Russian  counter-revolution  and  the 
foreign  Governments.     Under   the   protection   of  the 


APPENDIX  171 

Japanese  bayonets,  the  wliite  guardists  of  Vladivostok, 
who  constitute  but  an  insignificant  clique,  suddenly 
seized  authority  in  that  city.  A  similar  coup  d'etat  has 
been  effected  in  Nikolsk-Ussuriysk  and  in  other  local- 
ities occupied  by  the  Japanese.  Thus,  the  most  open 
sort  of  counter-revolution  has  been  installed  by  the 
Japanese  armed  forces  in  the  territory  of  their  occu- 
pation. 

The  Russian  masses  of  peasants  and  workmen  in  the 
Far  East  have  done  everything  in  their  power  to  obtain 
an  acceptable  peace  with  Japan.  They  have  organized 
a  separate  democratic  republic  in  order  to  make  this 
peace  possible,  and  the  independent  Far  Eastern  Re- 
public, with  this  in  view,  signed  an  agreement  with 
Japan,  which,  under  this  condition,  was  ready  to  with- 
draw her  troops  from  this  territory  and  to  return  fre&- 
dom  to  the  Russian  popular  masses  of,  the  Far  East. 
In  their  name,  the  Government  of  their  Republic  con- 
stantly strove  toward  the  consummation  of  a  complete 
agreement  with  Japan,  in  order  to  live  with  her  in 
peace  and  in  friendly  and  neighborly  relations.  But 
the  Japanese  Government  replied  to  their  peaceful 
efforts  with  a  new  cruel  attack  upon  their  internal 
freedom  and  their  external  independence. 

The  bitterest  foes  of  the  Russian  popular  masses,  the 
extreme  reactionaries,  whose  obvious  object  is  to  conquer 
Siberia  with  the  aid  of  the  Japanese  bayonets  and  then 
become  there  the  subservient  agents  of  the  Japanese 


173  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

conquerors,  have,  by  violence,  seized  authority  in  those 
places,  in  which  the  Japanese  armed  forces  are  in  con- 
tjol.  However,  this  first  test  step  on  the  road  of  the 
conquest  of  Siberia  is  not  an  isolated  fact.  The  Jap- 
anese Government  distributes  among  its  own  capitalists 
the  fishing  rights  in  the  waters  of  Kamchatka,  which 
rights  have  hitherto  belonged  to  the  Russian  coopera- 
tives and  to  others  of  our  citizens.  Japan  has  intro- 
duced her  own  control  there  and  has  seized  the  revenues 
accruing  from  the  Kamchatka  fisheries ;  this  constitutes 
an  act  of  arbitrary  seizure  and  plunder  of  Russia's 
wealth,  which  the  Russian  Government  considers  a  vio- 
lation of  the  elementary  rights  of  the  popular  masses 
of  Russia.  At  the  same  time,  with  the  aid  of  Japanese 
armed  forces,  the  remnants  of  the  counter-revolutionary 
bands  of  Semenov  and  Kappel  retain  their  positions  on 
the  boundaries  of  China  and  continue  to  occupy  the 
Chinese  Eastern  Railroad.  Only  with  the  assistance 
of  Japanese  auxiliaiy  troops  are  Ungem's  bands  able 
to  terrorize  Mongolia  and  prepare  their  attacks  against 
the  Russian  Republic.  The  agents  of  the  Japanese 
imperialism  penetrate  even  into  Central  Asia,  attempt- 
ing to  start  insurrections  there,  while  the  emissaries  of 
the  Turkestan  counter-revolutionary  elements  gather  in 
Japan  in  order  to  work  out  their  plans  in  common. 

The  Russian  Republic  has,  on  a  number  of  occasions, 
offered  peace  to  the  Japanese  Government,  and  yet,  in 
spite  of  all  of  Russia's  efforts  toward  peace,  the  Jap- 


APPENDIX  173 

anese  Government  is  at  the  present  time  the  initiator 
of  a  new  interventionalist  campaign,  directed  against 
the  rule  of  the  Russian  workmen  and  peasants. 

The  Soviet  Government,  expressing  the  will  of  the 
Russian  masses,  warns  the  Japanese  Government  that 
the  great  popular  masses  of  Russia,  having  taken  their 
fate  into  their  own  hands  and  having  repelled  all  the 
attacks  of  their  enemies,  will  he  able  to  conduct  vic- 
toriously this  new  struggle,  and  will  make  those  who 
have  attacked  them  feel  their  strength  more  than  suf- 
ficiently. 

However,  the  responsibility  for  these  inimical  acts 
cannot  be  laid  at  the  door  of  the  Japanese  Government 
alone.  There  are  proofs  to  the  effect  that  the  French 
Government,  in  its  irreconcilable  enmity  toward  the 
rule  of  workmen  and  peasants  in  Russia,  is  one  of  the 
active  instigators  of  this  new  interventionalist  campaign 
and  takes  part  in  Japan's  plans  of  conquest  in  Siberia. 
Soviet  Russia  cannot  but  consider  all  the  powers  of  the 
Entente  morally  responsible  for  this  new  link  in  the 
chain  of  intervention,  which  is  a  product  of  the  collec- 
tive workmanship  of  the  Entente  powers.  It  considers 
this  on  the  part  of  the  British  Government  as  a  mani- 
festation of  inimical  activity,  entirely  out  of  keeping 
with  the  Anglo-Russian  Agreement. 

The  Russian  Government  protests  most  energetically 
against  these  acts,  directed  against  Russia  herself  or 
through  the  Far  Eastern  Republic  which  is  friendly 


174  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

witli  her  as  an  intermediary  stage,  and  retains  the  right 
to  draw  from  this  the  inevitable  conclusions. 

The  People's  Commissary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Chicherin. 


2.    BU8SIA  AND   CHINA. 

A.    THE   EUSSO-MOITGOLIAN-CHmESE 
AGREEMENT  OF  1915. 

[Text  of  Articles  1  to  8.] 

Article  1. 

Outer    Mongolia    recognizes    the    Chinese-Russian 

Declaration  and  the  Notes  exchanged  between  China 

and  Russia  on  the  5th  day  of  the  11th  month  of  the 

2nd  year  of  the  Republic  of  China  (October  23,  1913). 

Article  2. 
Outer  Mongolia  recognizes  China's  suzerainty,  China 
and  Russia  recognize  the  autonomy  of  Outer  Mongolia, 
forming  part  of  Chinese  territory. 

Article  3. 
Autonomous  Mongolia  has  no  right  to  conclude  inter- 
national treaties  with  foreign  powers  respecting  political 
and  territorial  questions.  As  regards  questions  of  a 
political  and  territorial  nature  in  Outer  Mongolia,  the 
Chinese  Government  engages  to  conform  to  Article  2  of 
the  Note  exchanged  between  China  and  Russia  on  the 


APPENDIX  175 

5tli  day  of  the  11th  month  of  the  2iid  year  of  the 
Eepublic  of  China  (October  23,  1913). 

Article  4. 
The  title  "Bogdo  Cheptsun  Damba  Ku-tukh-tu  Khan 
of  Outer  Mongolia"  is  conferred  by  the  President  of 
the  Eepublic  of  China.  The  calendar  of  the  Republic 
as  well  as  the  Mongol  calendar  of  cyclical  signs  are  to 
be  used  in  official  documents. 

Article  5. 
China  and  Russia,  in  conformity  with  Articles  2  and 
3  of  the  Sino-Russian  Declaration  of  the  5th  day  of 
the  11th  month  of  the  2nd  year  of  the  Republic  of 
China  (October  23,  1913),  recognize  the  exclusive  right 
of  the  Autonomous  Government  of  Outer  Mongolia  to 
attend  to  all  the  aifairs  of  its  internal  administration 
and  to  conclude  with  foreign  powers  international 
treaties  and  agreements  respecting  all  questions  of  a 
commercial  and  industrial  nature  concerning  autono- 
mous Mongolia. 

Article  6. 

In  conformity  with  the  same  Article  3  of  the  Decla- 
ration, China  and  Russia  engage  not  to  interfere  in  the 
system  of  autonomous  internal  administration  existing 
in  Outer  Mongolia. 

Article  7. 

The  military  escort  of  the  Chinese  dignitary  at  Urga 
provided  for  by  Article  3  of  the  above-mentioned  Deela- 


176  RUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

ration  is  not  to  exceed  two  hundred  men.  The  military 
escorts  of  his  assistants  at  Uliassutai^  at  Kobdo,  and  at 
Mongolian-Kyakhta  are  not  to  exceed  fifty  men  each. 
If,  by  agreement  with  the  Autonomous  Government  of 
Outer  Mongolia,  Assistants  of  the  Chinese  Dignitary 
are  appointed  in  other  localities  in  Outer  Mongolia, 
their  military  escorts  are  not  to  exceed  fifty  men  each. 

Article  8. 

The  Imperial  Government  of  Russia  is  not  to  send 
more  than  one  hundred  and  fifty  men  as  consular 
guard  for  its  representative  at  Urga.  The  military 
escorts  of  the  Imperial  consulate  and  vice-consulates  of 
Russia,  which  have  already  been  established  or  which 
may  be  established  by  agreement  with  the  Autonomous 
Government  of  Outer  Mongolia,  are  not  to  exceed  fifty 
men  each. 


B.    APPEAL  OF   THE  PROVISIONAL   REVO- 
LUTIONARY   GOVERNMENT    OF 
MONGOLIA. 

[Translation  from  the  Russian  text  published  in  the 
Moscow  Izvestiya,  August  10,  1921.] 

The  People's  Revolutionary  Government  of  Mon- 
golia addresses  to  the  Government  of  the  Russian 
Socialist  Federated  Soviet  Republic  a  request  not  to 
withdraw  the  Soviet  troops  from  the  territory  of  Mon- 


APPENDIX  177 

golia  until  the  complete  removal  of  the  menace  from 
the  common  enemy,  who  is  now  seeking  reinforcements 
in  the  Eastern  Steppes.  The  People's  Eevolutionary 
Government  finds  it  necessary  to  address  this  request 
to  the  Government  of  the  R.  S.  F.  S.  H.,  because  the 
Mongolian  Government  has  not  as  yet  completed  the 
organization  of  the  apparatus  of  the  new  authority. 
The  presence  of  the  Soviet  troops  is  dictated  by  cir- 
cumstances, its  purpose  being  to  preserve  the  security 
of  the  territory  of  Mongolia  and  of  the  frontiers  of  the 
R.  S.  F.  S.  R.  The  People's  Provisional  Revolutionary 
Government  of  Mongolia  is  confident  that  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  R.  S.  F.  S.  R.  will  realize  the  seriousness 
of  the  situation  and  the  common  interest  in  the  defeat 
of  the  common  enemy,  and  will  accede  to  this  request. 
Members  of  the  People's  Revolutionaey 
Government  of  Mongolia, 

BODO. 

Bolyuk-Sai-Khan. 


C.     CHICHERIN'S  REPLY   TO   THE  APPEAL 

OF   THE  PEOPLE'S   REVOLUTIONARY 

GOVERNMENT    OF    MONGOLIA. 

[Translation  from  the  Russian  text  published  in  the 
Moscow  Izvestiya,  August  12,  1921,] 

The  Russian  Soviet  Govei-nment,  in  alliance  with  the 
Government  of  the  Far  Eastern  Republic,  ordered  its 


178  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

tToops,  side  hy  side  with  the  revolutionary  army  of  the 
Provisional  Government  of  Mongolia,  to  deal  a  crushing 
blow  to  their  common  enemy  the  Tsarist  General, 
TJngem,  who  has  subjected  the  Mongolian  people  to 
unprecedented  enslavement  and  oppression,  violated  the 
rights  of  autonomous  Mongolia,  at  the  same  time  threat- 
ening the  security  of  Soviet  Russia  and  the  inviolability 
of  the  territory  of  the  fraternal  Far  Eastern  Republic. 
The  appearance  of  the  Soviet  troops  on  the  territory 
of  autonomous  Mongolia  has  for  its  sole  aim  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  common  enemy,  thus  removing  the  danger 
which  threatens  the  Soviet  territory,  and  safeguarding 
the  free  development  and  self-determination  of  autono- 
mous Mongolia. 

Welcoming  the  first  steps  of  the  People's  Revolu- 
tionary Government  of  Mongolia  on  the  road  toward 
creating  a  new  order  in  its  country,  now  freed  from  the 
enemy  by  common  effort,  the  Russian  Government  notes 
with  great  satisfaction  the  Appeal  addressed  to  it  by 
the  People's  Revolutionary  Government  of  Mongolia, 
which  appeal  expresses  the  wish  that  the  Soviet  troops 
should  not  be  removed  from  the  territory  of  Mongolia 
until  the  complete  destruction  of  the  common  enemy 
shall  have  been  encompassed.  Considering  this  pro- 
posal a  manifestation  of  the  steadfast,  close  and  friendly 
bonds  which  unite  the  liberated  people  of  Mongolia 
with  the  workmen  and  peasants  of  Russia  who  have 
thrown  off  the  yoke  of  the  exploiters,  the  Russian  Gov- 


APPENDIX  179 

ermnent  declares  that  it  recognizes  fully  the  seriousness 
of  the  situation  and  the  common  interest  of  Russia  and 
Mongolia  in  the  destruction  of  the  common  enemy. 
Having  firmly  decided  to  withdraw  its  troops  from  the 
territory  of  autonomous  Mongolia,  which  is  bound  to 
Soviet  Russia  only  by  the  ties  of  mutual  friendship  and 
common  interests,  just  as  soon  as  the  menace  to  the  free 
development  of  the  Mongolian  people  and  to  the  secur- 
ity of  the  Russian  Republic  and  of  the  Far  Eastern 
Republic  shall  have  been  removed,  the  Russian  Govern- 
ment, in  complete  harmony  with  the  People's  Revolu- 
tionary Government  of  Mongolia,  notes  that  this  moment 
has  not  yet  arrived.  In  response  to  the  request  addressed 
to  it  by  the  People's  Revolutionary  Government  of 
Mongolia,  the  Russian  Government  announces  its  deci- 
sion to  give  this  request  complete  satisfaction. 

The  Russian  Government  is  convinced  that,  in  the 
near  future,  by  the  united  efforts  of  the  two  peoples 
who  are  struggling  against  the  violence  of  the  Tsarist 
generals  and  against  foreign  oppression  and  exploitation, 
the  free  development  of  the  Mongolian  people  will  be 
secured  on  the  basis  of  its  autonomy,  and  that,  as  a 
result  of  the  organization  of  the  apparatus  of  popular 
revolutionary  authority  in  Mongolia,  such  authority  will 
be  definitely  established  and  firmly  secured  there. 

The  People's  Commissar  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
Chicherin. 
August  10,  1921. 


180  EUSSIA  IN  THE  FAR  EAST 

D.     SOVIET  NOTE  ON  CHINESE-MON- 
GOLIAN  EELATIONS. 

[Translation  from  the  Russian  text  published  in  the 
Moscow  Izvestiya,  September  lY,  1921.] 

Telegram  sent  bj  the  People's  Commissar  of  Foreign 
Affairs  to  the  President  of  the  Council  of  Min- 
isters and  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
People's  Revolutionary  Government  of  Mongolia, 
Bodo,  dated  September  14,  1921: 

The  toiling  masses  of  Russia  and  the  Workmen- 
Peasants  Government  which  expresses  their  will  greeted 
with  joy  the  establishment  of  the  People's  Revolutionary 
Government  of  Mongolia  and  the  liberation  of  the 
friendly  Mongolian  people  from  a  foreign  yoke  and 
from  the  bloody  rule  of  the  former  Tsarist  General, 
Ungem.  The  glorious  Red  army  of  the  Russian  Soviet 
Republic,  together  with  the  troops  of  the  friendly  and 
allied  Far  Eastern  Republic,  hand  in  hand  with  the 
people's  revolutionary  army  of  Mongolia,  fought  against 
the  enslavers  of  the  Mongolian  people,  who  are  at  the 
same  time  enemies  of  the  workmen  and  peasants  of 
Russia,  and  assisted  in  the  liberation  of  the  Mongolian 
people  from  oppression. 

The  Russian  Government  expresses  its  gratitude  to 
the  People's  Revolutionary  Government  of  Mongolia  for 
the   friendly   feelings   toward   the   toiling   masses   of 


APPENDIX  181 

Eussia  and  toward  the  Soviet  Government  and  for  tlie 
confidence  in  them,  expressed  in  the  Note  of  citizen 
Bodo  of  September  10.  The  Eussian  Government 
shares  the  conviction  of  the  People's  Revolutionary 
Government  of  Mongolia  as  to  the  need  of  establishing 
peaceful  and  business-like  relations  between  Mongolia 
and  China.  It  hopes  that  the  steps  it  is  taking  in  this 
direction  will  lead  to  favorable  results  in  the  near 
future,  provided  the  Mongolian  people  at  the  same  time 
applies  its  right  to  self-determination. 

More  than  once  has  the  Russian  Government  ap- 
proached the  Government  of  China,  both  directly  and 
through  the  representatives  of  the  Tar  Eastern  Republic 
who  were  in  communication  with  the  latter,  with  offers 
to  begin  negotiations  on  this  question.  In  the  near 
future  the  Russian  Government  expects  to  enter  into 
permanent  relations  with  the  Government  of  China  by 
means  of  a  trade  delegation  which  is  being  sent  to 
Peking. 

The  Russian  Government  notes  with  joy  the  readiness 

of  the  Mongolian  People's  Revolutionary  Government 

to  enter  into  negotiations  with  China  on  this  question, 

as  expressed  in  citizen  Bodo's  Note  of  September  10. 

It  hopes   that  the   Chinese   Government  will   receive 

favorably  this  offer,  which  it  will  present  in  the  spirit 

of  good  offices,  in  order  to  remove  the  possibility  of  a 

conflict  between  the  peoples  and  the  governments  of 

Mongolia  and  of  China.  ^ 

°  Chicheein. 


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